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SUMMARY 
Several new areas in aerospace structural reliability were investigated. 
The investigations were directed toward the development of a methodology for 
selecting a combination of structural tests and structural design factors for 
aerospace systems on the basis of optimized expected cost. The optimization 
method involves the use of Bayesian statistics and statistical decision theory 
as exemplified by the work of Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer of the Harvard 
School of Business Administration. 
From the basic theory, a specific model applicable to the problem of 
selecting structural tests and design factors was  developed. This was accom­
plished by establishing the decision to be made as a selection of a test method 
from four alternatives or options and the selection of a design factor from a 
continuous spectrum. The strength of the structure and the loads applied to the 
structure were assumed to be random variables that influence the decision. 
The decision criterion was minimum expected cost , where probabilistic as well 
as deterministic costs were considered. 
Probabilistic strength distributions needed in the decision model 
required new developments. Subjective expert opinion, obtained through mail 
questionnai?es, was used to obtain a strength distribution’for a test option 
where observed &hwere not available. The method of acquiring opinions and 
Le probabilistic models used in the analysis of the opinions were first verified 
1 1 1 1 1 1  
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by a test questionnaire which gave results that could be compared with observed 
data. 
A technique employing Bayesian statistics was used to incorporate new 
information with prior data in obtaining another strength distribution. Labora­
tory test results were used to obtain a prior distribution, and flight data were 
used as new information for revising the prior distribution. 
The methodology developed was applied to several typical aerospace 
structures to illustrate the effect of system’characteristics such as value of 
weight, cost of failure, and cost of testing on the optimum decision. From the 
example problem results, it was concluded that the method provides a reason­
able means of selecting tests and design factors for aerospace structures. 
- - 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Organization of Material. . . . -
The research will be introduced by a brief discussion of some background 
concepts required for understanding the remainder of the work. Following this, 
since the research falls into the broad category of aerospace structural reliabil­
ity, a review of the literature in this area is given. 
In light of this review of previous work, a statement of the research 
problem and the various topics composing the problem is presented in Chapter 
ID, followed by an overview of the method of solution. 
The three major original contributions of the research and several other 
contributing innovations are  presented in Chapters IV through VII. The analysis 
method developed is then applied to several structural assemblies of NASA space 
vehicles in Chapter VIII to illustrate the technique and to show how the system 
characteristics of the various assemblies affect the outcome. 
Some results and conclusions from the research are  discussed in Chapter 
M. Recommendations, particularly in the area of possible further research, 
are  also given in that chapter. Nomenclature for the entire dissertation is given 
in Appendix A. 
4 
1 . 2  Background 
On the following pages certain concepts which are essential to further 
development of the research are briefly outline-'. In most cases, the concepts 
discussed here have developed into common usage and only typical references, 
usually not to the original contributor, a r e  c i t d .  The references mentioned 
generally give a coherent discussion of the idea under consideration, as applica­
ble to the present research. 
1 .2 .1  Reliability 
Tribus 11 credits the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
with the following definition of reliability: the probability of a device perform­
ing adequately for the period of time intended under the operating conditions 
encountered. Some key words and phrases in this definition require careful 
interpretation in the light of each problem. 
Benjamin and Cornell 21 discuss probability as the relative frequency 
of occurrence of an event in repeated trials or, more liberally, as an 
individual's measure of the relative likelihoods of the possible outcomes of an 
experiment. Many have argued, including Tribus [ 11 and McGee [ 31 , that the 
individual's belief about the relative likelihood o r  plausibility of an event is the 
appropriate concept of probability and that the relative frequency interpretation 
is only a special case of this more liberal interpretation. For example, if there 
is to be only one launch of a particular type of spacecraft, there is no such thing 
as a long-run relative frequency in connection with the probability of success. 
The single mission will either succeed o r  fail. Given information about the 
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spacecraft, one might assign a n u d e r  between 0 and 1as a plausibility 
(probability) measure that the mission will be a success. Note that such a 
plausibility measure can include cases where relative frequency is meaningful. 
It is this concept of probability as  a plausibility measure that will be used in 
this research. 
In the reliability context there are two possible events or outcomes -
success and failure. Thus, reliability becomes the decision-maker's assess­
ment of the probability o r  plausibility of success. Since success and failure are 
prescribed to be the only possible outcomes, the following relationship results 
from an axiom of probability as given by Benjamin and Cornel1 [ 21 : 
+ L =  1

pF 
or  
where PF is the probability of failure and L is the reliability or probability 
of success. In this research, probability of failure will be a frequently used 
idea with the understanding that the corresponding reliability is readily obtain­
able from equation (1.1). 
Device is the next word in the definition to be discussed and is the 
identification of the article, component, or system for which the reliability is 
being discussed. The device could range from a single simple tension member, 
to a complete airframe, to an entire fleet of airplanes. 
1111 I 
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The period of time intended and the operating conditions__ _-encountered 
must also be clearly stated. These conditions of operation could range from 
withstanding a single prescribed application of load to survival of all expected 
conditions in a complete airplane service life. 
A precise descriptionof is equally important; 
otherwise, reliability is an ambiguous term. In some situations, the appearence 
of any defect requiring repair would be termed inadequate performance. In 
other instances, only a catastrophic loss of the system is of interest. 
It should be noted that these assertions of the device under consideration, 
the overall conditions of operation, and the description of adequate performance 
should be specified in deterministic form as a prelude to calculating the 
probabilistic quantity, reliability. 
A misunderstanding of any of these assertions can cause a difference in 
reliability of several orders of magnitude. Of course, more detailed probabil­
istic requirements a r e  derived from the specified determinis tic requirements 
in calculating reliability. 
1.2 .2  Resistance and Load 
Two generally accepted and understood ideas of structural reliability 
discussions a re  the concepts of resistance and load, under various names. 
I
Names often used for resistance a re  strength, capacity, and capability. Terms 
used for load a re  s t ress ,  strain, and demand. Generally speaking, the load is 
a measure of the environment acting on the system, and the resistance is a 
measure of the ability of the system to withstand the environment. 
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Frequently, though not always, the load represents effects not under the 
immediate control of the designer, and resistance is visualized as a quality to 
be determined by the designer; that is, the designer is to select a design which 
has a resistance sufficient to withstand the load. For example, the designer may 
be required to select a structural design with sufficient static strength to with­
stand a given static or  quasi-static load. As another examgle, a design may be 
required to have fatigue capability (resistance) to withstand a particular s t ress  
for a given number of cycles. Very simple relationships can be used to denote a 
satisfactory design, as 
R
R Z S  , or  R - S 2  0 , o r -S 2 1 , 
where R is resistance and S is load. Such relationships a re  discussed in 
numerous publications. For example, see Asplund [ 41 , Brewer [ 51, Brown 61 , 
Chilver [ 71 , Disney, Lipson, and Sheth [ 81 , Freudenthal [ 91 , or Su [ 101. 
Complexities arise in the satisfaction of the inequalities of equation 
(1.2)  because of uncertainties in the resistance and load. These uncertainties 
stem From two basic sources. First, there is a natural or  intrinsic uncertainty 
because loads and resistances a re  probabilistic phenomena. Second, the engi­
neer cannot precisely describe the phenomena. Uncertainties can also be 
classified as objective (those that can be expressed in terms of measured data) 
and subjective (those that cannot be or  have not been measured and depend on 
personal assessment) . Uncertainty dictates that a completely rational descrip­
tion of the design adequacy cannot be expressed by equations (1.2) but requires 
8 
probability statements about the inequalities in (1 .2) .  Give9 sufficient infor­
mation about R and S, the engjneer may make the following statements, 
RP [ R r S ] = a !  , o r P [ R - S 2 0 1 = a !  , o r P [ - - l 1 ] = a !  , ( 1 . 3 )
S 
where the first statement, for example, is read, "the probability that R is 
greater than o r  equal to S is a! ." If R and S a re  defined appropriately, then 
a! = L, the reliability. 
i . 2 . 3  Safetv Measures 
In this discussion of safety measures, resistance R and load S are  
-
assumed to be described in terms of statistical parameters, R (mean resist-
-
ance) , S (mean load) , cr R (standard deviation of resistance) , and (r S 
(standard deviation of load). 
The term "safety measure" a s  used in the heading of this section means 
any parameter devised to provide a safety increment between load and resistance. 
Safety factors, safety margins, and safety indices a re  safety measures to be 
discussed in this section. A number of commonly used safety measures a re  
discussed by Kececioglu and Haugen [ 111 . Any safety measure can be regarded 
a s  either a prescribed constant which controls o r  specifies the design o r  a s  a 
variable which describes the status of the design. These a re  actually two 
distinct concepts with subtle differences, and this has caused a considerable 
degree of difficulty in communication. The two concepts will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs in terms of the safety measure known as  the safety 
factor. The safety factor can be expressed a s  follows: 
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where v is the safety factor. In the first concept, this factor is perceived a s  a 
design requirement or design specification and the interpretation would be, "It is 
required that the resistance-to-load ratio be v." It is evident that v is a 
constant in this case, and the equation is ambiguous unless particular values of 
R and S such a s  E and s are  used in the equation. In this case, u is called 
0
the mean or central safety factor and could be appropriately labeled as v. Other 
values of R and S could be used in the specification. For example, 
- PUR
Av =  s + q a  _ -
- RP 
9 ( 1.5)S
S 
where p and q a re  constants, has frequently been used. In this dissertation a 
superscript " o", " A ' 1 ,  or  other identification will always be used to distinguish 
the specified safety factor, and the term, design safety factor, will be used in 
the text. 
In the second concept, the safety factor is a property of the design. 
Equation (1.4) would be interpreted as 'The ratio of resistance to load is u." 
Thus, u is a variable for the second concept, which describes the status of the 
design. If R and S a re  random variables, v is also a random variable, and 
equation (1.4) can be substituted into ( 1.3)  to yield, 
P[vrll = a = L , 
i o  

which directly relates the safety factor to the reliability. 
Another frequently used safety measure is safety margin. -Twodifferent 
definitions of safety margin are as ;'allows: 
S M = R - S  
and 
R
S M = - - l  .P 
A 
% 
Through equation ( 1 . 3 )  the reliability can be calculated directly from definition 
(1.7) as  
L = P [ R  - S 01 = P[SM 2 01 . (1.9) 
Equation (1.8) is used extensively in the aerospace industry and gives the 
fraction by which the design resistance exceeds the requirement, 
The safety index provides another means of specifying or calculating 
structural reliability. Its definition is 
R - S
P =  e (1.10)
d uR + a 2S 
The safety index will be used extensively in this research, It is a relatively new 
concept which was mentioned by Corso in a discussion of Freudenthal's paper 
[121. The concept has been used by Blake [ 131 and Mau and Sexsmith [141. 
11 

Cornel1 1151 suggested its use in a structural code. 
It should be mentioned that in any given situation it would be possible to 
apply any one of the preceding safety measures. The primary factors to be 
considered in selecting the safety measure to be used are convenience and 
communication. The convenience is usually computational. For example, if 
resistance and strength a re  normally distributed random variables, then 
R - S is also normally distributed. This could well lead one to utilize the 
safety margin or safety index for normally distributed R and S. Communica­
tion is a tremendously important aspect which is frequently overlooked. It is 
unlikely that a new research idea will gain widespread acceptance unless the 
results are eventually cast in some form easily recognizable to practitioners 
in the field. This could lead to use of a well-known. safety measure or at 
least to  a demonstration of how the safety measure used relates to a familiar 
measure such as the safety factor recognized by most structural engineers. 
I. 2.4 Structural Testing 
A brief explanation of structural testing will be given here to place it 
in proper context with respect to this dissertation. Small-scale static and 
fatigue tests on specially designed specimens to determine basic material 
properties could properly be called structural tests. However, the kind of 
testing considered here is on a much larger scale. The concern here is with 
the testing of large structural assemblies which make up an airframe, or even 
the testing of the complete airframe itself. This is the type of testing discussed 
12 

by Lowndes and Cavanagh [ 161, Thom=& ;?I, and fiosenfield 1181, which wi l l  
be described as the "baseline" tec:,ing. 
In most airplanes o r  aerospace systems, all structural assemblies of 
the airframe have been tested in the laboratory, either as separate units or  
a; a complete assembly. Both methods have been succes.$ul. If the assemblies 
are tested separately, care must be taken to simulate the boundary conditions 
where the tested structure joins the remainder of the airframe. Because of 
various practical considerations, testing by assemblies has the advantage of 
providing for more refined application of loads and more densely distributed 
instrumentation. If the complete airframe is tested, larger facilities are 
required, loading is less refined, and instrumentation is more sparse. How­
ever, the important boundary condition problem is eliminated. 
Ideally, the testing discussed above is accomplished on an airframe 
built from the same specifications and under the same conditions as the actual 
flight articles. Often, there are compromises in this respect. 
Studies have been made to determine the need for such testing. These 
studies have revealed a failure rate ranging from 32 percent to 65 percent in 
this type of testing; that is, approximately one-third to two-thirds of the test 
articles experience some type of failure at less than predicted failure load, 
as shown by Bouton and Trent 1191, Jablecki 201 , and Thomas [ 171. There 
can be no doubt that full-scale structural testing has been an effective ?Ierror 
discloser" as discussed by Bouton and Trent [ 191 . 
13 

Nevertheless, the increasing size of airplane and aerospace structural 
systems and the complexity of environments such as temperatures applied to 
the systems have encouraged a search for other means of wsurlng structural 
reliability. Lowndes and Cavanagh [161 discuss facility and operational costs 
in testing large high-temperature systems and show that costs could be an 
order of magnitude higher than previous costs for lower temperatures. 
Other methods of testing have been used to some extent, usually as a 
supplement to the testing discussed above. These include model tests (a 
scaling down of the test article s ize) ,  component tests (the testing of individual 
small subassemblies which make up the major assembly), and proof tests 
(the pretesting of each actual flight assembly). These alternative types of 
tests will be expanded in scope and considered as options which could be used 
in place of the tfbaselinefftype of testing previously discussed. 
I. 2.5 Relationship of Safe* =Measures, Testing, and Cost 
Alternatives to the Ifbaselinefttype of testing appear more plausible if 
studied in conjunction with safety measures and cost. To s i n  an understanding 
of the relationships involved, consider some extreme examples. As a first 
example, assume that the design safety measure has been set at a very high 
value ao that even if e r ro r s  exist in the analysis, failure is unlikely. Then 
there is no need for testing, and the test cost has been saved with perhaps no 
decrease in reliability and no increase in  maintenance cost. However, the 
large safety measure is certain to cause weight increases which could perhaps 
be tolerated in some systems but not in others. 
As a second example, assume that testing of not one but several com­
plete airframes identical to the flight article is planned and that design changes 
will be made on all flight articles to correct any deficiencies observed during 
testing. This gives a high assurance that fewer e r ro r s  will remain in the 
design o r  manufacturing after the test program has been completed. Then the 
design safety measure used in the initial design could be much lower, again, 
with no decrease in reliability and no increase in maintenance cost, but with 
the attendant lower weight and increased performance. It is quite possible 
that this increased performance could be well worth the increased test cost in 
some systems. 
Although the baseline method of testing has usually produced acceptably 
reliable systems, there is certainly no proof that it is the best method for all 
systems. Alternative methods deserve careful study. 
i . 2 . 6  Decision Theory 
Statistical decision theory, as exemplified by Pratt, Raiffa, and 
Schlaifer [ 21J , provides an excellent means of studying the complex inter­
relationships discussed above in a quantitative manner. A lengthy discussion 
would be required to present even a rudimentary development of decision 
theory. Instead of embarking on such a development, we will devote this 
section to describing what can be done with the theory. 
Statistical decision theory is one technique which provides a mathe­
matical model for  making decisions in the face of uncertainty. For example, 
the fact that uncertainties exist in loads and resistance has already been 
I 
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discussed, yet a decision may be required on what design safety factor to 
specify. 
The decision-making process is formulated as the process of choosing 
an action , a, from among the available alternative actions, an '  the 
members of the action space, A .  For each possible action the true state of 
nature will yield a certain value, a measure of the consequences of the action. 
For example, the action could be the choice of design safety factor, the state 
of nature could be the reliability and system weight achieved, and the value 
could be the total tonnage of goods deliverable by a fleet of airplanes. 
I3 the true state of nature were known with certainty, one would readily 
calculate the value of each alternative action and select the action with highest 
value. Statistical decision theory provides a method of determining the action 
with the highest expected value when the true state of nature is not known with 
certainty, but probabilistic information is available about the state of nature 
or its constituents. 
Further, if Bayesian statistical methods are used, the probabilistic 
information can be in the form of observed data o r  of the engineer's subjective 
degree of belief. One distinct advantage of the Bayesian approach is that 
experimental data can be combined with the prior information available. It is 
required only that the resulting probabilities represent &e relative likelihoods 
upon which the individual is prepared to base his decision. 
The decision methodology also provides for selecting an experiment 
(or no experiment) from among several candidates which achieves the best 
balance between experiment cost and reduced risk in the action choice. Through 
Bayes' theorem a means is provided for incorporating new data with existing 
data to update probability estimates. 
--.- . . . . .-
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.I Scope of Ljtgrature Review 
The scope of the present research extends into several areas,  such as  
probability, statistics, decision theory, and testing. However, the major 
motivation for the work and the primary thrust of the research is directed 
toward the reliability of aerospace structures. Since it would not be feasible 
to attempt a reasonably complete literature review in all of the areas 
mentioned above, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the area of primary 
emphasis , aerospace structural reliability. 
In some respects, a broad view of the topic of structural reliability is 
included. For example, literature in the field of structural criteria such as 
safety measures is included, whether or not the safety measure is related by 
the author to structural reliability. Also, a number of publications outside 
of the aerospace field, particularly in the area of civil engineering structures 
where a great deal of closely related work has been done, a r e  included if the 
techniques presented can be applied directly to aerospace structures. In other 
respects, the review is restricted to a narrower viewpoint. For example, 
although several important articles on fatigue a re  included, the review in this 
area is by no means complete, because the present research was restricted 
18 

to  the static strength of structures. For the same reason, material on struc­
tural loads is included only as required to make the material on structural 
strength more meaningful. 
The review is conducted in essentially a chronological order.  Excep­
tions to this a r e  made when a grouping of several articles in a closely related 
area improves the continuity of the presentation. The primary purpose of the 
review is to simply relate what was done in each publication, but evaluative 
remarks are sometimes made in relating th; publication to the present 
research. 
2 . 2  Historical Observations 
According to Bouton and Trent [19], the concept of the structural safety 
factor for aircraft dates back to the Wright Flyer, when the Wright brothers 
established as their objective a structural system that would sustain five times 
the weight of the vehicle. It would appear that such a goal may have been some­
what arbitrary and that some rational, quantitative basis for selecting safety 
factors is desirable, but to this date no widely accepted quantitative means of 
selecting structural safety factors has appeared in the aerospace industry. 
In spite of attempts by some engineers to introduce rational means of safety 
factor selection, usually on the basis of reliability analysis, safety factors 
are still arbitrarily selected in many cases,  and the particular values are 
based on precedent and tradition. 
In general, such an approach has produced acceptably reliable 
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structural systems in the past; hence, there has been a great reluctance to 
change the approach. Nevertheless, it has certainly not been proved that no 
better method of selecting safety factors can be devised. It is highly probable 
that some alternate method could produce equally reliable structures with 
better peFformance and at lower cost, o r  possibly, more reliable structures 
with equal performance and cost. 
The phrase safety factor could refer to any parameter used to control 
the strength of a structure relative to the applied load. However, since the 
term "safety factor" has acquired a mora specific meaning, the term "safety 
measure" will be used to refer to such parameters as discussed in Chapter I. 
2 . 3  Contents of the Literature 
Tye 1221 suggested in 1944 that aircraft performance envelopes, 
rather than arbitrary factors, be used to establish yield strength and ultimate 
strength requirements. For example, the ultimate condition could be specified 
as one which occurs once in 100,000 hours and the yield condition one which 
occurs once in 100hours. It was argued that arbitrary factors sometimes 
resulted in physically impossible load conditions. The paper contains 
examples of typical safety factors in use in the 1940's. Evidently, this was a 
transition period in which the yield factor was changing from i . 5  or 1 25 to 
I.125 and the ultimate factor from 2.0 to 1 .5. 
In 1947 Freudenthal published one of his classic papers [231 con­
taining many fundamental concepts of reliability analysis. The safety factor 
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is defined as the ratio of the random variable resistance to the random variable 
load, rather than the ratio of a %&&"m" resistance to a W"u"fload. 
Several topics such as superposition of in�luences, types of loads, temperature 
effects , wind forces , boundary conditions , material properties , and uncertainty 
in dimensions were discussed in analytical form. 
Chilver [7] showed that the frequency of structural failure could be 
calculated by integrating either over increments in the strength of the structure, 
considering the load fixed, or  over increments in load considering the strength 
fixed in each increment. These relationships were shown as sums over 
discrete increments and in integral form. Pugsley 1241 discussed several 
items affecting structural safety, including fatigue, random loading, and 
corrosion effects. The probabilistic effects of strength and loading were 
considered, and the effect of safety factor on the probability of failure was 
shown graphically. A trend toward reducing the reliability problem to one of 
economics was discussed, and a simple cost minimization model, in which 
initial cost and cost of failure were considered, was presented. 
In a 1955 doctoral thesis 1201 Jablecki presented the results of 
static load testing of a large number of aircraft major components. Roughly 
one-half of the components failed at less than design ultimate load. The 
report seems to substantiate the fact that static testing is essential for air­
craft structures designed with small safety factors. The linkof safety factors 
to the amount of testing needed has received little attention, in general. The 
publication is a valuable source of information on structural failures, and in 
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many cases, the location and cause of failure were given. Unfortunately, 
strength values of structures sustaining greater than design ultimate load were  
not given, and a strength distribution cannot be developed from the data. It is 
noteworthy that , regardless of the component, almost all failures occurred in 
some type of joint, fitting, cutouts, or some other type of load transition area. 
A general review of the role of safety factors in aircraft structural 
safety was given by Williams [25] . The importance of the ultimate strength 
test in demonstrating that an aircraft can survive greater than limit load was  
stressed. Williams visualized the ultimate safety factor as an assurance that 
the few aircraft in a fleet which might encounter excessive loads will survive, 
The fatigue or life factor assures that each individual aircraft in t h ~fleet will 
sustain the required load repetitions. 
Freudenthal published a handbook-type exposition on structural 
safety [ 121 in 1956. The relationship of economics to reliability was  intro­
duced. Analytical relationships among several safety measures , statistical 
distributions, and the probability of failure were given. In discussions of the 
paper, the safety index (unnamed at the time) and additional ways to compute 
the probability of failure were  introduced. Asplund [4]exploited the idea that 
some r isk is unavoidable in design and related this r isk to mortality and the 
efficient use of resources. 
A progress report of an ASCE committee on factors of safety 1261 
w a s  written by Chairman O . G .  Julian in 1957. The committee recommended 
the use of two separate factors: a factor of safety and a factor of serviceability. 
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The factor of safety was defined as the ratio of mean collapse resistance to the 
mean load and was to assure a sufficiently high probability that the structure 
would not collapse, The factor of serviceability is a similar ratio, but with 
respect to serviceability rather than collapse. Nomograms and tables were 
given for determining probability of failure versus safety factor for normal 
aild log-normal load and strength distributions. 
In Part I of a United States'Air  Force Report [271, Landes, Wagner, 
and Kriegshauser reviewed the structural requirements and characteristics of 
several missile systems with the goal of developing design criteria on a 
reliability basis. Because of the lack of data to implement such criteria, they 
recommended, on an interim basis, that separate factors be applied to speed, 
quality, and maneuverability instead of applying a single safety factor to 
loads. In Part 11of the report [283 , Ready developed a framework for 
establishing design requirements to achieve a given level of reliability. The 
methodology deals almost entirely with load variability with little attention to 
strength variability. Because of an attempt to make the method all-inclusive, 
it appears very difficult to understand and to use. The report also contains 
some questionable assumptions in the area of probability and statistics. 
Nevertheless, it is the first attempt to develop structural criteria adaptable 
to very complex environmental conditions. 
Su [ I O ]  , Brown [61 , and Svensson [291 discussed means of combining 
the variability of several effects such as strength, loads, dimensions, and 
environments to obtain a single safety factor. For example, Brown combined 
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a factor on loads, a factor on strength, and a factor on social consequences 
into a single safety factor to be multiplied by a characteristic load value to 
establish a characteristic strength value. 
Although a few authors had mentioned the possibility of optimizing 
reliability toward some desired goal such as minimum costs, it appears that 
Hilton and Feigen contributed the first analytical structural optimization 
problem in reliability [30]. Their problem was to minimize the weight of a 
structure for a preassigned probability of failure. To accomplish this , 
Gaussian distributions for loads and strength were assumed. The weight of 
the structure and the probability of failure were both expressed as functions of 
the member areas, and the problem was  formulated as a minimization of the 
member weights with the prescribed probability of failure as a constraint. It 
was shown that the heavier structural members should be assigned relatively 
higher individual failure probabilities to achieve minimum weight. 
Freudenthal [ 91 published a method for calculating reliability when 
the combined effects of fatigue and ultimate failure a re  considered. The 
reliability was expressed as a function of the life of the structure in terms 
of the number of load repetitions for both fatigue and ultimate failure. By 
assuming independence of the two failure modes, the combined probability of 
failure was obtained by adding the two contributions. The probability of 
ultimate failure was considered constant over the life, but the probability of 
fatigue failure increased with the number of  load repetitions. Freudenthal 
recognized that the assumption of independence of the failure modes may not 
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hold in many cases, since a fatigue-damaged structure is more susceptible to 
ultimate load failure. However, if the dependence of the failure modes is 
recognized in the analysis, ultimate strength data on fatigue-damaged struc­
tures a re  required in the analysis, and these data are not normally available. 
Structural reliability as a probabilistic phenomenon was discussed 
by Bouton 1311 , who pointed out that the probability of survival is an 
appropriate quantitative measure of reliability. The conflict of influences 
tending to increase reliability (economics of failure of the system) and 
influences tending to decrease reliability ( system weight) were recognized. 
The author indicated that the selection of an appropriate reliability is primarily 
economic in nature but considered the analysis required to perform such a cost 
optimization impractical at that time. The effect of variability in loads and 
strength on reliability was discussed, and the results of some example 
problems were shown, but the method of calculation was not given. A flow 
chart showing the various factors that influence component strength and the 
environment of the component, and hence determine the reliability, was 
developed. 
A unique method of characterizing loading was given by Leve [32] 
In this method, the loading is characterized by a set of deterministic life 
histories, and the reliability over an individual life history is the minimum 
value attained along the history. The total reliability is obtained by summing 
the products of the individual reliabilities and their probability of occurrence. 
It was also shown in this paper that an assumption of independence of failure 
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of individual members is invalid if the loading in the members is not independ­
ent. Techniques for apportioning reliability were also discussed, and a 
modification of the Hilton-Feigen model [301 was suggested? which accounts 
for dependence of the failure modes. 
The reliability analysis and allocation methods advocated by Leve 
hinge on the idea that there are only a few predominant failure modes in a 
complex structure and that other failure modes, less likely to occur, are 
associated with these predominant modes. Only the predominant modes are 
assumed independent. The result of such an approach is that the overall 
reliability goal for a structure can be achieved with lower individual member 
reliabilities, yielding a lower structural weight than an assumption of inde­
pendence of all failure modes. The problem with such an approach appears. 
to be that the predominant failure modes must be known a priori, whereas in 
many instances oversights o r  e r rors  by the designer is a major contributor 
to unreliability as discussed by Bouton and Trent [19]. 
Possible alternatives in testing large airframes were  discussed by 
Lowndes and Cavanagh [ 161. The rapidly escalating cost of full-scale testing, 
primarily due to more severe thermal environments ? was discussed. The 
continued need for full-scale testing was substantiated by datawhich showed 
that failures occurred in many static test programs of aircraft between 1940 
and 1963. The authors pointed out that testing is effective in determining 
marafacturing effects ? determining analytical deficiencies ? and disclosing 
human errors .  
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Four alternative methods of testing were reviewed with regard to 
their effectiveness in performing the above functions. These are' ( I)loading 
the entire vehicle but heating only local areas, ( 2) separating into components 
and heating and testing each separately, ( 3) testing to higher than flight loads 
with lower than flight temperatures, and 14) model testing. No conclusion 
was reached as to the best alternative. It should be mentioned that component 
testing was successfully used by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis­
tration in the Saturn program as discussed by Thomas [ 171 The problem of 
boundary conditions where the test component joins the res t  of the airframe 
was usually overcome by building a test fixture with stiffness to simulate 
the adjoining structure or actually using a part of the adjoining structure as 
part of the test fixture. 
A linear-perturbation method of reliability estimation and weight 
optimization was published by Broding, Diederich, and Parker [33].  Relia­
bility was related to safety factor by assuming that the safety factor is a 
normally distributed random variable. In the linear perturbation method, 
weight and safety factor are expressed as linear functions of the design 
variables through a Taylor series expansion about some reference values in 
the range of interest. The weight is then minimized with respect to each 
design variable such as strength or thickness, with a probability of failure 
for each mode of failure as constraints. The authors stated that the approach 
could be extended to the case of a prescribed overall reliability. The method 
appears to be useful when the interest is in optimizing on several design 
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variables and safety factor and weight are approximately linear functions of 
the design variables in the range of interest. In an example problem, tempera­
ture,  allowable strain, coefficient of thermal expansion, and elastic modulus 
are treated as design variables. 
Switzky [ 341 produced an analysis procedure for minimizing weight 
of components with a constraint on the overall probability of failure. This was 
accomplished by assuming that the ratio of any given component weight to the 
total weight is independent of the probability of failure for small probabilities 
of failure. Normal distributions of load and strength were used, and the 
probability of failure was expressed as the inverse of the cumulative distribu­
tion of the safety index. The mean safety factor was shown explicitly as a 
function of the probability of failure and the load and strength coefficients of 
variation. The weight minimization w a s  accomplished using a Lagrange 
multiplier technique for the constrained minimization problem. A technical 
note by Ghista [35] also addressed the problem of weight minimization with 
a probability of failure constraint. The suggested trial-and-error technique 
for solution yielded satisfactory results for a two-member example problem. 
A survey paper by Coutinho [36] reviewed basic statistical and 
reliability concepts and discussed some government reliability specifications 
and their applicability. An interesting breakdown of types of failure and the 
responsibility for each was given: initial failures a re  usually traceable to 
manufacturing and quality control, wear-out failures to maintenance, and 
random failures to design. The philosophy and operational aspects of 
I 1. I .. . 
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reliability assurance engineering were discussed. Coutinho listed the four 
major causes of unreliability as: 
1. Lack of reliable methods for predicting operating environments. 
2. Unit-to-unit variations in resistance (within specification). 
3. Design errors .  
4. Manufacturing errors .  
A qualitative comparison of the relative reliability of different types of aero­
space systems was given. Airframes are credited with the highest reliability 
and electronics the poorest. However, it should be mentioned that alternate 
o r  redundant electronic systems can usually be provided at much less cost 
and weight increase than structural systems. 
Mooa, Shinn, and Hyler [37]discussed the determination of design 
allowables for Military Handbook 5 [38];the primary source of materials 
strength data in the aerospace industry. statistical techniques for determining 
allowable strengths on a probability basis, the use of specification values and 
typical values, the derivation of design allowables for a given property from 
closely related properties, and the determination of allowables at other than 
room temperature were discussed. 
A final report of the Task Committee on Factors of Safety, American 
Society of Civil Engineers, was written by Freudenthal, Garrelts, and 
Shinozuka [39]. This is an extremely useful reference which defined 
commonly used terms in reliability and gave concise derivations of 
important structural reliability relationships for numerous cases. As would 
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be expected for this type of report, much of the material had been developed 
and published earlier, but this publication brought the information together in 
an easy-to-use handbook style. The report will be frequently referenced in 
this research, especially where it concisely states some commonly accepted 
principle that has been gradually developed by a number of contributors. 
The task committee defined the safety factor as the ratio of resist­
ance to load, and since resistance and load are random variables, the safety 
factor is also a random variable. The report showed how to treat multiple 
member structures under multiple load cycles. This was done for the case 
that resistance and load are independent of the number of load applications 
and for the case that one or both depends on the number of previous load 
applications. Consideration was given to loads applied at specified times 
(life is measured in number of load applications) and to loads governed by a 
Poisson law (life is measured in time). Fatigue was treated by the residual 
strength concept, where resistance is a decreasing function with number of 
load applications. 
Evidently, the first attempt at recommending specific safety factors 
for aerospace structures that vary depending on the desired reliability and the 
nature of the design was made by Bouton, Trent, and Chenoweth 1401. These 
authors developed, based on statistical analyses, a matrix of safety factors to 
be used under various conditions. To select the appropriate safety factor, 
one of three overall reliability objectives is chosen: 0 .99  for high-risk 
vehicles, 0 e 9999 for  standard vehicles, and 0.999999 for low-risk vehicles. 
Beyond this, the safety factor selected depends upon the expected strength 
scatter in the structure under consideration (four classes are listed) and 
whether the loads and strength are verified by test. The recommended safety 
factor ranges from i. 15 for a high-risk vehicle, with small scatter in strength 
and loads and strength verified by test, to 4.0 for all structures not verified 
by strength test and all structures with large strength scatter and no test 
verification of loads. The approach seems to be a very reasonable step beyond 
the usual practice of arbitrary selection of safety factors, and it is surprising 
that the approach o r  some variation thereof has not come into general use in 
the aerospace industry. Perhaps the reluctance to use the method stems from 
the a priori judgments which must be made: selection of a reliability goal and 
determination of strength variability. The present research contributes to a 
rational means of resolving this problem through the use of decision theory. 
Statistical analysis of fail-safe designs was considered by Shinozuka 
and Itagaki 1411. It was shown in an example problem, which could ideal­
istically represent a three-spar wing, that the probability of survival after 
failure of one member is undesirably low (in the range of 0.20 to 0.33)  , even 
for a ductile material. The failure condition considered was yielding of the 
structure, and the authors indicated that different conclusions could be 
expected for a fatigue failure mode. 
An article by Turkstra [421 discussed the choice of design from a 
set of designs with equal functional value based on minimization of expected 
loss. The basic idea offered was that, within a reasonable approximation 
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under certain conditions, only bounds on reliability of the candidate designs a r e  
needed, and the design selected should be the one with minimum cost which 
has a reliability within a prescribed value; that is, all designs with reliability 
falling within the prescribed reliability a re  equally acceptable, regardless of 
the exact reliability. This can considerably simplify cost optimization calcula­
tions. The costs considered were initial costs and the expected cost of failure. 
Initial cost was  assumed to be a linear function of the mean safety factor. 
Turkstra's method would be very limited in aerospace applications, since the 
assumption of equal functional value for all structures would rarely apply. 
For example, the functional value of aerospace structures depends greatly 
on the weight of the structure, which is a function of the safety factor. Thus, 
designs with different safety factors have distinctly different functional values, 
because increased weight in the structure usually results in decreased payload 
weight. 
A paper by Moses and Kinser [43] gave computational methods for 
multiple member structures under multiple load conditions. The authors 
emphasized the bounds on reliability and the relationship of the bounds to the 
degree of dependence among the failure modes. Computations of the reliability 
were made, using the known dependence of failure modes, for comparison with 
the bounds when complete independence, then complete dependence, of the 
failure modes were assumed. It was concluded that the essential relationship 
which controls the dependence, assuming that loads on all members arise from 
a common source, is the load variability compared with the strength variability. 
I 
- ., . , .... 
32 

A small relative variability of load leads to statistical independence, and a 
large variability of load relative to strength variability leads to statistical 
dependence. 
It was clearly demonstrated in the paper that an assumption of 
independence of failure modes , when dependence actually exists, can cause a 
significant underprediction of reliability. However, the particular example 
problem chosen seems to amplify the effects of such an assumption because of 
the low reliabilities involved. For more typical, higher reliability, the 
difference in predictions using assumptions of dependence and independence 
would not differ so much. 
Weight optimization with a constraint on the probability of failure , 
which was examined by Hilton and Feigen [30]and Switzky [34],was treated 
by Moses and Kinser [44]with dependence of failure modes considered. They 
showed that additional reduction in weight can be achieved if the assumption of 
the independence of failure modes is discarded in favor of a more exact 
treatment. 
A book by Pugsley [451 treated the subject of structural safety in 
an easy-to-read fashion. Several chapters dealt with elementary structural 
cbncepts and analysis, followed by a discussion of the variability in strengths 
and loads and the r isk of failure. The safety rules (or design codes) used to 
obtain safe structures were then discussed. An interesting chapter on "Some 
Famous Accidents" illustrated some of the conditions which can result in 
unsafe structures. 
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An excellent treatise of the bounds on structural reliability was given 
by Cornell [46]. The bounds depend upon the degree of dependence among 
loads and among failure modes. Expressions for upper and lower bounds on 
reliability were first given for a fundamental problem with time-independent, 
equally distributed resistance subjected to a sequence of random loads. A 
generalization was then made to time-dependent loads , time-dependent 
resistance, and unequally distributed resistance. 
Blake [ 131 discussed the direct application of statistical decision 
theory to structural reliability problems. He emphasized the importance of 
the cost effectiveness of a design as opposed to the desirability of the same 
fixed safety factor o r  the same fixed value of reliability for every component 
in a structural design. Relationships were developed for sizing a structural 
design to obtain a reliability such that system effectiveness is maximized. If 
the loads on the system and the strength of the system are  normally distributed, 
the reliability was shown to be related to the safety index, and the optimum 
safety index was tabulated against a measure of the change in system effective­
ness with safety index. 
Blake continued his development by considering the possible loss of 
system effectiveness for nonoptimum safety index. Since exact knowledge of 
effectiveness, safety index, and reliability is not usually available, the 
approach adopted was to minimize the loss in effectiveness for nonoptimum 
choice of the safety index. This leads to a nonoptimum design size with a 
conservative bias. The foregoing preceded a discussion as to whether more 
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information, which would permit selection of a design size nearer the optimum, 
would be worth the cost of such information, and led to a realizatibn that, in 
addition to the intrinsic random nature of design variables affecting reliability, 
there is also uncertainty associated with a lack of complete information. Both 
of these uncertainties should be considered in cost optimization. The author 
also pointed out that the Bayesian approach permits the incorporation of 
subjective judgments with objective data in reaching a design decision. 
Benjamin [47] described the advantages of probabilistic design as 
compared with deterministic procedures. The author envisioned deterministic 
approaches as lacking in informational content, modeling of reality, refinement 
of analysis and design, and decision-making. Illustrations showed that the 
designer is not usually fully aware of the true state of affairs when determ­
inistic approaches are used. A simplified Bayesian-type decision tree was 
presented, illustrating the choice of an optimum building design for earthquake 
loading. 
Bouton and Trent [ I 9 1  elaborated on the ideas initially set forth by 
Bouton, Trent, and Chenoweth 1401. They described in great detail how a 
variable safety factor requirement could be incorporated into the technical 
and contractual management of aerospace systems and made an extensive 
evaluation of previous structural cri teria proposals to show that none of these 
could fulfill what they considered the essential requirements of structural 
criteria. Most of the other proposed criteria could not satisfy a requirement, 
considered essential by the authors, that a means of proof of compliance must 
35 

exist for the criteria. For example, if the criterion is that the structure must 
have a certain reliability, then proof of Compliance is virtually impossible 
before the structure is placed in service Thus , structural cri teria which 
specify reliability would not be acceptable to the authors. 
A proposal for separating loads into fflimitlfand ffomegaffconditions was 
presented. The limit condition is a load at which the structure is expected to 
survive, and the omega condition is a load, possibly caused by malfunction of 
other systems , beyond which the structure is not expected to survive. 
The primary thrust of the work by Bouton and Trent was an advocation 
of changes in the present safety factor system for airframes. They showed 
how structural reliability fits into the total system approach, and emphasized 
the need for establishing exactly what is expected of the structural system and 
design and test procedures for obtaining and measuring compliance with what 
is expected. The system created by them utilizes deterministic safety factors 
for analysis and testing which have been established by probabilistic tech­
niques. The approach retains the advantage of having designers and analysts 
working with a given safety factor but also has the advantage that the safety 
factor has been determined in a rational manner. The basic premise for 
setting the safety factor is a reliability goal, but the safety factor also depends 
upon the scatter in strength of like structures and upon the number of tests 
contemplated. 
There can be little doubt that such a comprehensive evaluation and 
thorough proposal was a result of much study and deliberation. It appears that 
the proposed criteria would be workable and would be a significant improvement 
over present practices. It does seem that the authors may have overlooked 
some plausible alternatives because of a preoccuptation with the legalistic 
aspects of the problem. For example, the proof of compliance previously 
mentioned and a requirement that blame for any failure must be traceable may 
be desirable goals but probably should not be permitted to dominate or  mask 
other important objectives . 
Kececioglu and Haugen iI]swnmarized various definitions of safety 
factors, safety margins, and measures of reliability which have been used 
and illustrated the use of some of them. A curve showing reliability as a 
function of safety index for normal distribution of loads and strength was given. 
Disney, Lipson, and Sheth [8] published formulas for determination of the 
probability of failure for several commonly used distributions of loads and 
strength. 
Some simplifications to the Hilton-Feigen model for minimum weight 
[30] were made by Murthy and Subramanian 1481. Some approximations were 
introduced that resulted in a set  of equations which, unlike the Hilton-Fiegen 
model, could be solved without iteration. Some results in an example problem 
using the approximate solution had a close correspondence to the exact 
solution. 
Shinozuka presented a model for weight-optimized design subject to a 
constraint on expected cost [491. The expected cost consisted of the expected 
cost of failure in service and in proof testing. The proof test was considered 
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to truncate the strength distribution at the proof-test level, and the reliability 
in service w a s  thus enhanced. The optimization was  performed with respect 
to the proof-test load level; that is, a proof-test level which minimized expected 
cost or weight was  the result of the analysis. The procedure was developed for 
both determinant and indeterminant structures. 
The use of statistical decision theory as a tool in design is discussed by 
Cornel1 [ 501 The Bayesian method of incorporating all physical, parameter, 
and model uncertainties into a single probability law was emphasized, since 
such a law can be used directly in design decisions and reliability estimates. 
A qualitative description of the residual strength concept of fatigue was  
given by Bouton and Trent [51] a The basis of the concept is that fatigue 
failures a re ,  in reality, ultimate strength failures of fatigue-damaged struc­
tures. The analysis of such structures had previously been considered by 
Freudenthal, Garrelts, and Shinozuka [ 391 ., The relationship of the concept 
to the amount and type of testing required was  discussed. 
Shah [521 advocated a design code in which resistance and load a r e  
recognized as probabilistic quantities. Some of the fundamental aspects of 
reliability and statistics were reviewed. A factor to account for differences 
in laboratory and field strengths was considered. Sexsmith and Nelson [ 531 
discussed the limitatiom in the application of probabilistic concepts to struc­
tural design. Each limitation mentioned was accompanied by a discussion of 
how it might be overcome. Some of the limitations examined were problems 
in selecting a model, consideration of subjective information, use of 
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information in making a decision, and confidence limits on reliability. 
A generalization of the classical probability of failure concept as a 
structural criterion was proposed by Ang and Amin [541. A concept of the 
Itprobability of unsafetyflw a s  introduced such that the event (R/S < v) , v L i , 
constitutes a state of unsafety, where R is s t ructural  strength o r  resistance, 
S is the applied load, and v is a factor for uncertainty. For v = I,the 
concept reduced to a conventional reliability analysis. It was proposed that 
the known probabilistic information be incorporated into R and S and that 
account for any remaining dispersions o r  unknowns. The structural require­
ment would then be expressed by the condition P [R/S < v ]  5 a! , where Q is 
the allowable risk. It was further shown that a reasonable and conservative 
choice for a! is pq where p is the probability of having a structure with 
resistance less than a characteristic value, R and q is the probability of 
P' 
occurrence of a load greater than a characteristic value, S 
q' 
The principal advantages of the approach a re  that it separates the 
uncertainty into subjective and objective parts and it makes the design much 
less sensitive to the assumed distributions of R and S if a! is chosen as 
pq. The disadvantage of the approach seems to be that it involves several 
somewhat arbitrary choices ( v ,  p, and q) instead of one choice, for instance, 
a level of reliability. It also appears that Bayesian statistics may be a more 
consistent way to introduce subjective uncertainties than the proposed method. 
A structural design code was suggested by Cornel1 [15] in which the 
safety factor selected depends only upon the means and coefficients of variations 
v 
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of resistance and load, but not upon their specific probability distributions. To 
apply the method, however, a value of the safety index p must be selected, 
evidently somewhat arbitrarily. The author suggested that P be specified in 
the code and that its value depend upon the consequences of failure. 
Yao and Yeh [55] concentrated upon developing a procedure for system­
atically counting the failure paths in a redundant structure in the formulation of 
a reliability analysis. 
Thomas [171 summarized the test results for large structural assem­
blies in the Saturn V launch vehicle system and gave a rationale for determ­
ining safety factors for structures which would not be tested. The Saturn V 
test data confirmed the trend of the Jablecki data [20] in showing that struc­
tural failures are to be expected frequently in static testing of large assem­
blies. Such failures were seen as er ror  disclosures by Bouton and Trent [ 191 
and are usually attributed to analysis inaccuracies or er rors .  The Saturn V 
data showed a trend toward more accurate analysis as compared with the 
Jablecki data which were compiled from tests in the 1940's. 
An analysis of the Jablecki data was performed by Chenoweth [56] to 
determine the safety factor which would be required for untested structures. 
The analysis showed that large safety factors (in a range from 4 to 11) would 
be required to assure  a reliability of 0.9999 in sustaining limit load. Although 
the conclusions of the paper are generally acceptable, the definition of 
reliability as the probability of sustaining limit load is inadequate for quantita­
tive decision methods. In a more refined analysis, the probabilistic aspects 
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of the loading should be considered, and reliability should be defined in terms 
of the probability of failure in service. This would undoubtedly result in lower 
required factors of safety than those shown in Chenoweth's paper, since limit 
load is usually considerably larger than the expected load. 
Stevenson and Moses [57] presented an analysis method for determining 
the probability of failure in structures for which the failure mechanism is 
expressed as a linear combination of several resistances and loads. The 
method was applied to the limit design of frames in which the resistances were 
the plastic hinge moment capability of joints and the loads were applied to 
various points of the frame. It was  shown that variance in strength and load 
has a large effect on reliability, that the particular form of statistical distribu­
tion assumed has a small effect for high failure probabilities and a large 
effect for low failure Probabilities, and that the dependence between failure 
modes is not very significant if the dependence is weak. 
A paper by Shah and Tang [581 developed a procedure for determining 
load factors. One criterion used was cost, based on a simple model consisting 
of construction cost and expected cost of failure. A summary of the views of 
several European committees studying structural safety was given by Rowe 
[59 ] .  The basic approach was deterministic, but the deterministic factor may 
be developed from several sources of uncertainty which could be represented 
probabilistically . 
Optimum design with respect to weig%twith a constraint on the prob­
ability of failure was the subject of a paper by Moses and Stevenson [60 ] .  The 
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application was to both elastic design and limit design of frame structures. 
The problem was similar to that addressed by Hilton and Feigen 1301 Switzky 
[341 and Moses and Kinser [44] except that limit design failures were 
considered. 
Ghare 1611 discussed the perogative of the designer in trading off the 
safety factor used in design with the quality factor associated with production 
to obtain a required reliability within prescribed resources 
An ultimate strength analysis of more than 300 data points of different 
types of aircraft structures and components was presented in terms of test  
strength compared with analytical strength 1621 by Freudenthal and Wang. 
A comparison with the Jablecki data 1201 showed some improvement in 
analytical prediction. The data were used in two reliability analyses of air­
craft by disregarding the fact, recognized as questionable by the authors, that 
strength deficiencies discovered in tests would be rectified. 
Blume 1631 discussed the philosophy of public safety in civil structures 
and the consideration of economic and safety trade-offs. The paper was  a 
discussion only, with no analysis given. In the same volume , Freudenthal [641 
discussed similar questions and suggested a model for selecting reliability 
based on minimizing the total expected loss. The expression for loss accounted 
for initial costs (which may be a function of reliability) and expected cost of 
failure, the product of cost of failure and probability of failure. 
Carnahan published an investigation of the reliability growth in orbital 
launches from 1958 to 1968 1651. Data in this article showed that the overall 
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reliability has grown from about 50 percent in 1958 to about 95 percent in 
1966-1968 and has leveled off at about 95 percent. The causes of $ailure were 
examined and found to be almost entirely hardware related, as opposed to 
personnel o r  procedural. Ninety percent of the failures were mechanical, 
and of these 48 percent were  in nonmoving parts. The author defended 
component testing as the least expensive means of increasing launch reliability. 
An excellent review of statistical me3nds in fatigue was given by 
Wirsching and Yao [661. Emphasis was on vai-ious ways of presenting fatigue 
data and the use of the Weibull distribution for representing fatigue life. An 
estimation of parameters for the two-parameter and the three-parameter 
distribution was discussed and illustrated. The graphical method, the method 
of moments, and the maximum likelihood method were presented. 
Ang 1671 further developed the concept of unsafety introduced by Ang 
and Amin [ 541 . The concept is that separate devices a r e  used to account for 
subjective and objective uncertainties. Subjective uncertainties a re  taken 
into account by the conventional technique of requiring that some characteristic 
value of resistance is equal to the product of a safety factor and a character­
istic value of the applied load. Objective uncertainty is considered by 
requiring that the probability that the desired subjective safety factor exists 
be a predetermined value. This value is called the probability of unsafety . 
Ang recommended that a log-normal distribution always be used for the 
subjective safety factor, based on physical grounds. When this is done, the 
objective probability of unsafety becomes much less sensitive to the assumed-
43 

statistical distribution of resistance apd load than would exist if all uncertainty 
is incorporated into the probability of unsafety. It should be noted that two 
separate deterministic selections must be made to apply the method: a safety 
factor and a desired probability of unsafety. 
An extension of the Shinozuka model [491 was presented by Heer  and 
Yang [68] .  The area of extension w a s  in the application to designs susceptible 
to brittle fracture in which the growth of flaws due to cyclic and sustained 
loading was considered. The effect of the flaw growth is to lower the struc­
tural resistance with use of the structure. In the optimization procedure, 
weight was optimized with a constraint on the total expected cost. The predic­
tion of the reliability of structures subjected to stationary random excitations 
was considered by the same authors (691. The degradation of resistance by 
the loading history was considered in the reliability prediction. The applica­
tion of the random loading was to a single-degree-of-freedom system, along 
with other quite restrictive assumptions. 
In a philoaophical paper [70] in 1971, Lind formalized the art of safety 
factor selection and showed that the rationale of several proposed design codes 
can be derived from various combinations of a small set  of postulates. The 
postulates common to all of the proposed codes were first enumerated. For 
example, the consideration of strength as a random variable is one of these 
postulates. Next, the postulates peculiar to the individual code proposals 
were stated. For example, Cornel1 [ I 5 1  postulated that the means and coef­
ficients of variations of loads and resistances should be considered as a 
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sufficient statistical description 
Hardrath 1711 presented an excellent capsulation of the fundamentals 
of fatigue and fracture mechanics and included a bibliography of approximately 
200 sources. The Task Committee on Structural Safety of the ASCE Structural 
Division published a literature review of structural safety- [72]which contains 
a useful bibliography of approximately 400 references. 
A paper by Tang and Yao [ 731 extended the Miner fatigue damage 
criterion such that the fatigue lives (in cycles) at each s t ress  level are treated 
as random variables instead of constants. In this case, the cumulative damage 
itself then becomes a random variable. 
Campion, et al . 1741 evaluated the criteria developed by Bouton and 
Trent [ 191 . The method was reviewed to determine the data required and the 
availability, the implications of such an approach in the structural design 
process, the methods by which the implementation could be achieved without 
discontinuity, and handbooks. A trial application of the procedure was made 
to the C-I41 transport aircraft wing. The evaluators concluded that total 
application of the procedure is premature, essentially because of a lack of 
data for implementation. Additional trial applications to existing systems 
were recommended, along with efforts to collect and develop the required 
data. 
A development with an optimization objective closely paralleling that 
of the present research was presented by Mau and Sexsmith [14]. This was 
a problem of optimizing expected cost as an unconstrained minimization 
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problem. The result was a Bayesian-type decision process, illustrated 
by the authors in a simple decision tree. The entire model was extremely 
simplified to minimize computations. For example, the initial cost of 
the structure was related only to the material costs, failure'modes were 
assumed independent, costs consisted only of initial costs plus the 
expected cost of failure, and load and resistance were assumed normally 
distributed. Permitting different types of testing in the design alternatives 
was not considered. 
Lind [ 751 proposed distribution functions for load and resistance 
composed of a normal central portion and an exponential tail portion 
for reliability calculations. Lind believed that the incorporation of new 
data with prior data by simply recalculating the required statistics was  
simpler than a Bayesian procedure for the proposed distributions. 
Several probabilistic models were reviewed by Heller [ 76 I with 
respect to their representation of component life. The viewpoint was a 
comparison of the physical phenomena to be represented with the properties 
of the models (normal, log-normal, exponential, or Weibull) . It was 
shown that the Weibull model provides a convenient representation of life-
type phenomenaD Graphical means of determining model parameters 
were discussed and illustrated with a fatigue example. This was done for 
both complete samples and for extreme observations. 
A review of statistical methods applicable to structural reliability was 
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given by Lemon [771. The concepts of conceptual models, distributions, and 
parameters were reviewed, including the basic terminology used to  describe 
distributions. A very readable explanation of order statistics was given. 
Point and interval estimation of parameters was explained and ffwithinffand 
f lbetweenflbatch variability was discussed. Chi-square and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness-of-fit tests were  explained. A fairly thorough t rea tmed of 
the Weibull distribution was presented, including illustration of the effects of 
parameters, parameter estimation, distribution of certain functions of the 
parameters, and confidence bz.-.nds on the parameters. 
Forney [ 781 discussed the recent improvements in reliability methods 
for computing fatigu. es; of aircraft structures, particularly the development 
of models for estimating the expected time to the first failures in a fleet. A 
multiphase program of the Air Force Materials Laboratory for reducing 
structural reliability analysis methods to practice was described. One phase 
of the program was concerned with cost and weight trade-offs as affected by 
reliability; this is closely related to the present research. 
Some of the problem areas in structural reliability computation and 
communication were pointed out by Bouton [791. Among these a re  the effect 
of analytical e r rors  and the problem of giving a precise definition to reliability. 
For example, the importance of defining whether the reliability pertains to the 
entire fleet or  to a single aircraft was pointed out, as well as the need for 
carefully defining what constitutes a failure. 
Buntin [SO] discussed a proof-test program currently in use on the 
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F-lii aircraft. The main purpose of the proof-test program is to detect flaws 
in high-strength steel parts in the aircraft which could cause failure during 
service. The program was instituted because an early flight failure was 
attributed to a flaw in a wing-pivot fitting. Basic fracture mechanics and 
proof test concepts were described, including a method of allowing for a yield 
zone at the crack tip. A flow diagram for calculating the probability of 
surviving a given number of flight hours after proof test was shown, but 
analytical details were not given. From a total of 325 operational aircraft 
which were proof tested, two failures occurred during testing, neither related 
to flaws. This demonstrated the ability of proof testing to detect anomalies 
other than flaws. 
A discussion of the latest developments in the U.S. Air Force structural 
integrity program was  presented by Haviland and Tiffany [81]. The discussion 
revealed a trend toward more attention to fatigue and fracture toughness 
problems, a result of encountering such problems on the F-iii and C-5A 
airplanes. Rosenfield [ i s ]  discussed the static test philosophy of the U.S.  
Navy on major aircraft structural assemblies. A review of 161, 171, [ 181, 
[ 191 , I: 201 , [ 621 , and 81I reveals a marked similarity in static structural 
test methods used by the A i r  Force, Navy, and the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 
There can be little doubt that some important contributions in the field 
of structural reliability have not been included in this literature review. How­
ever, it is hoped that the review does include a sufficient number and variety 
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of contributions to provide the reader a beginning point in the pursuit of some 
particular aspect of this many-faceted and interesting field of research. 
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CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, THE SETTING, AND THE 
METHOD OF SOLUTION 
3 . 1  Statement of the Problem 
In this section a concise statement of the research problem, a discussion 
of the related topics to be considered, the problem setting, and an overview of 
the method of solution will be outlined. 
3 . 1 . 1  Concise Statement of the Research Problem 
The need for structural testing of aerospace structural systems has been 
shown separately by Freudenthal and Wang [ 621, Jablecki [ 201, and Thomas [ 171. 
Their results show that one-third to two-thirds of the tested structures f a i l  at a 
load lower than that predicted by the analysts. The terms "analyst's predicted 
failure load" or "design ultimate load" have been used to designate the actual load 
predicted by the analysts at which failure is predicted to take place. N o  safety fac­
tors are  included in this load. Aerospace structural testing is expensive, and the 
sample sizes are  usually small. In addition to the influence of structural testing 
on the cost of the structural system, a prescribed safety measure also influences 
the cost through its effect on reliability and performance. Safety measure has 
been used as a general term meaning the safety factor, reliability measure, 
safety index, or other variable used to control the strength of the design. 
The research program discussed in this dissertation is to develop a 
methodology for selecting a suitable test option and an appropriate safety 
measure based on optimized expected cost, In the course of the development 
two additional problems have been considered, the solutions to which were 
required to provide information needed as input to the cost optimization model. 
1. In preliminary design and in making design decisions on the test 
options and safety measures based on optimized expected cost, i t  is necessary 
to estimate the probabilistic strength o r  failure distribution before testing has . 

actually been carried out and the observed data become available. In this 
dissertation a methodology will  be developed to systematically obtain the 
subjective expert opinion by using mail questionnaires and to use the answers 
to these questionnaires to represent the probabilistic strength distribution 
analytically. These investigations and developments are discussed in 
Chapter V. 
2, In developing the methodology to select the test option and safety 
measure, it is necessary to update the probabilistic strength distributions as 
new data become available in the form of test  data o r  flight experience. 
Furthermore, any procedure for updating should be adapted to the structural 
testing procedure used in the aerospace industry, which will be discussed in 
Chapter IV, This has been accomplished using Bayesian techniques and is 
discussed in Chapter VI. 
Several individual, closely related topics must be investigated and 
placed in a proper relationship to, each other in the research program. Each 
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topic is underlined in the following text. 
The first  topic to be discussed is "structural testing. I' The topic can 
perhaps best be introduced by examining an almost universally used st ructural  
test procedure which may be regarded as a "stakidardT'procedure. An examina­
tion of Thomas [ 1'71, Rosenfeld [ 181, and Bonton and Trent [ 191 shows that 
such a procedure is used by the United States Air Force, the Navy, and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration in testing airframes. This 
standard procedure consists of testing one full-scale specimen of each of the 
major structural assemblies which compose an airframe. The testing is 
accomplished by applying static loads to the assem5ly with hydraulic cylinders, 
weights, airbags, etc. Ideally, the test article is constructed from the same 
design drawings as the flight articles. Often, tk -* , t :  a r e  compromises in this 
respect. If a failure occurs at less than the predicted failure load, a design 
change is made, and a retest is accomplished. This procedure is iterated 
until one design "passes" the test, and the successful design is then used in 
production airframes. To permit a lucid description, the above procedure has 
been highly idealized. 
In some aerospace programs, records have been kept which give some 
insight into the levels at which failure can be expected in such testing. 
Freudenthal and Wang [ 62 1 , Jablecki [ 20 I , and Thomas [ 1 7  1 present such 
records. The failure levels in certain groups of structures are illustrated by 
the cumulative distribution functions (CDF'S) plotted in Figure 1. The CDF's 
for the recent aircraft data and the aircraft data from the 1940's a re  incomplete 
52 
-
0 30- 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 
PERCENTAGE OF DESIGN ULTIMATE LOAD 
Figure 1. Failure Data for Structural Assemblies. 
because the data were preserved only for assemblies which failed at  less than 
100 percent of design load. 
Although the difference between the 1940 data and the more recent 
results indicates a significant improvement in analytical accuracy, the role of 
the standard static test as an e r ro r  discloser is still very evident. It is 
important to realize that the distributions in Figure 1do not represent the final 
product, since the standard procedure requires a design change and a retest of 
any structure failing to achieve design ultimate load. Although some uses have 
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been made of test  and flight data, no procedure has been developed in the 
aerospace industry to analytically update the strength distribution after redesign, 
retest, and flight experience. Bayesian techniques will be used to develop such 
a distribution in the present research, 
The standard test procedure has been effective in producing acceptably 
reliable structural systems. However, as pointed out in Chapter I, there is no 
evidence that it is the most cost-effective procedure for every system, 
especially if the prospect of varying the design safety measure is admitted. 
Alternatives to the standard procedure wil l  be introduced and discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
To use statistical decision theory in selecting a particular test option 
from various available test  options, it is necessary to know the probabilistic 
representation of the structural strength distribution for each proposed test 
option. For example, one of the CDF's in Figure 1could be taken to represent 
the strengths before any redesigns are  applied to the understrength assemblies. 
Beyond this simplest case, no observed data have been located to calculate 
strength distributions for other test options. However, Bayesian procedures 
[ 21, for example, permit the use of any available information - observed or  
subjective - in obtaining strength distributions or  in other elements of the 
decision process. 
Furthermore, even for test  procedures where no observed data have been 
accumulated, the subjective belief of the decision-maker can be used to establish 
a distribution for the purpose of making a decision. Collective expert opinion 
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has been used to establish probability data for oil spills [ 821 , by Nair, Shah, 
Smith, and Shah. A similar technique will  be developed in the present research 
program on structural reliability. The accuracy of such a procedure will be 
established by direct comparision of some subjective distributions obtained 
from expert opinions with the available observed data, such as shown in 
Figure 1. 
Once particular distributions of strength have been established for the 
various test options, a second design variable under the control of the designer 
can be exercised. This is the design safety measure as  discussed in Chapter I. 
The safety measure commonly used in aerospace structures is the safety factor, 
which establishes some characteristic value of the structural strength or  
resistance relative to a characteristic value of the load. The design safety 
measure to be exploited in the present r e s e a c h  is the safety index, since it 
permits the designer a greater flexibility by allowing him to control variability 
as well as a characteristic value. 
The safety index has been shown to provide computational convenience 
if both load and resistance are  normally distributed. For example, see 
Kececioglu and Haugen [ 111 or Mau and Sexsmith [ 141. Cornel1 [ 151 proposed 
the use of the safety index in a design code and pointed out that it can be used 
as a safety measure when only the means and variances of load and resistance 
are  known, and no other information is available about the actual distributions. 
The role of the safety measure in controlling the resistance is illustrated in 
Figure 2. For simplicity, the safety measure used for illustration in this 
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r S, LOAD DISTRIBUTION (ASSUMED KNOWN) 
Figure 2. Effect of Safety Factor. 
a

figure is the mean safety factor, v . 
In Figure 2, the load distribution is assumed to be known, and the figure 
is assumed to be drawn for a particular test procedure, which determines the 
shape of R. The shape is the same for R1and R2. The designer can thus con­
trol the strength of his design by selecting a design msan safety factor, v 1  or  v 2  
. ,  
(or  any other value). A similar argument holds for any other design safety 
measur e. 
The role of the test  procedure and the design safety measure in con­
trolling the design strength has been discussed. The designer is confronted 
with the decisions of what test procedure and what value of the design safety 
measure to use for his design, Since the load and strength a r e  not deterministic 
values but a re  represented by probabi1it:r distributions, this is a decision in the 
face of uncertainty. Provided that the designer can quantify in a prescribed 
manner his preferences among the possible outcomss that will result from each 
of his alternative decisions and an assessment of the probability of each 
possible outcome, __ck_statistical decision-.theory provides a formal framework for 
making such a decision. 
In this particular application, the preference for outcomes wil l  be 
expressed in terms of the cost of each outcome. The cost model is expected 
to include all of the significant costs relevant to the decision. These include 
development costs, maintenance costs, cost of failure, and cost of loss in 
performance, each of which may be further subdivided. 
3 . 2  The Problem-Setting 
It is important to delineate the setting in which the decisions of what 
type of testing to do and what safety measure to use a re  most conveniently made. 
OQcourse, such decisions could be made at  almost any time during the design 
process. However, the decision process developed in this research would 
appear to be more appropriately applied during one particular phase of the 
typical design cycle. 
To apply the decision msthodology developed here, certain information 
peculiar to the particular structural system in question must be available. 
This includes such information a s  the change in weight as  a function of the 
design safety measure, the economic value of changes in the structural system 
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weight, and the anticipated cost of various methods of testing. It seems evident 
that a preliminary design must be available to develop this type of information. 
Of course, it might be possible to extend the present method to use probabilistic 
estimates of this information before design has begun. 
0 2  the other hand, if a detailed design has already been developed, 
fabrication drawings have been released, and test hardware and facilities com­
mitted, a decision to change the design safety measure or  the method of testing 
would be costly. 
From the preceding discussion, it can be inferred that the appropriate 
time for applying the decision methodology to select a test program and a design 
safety measure is after preliminary design is completed but before detailed 
design begins. For example, the methodology is not intended to provide a means 
of selecting between a skin-stringer design and a honeycomb sandwich design, 
for, say, an interstage structure. However, given that the design is skin-
stringer, the methodology provides a means of selecting a safety measure which 
will, in turn, determine the required skin thickness and stringer cross sectional 
properties. Likewise, the methodology would dictate face sheet thickness and 
core properties, given a honeycomb sandwich design. This is not to say that 
the method would not be useful in selecting between these two design concepts. 
However, to influence the selection, the method must be applied to each design 
separately and the f inal  r e su l t s  compared. 
Equally as important as the time phasing is an appreciation of the level 
of assembly to which the methodology applies. The method could be adapted to 
I 
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any level of assem5ly, provided thzt data a re  available to determine statistical 
strength distributions for the particular level under consideration. However, 
for several reasons the prebent research is directed toward large structural 
assemblies such as cgmplete wings, thrust structures, propellant tanks, or 
interstages. First ,  the available data for developing statistical strength dis­
tributions a re  applicable to this level of assembly. Second, structural tests 
are usually conducted on these large assemblies. Next, it would be very 
inconvenient for the designer to attempt to apply different safety measures to 
the various subassemhlies within the large assembly. 
The method is expected to be most applicable to structures under over­
all compressive and bending loads. Again, the data from which the strength 
distributions a re  developed are  for these types of structures. However, the 
compressive or bending loads in the test sample were often applied in a 
complex manner such as  concentrated engine thrust  applied to a large longeron 
which, in turn, shears the load into the fuselage structure. Thus, the results 
a r e  expected to be valid for such structures. Extension to other types of 
structures would involve only a development of strength distributions for the 
structure of interest. 
3 . 3  Mathod of Solul@ 
In the first section of this chapter on the statement of the problem, some 
preview information on the method of solution was  discussed in describing the 
problem and its ramifications. In this.section, the method of solution is to be 
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made more specific. Although it is intended to give a complete outline of the 
proposed solution, extended discussions will be deferred to later chapters, 
where various subjects a r e  developed in detail. It is intended to provide in this 
section a general outline of how the developments in Chapters IV through VI wi l l  
be used in Chapter W. 
An action or decision space is created. This consists of a discrete 
portion (the selection of one test procedure from several discrete possibilities) 
and a continuous portion (the selection of a design safety index from a continuous 
spectrum). A complete action must consist of a selection of both a test proce­
dure and a safety index. Selection of the test option determines the shape of the 
probabilistic strength distribution relative to the analysts' predicted failure load. 
This strength distribution is considered to be a part of the state of nature. 
Selection of the safety index determines the location of the strength distribution 
relative to the probabilistic distribution of the applied load, also considered to 
be a part of the state of nature. Every combination of course of action and state 
of nature results in a known value to the decision-maker. In particular, the 
negative of value in this problem is the cost associated with each combination of 
action and state of nature. The cost may include the development cost, cost of 
manufacturing, maintenance cost, cost of failure in operation and testing, and 
cost of loss in performance. 
The expected cost for  each course of action is obtained from the definition 
of expectation. The action is selected (i.e. , the decision is made to use the 
test procedure and safety index) which results in the minimiim expected cost. 
The formulation just described is illustrated graphically by the decision 
-tree in Figure 3. The fan-shaped displays for p ,Ri, and S indicate that these 
are continuous variables. No formal treatment of decision analysis or  decision 
trees is given here. Raiffa [ 831 gave a very readable introduction to the 
subject. Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer [ 211 gave a virtually self-contained 
development, and Benjamin and Cornel1 [ 21 gave a development oriented to 
engineering decisions. Savage [ 841 presented an exposition on the relationship 
of the Bayesian approach to other schools of thought in probability and statistics. 
Tribus [ 11 related decision analysis to a broader spectrum of ideas. After the 
problem has been cast in the form of a decision tree, the decision process will 
be based on the procedures presented by Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer [ 211. To 
analyze the decision tree, the expected cost for each test option, E[ U/p, Ti] , is 
determined. This expected cost includes the direct cost C . The direct cost 
Di 
is that portion of the cost not affected by the state of nature. Figure 4 shows 
graphically how the minimum cost test procedure and corresponding safety 
index are  selected. The optimum decision for the case illustrated in the figure 
is to select test option Toand the corresponding safety index, Po. 
The decision problem has been placed in the context of statistical 
decision theory to take advantage of the formal developments in this field, 
which establish the conceptual and mathematical rigor of the procedure used 
to optimize expected cost. Chapter VII will be devoted to a more complete 
development of the decision model. 
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T = TEST OPTION; Ri = STRENGTH; S = LOAD U = COST 
0 = SAFETY INDEX 
Figure 3. Dxision Tree for  an Assembly. 
Figure 4. Optimum Decision. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TEST OPTIONS, STRENGTH DISTRJ[BUTIONS, AND MFETY MEASURES 
Statistical decision theory provides the basis for the research problem. 
However, it is instructive to discuss the problem in some of the terminology of 
optimal structural design to clarify the role of some of the variables involved. 
An introduction to this terminology has been presented in a review article by 
Sheu and Prager [ 851. 
Geometric design constraints restrict  the choices of structural type and 
shape open to the designer. In this dissertation, all overall structural dimen­
sions, structural member arrangements, and the type of construction a re  con­
sidered fixed. The only choices open to the designer a r e  local dimensions such 
as thicknesses and cross-sectional areas. 
Behavioral design constraints set bounds on quantities that characterize 
the behavior of the structure under conditions of service. In the present 
research, the assumed behavioral constraint is that the structure shall not 
exhibit any behavior which indicates an inability to sustain the applied loads. 
The design objective for the structures comidered here is the minimiza­
tion of the total expected cost of the structure, including the probabilistic as 
well as the deterministic costs. It will be assumed that the test options and the 
design safety measures a r e  the two design variables that can be used by the 
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designer to control the strength of a structural assembly. The test option can 
be used to control the strength by disclosing rectifiable design errors or by 
eliminating random understrength designs. The test option can also be used to 
eliminate some uncertainties regarding the engineer's knowledge of the design 
strength, thereby impoving the accuracy in estimating the design performance. 
The safety measure can be used as  a design variable to control the design 
strength by establishing a characteristic design strength relative to a charac­
teristic load, or more generally, by controlling both a characteristic value and 
the variance of strength. 
4.1 Test Options 
The concept of a test option is introduced in this section to explain a pro­
cedure by which the method of testing can be used as a design variable. Unlike 
the classical experiment of statistical decision theory, the test option includes 
a predetermined (deterministic) response by the designer to each possible test 
outcome. The testing and predetermined actions by the designer together a re  
used to control the state of nature. The classical experiment in statistical 
decision processes is used to observe the state of nature. From a probability 
standpoint, a predetermined action means that for each possible outcome of the 
test, one particular subsequent course of action wi l l  be taken with probability 1, 
and there is zero probability that any other course of action will be followed. 
The standard test procedure discussed in Chapter I provides a ready example. 
For the outcome that the structural assembly fails to pass the test, the 
- ... , 
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predetermined action is to redesign and retest. For the outcome that the 
assembly passes the test, the predetermined action is to make no design change 
and to discontinue testing, even if the test reveals an overdesign. 
Four test options a re  included in this research. An unlimited number of 
test options could conceivably exist, and each could be treated in a manner 
similar to that presented here. It would be possible to create new test options 
by various combinations of the test  options considered here. A description of 
each of the four test options is given as follows. 
4.1.1 No-Test Option, T o  
Under the No-Test Option procedure no structural testing is done. Analyt­
ical predictions alone a re  used to establish the design and predict the strength. 
This is mach like what is done on most civil engineering structures where 
structural testing is not accomplished on each individual design. It would be 
inprudent, of course, to use this option if some radically new design concept is 
to be used. 
4.1.2 Standard Test Option, TI 
The Standard Test Option procedure has been introduced in Chapters I 
and 111. This is the normal procedure used in the aerospace industry to qualify 
the airframe for flight use. It consists of testing one each of the large assem­
blies such as a complete wing, a fuel tank, or an interstage structure which 
make up the airframe, More than one assembly may be tested in a single test  
setup. It is not unusual to test a complete airframe. A design change is 
required to be made on any structure failing to sustain design ultimate load. 
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Failure does not necessarily mean collapse or breakup; it could mean that some 
measured parameter such as displacement or  strain falls outside a prescribed 
range. Testing and redesign are to be iterated until a design passes the test. 
Testing is to  be done on assem5lies built to the same specifications as the flight 
articles. 
4.1.3 Proof Test Option, T, 
In the Proof Test Option procedure, every production flight article is 
pretested in the laboratory to some prescribed load level less than design 
ultimate load. Articles which fail to pass the proof test  a r e  discarded from the 
population o r  repaired and retested until they pass the proof test. This effec­
tively prohibits the use of random understrength structures as flight articles and 
establishes a lower bound for the strength of those structures that are used.. It 
is possible that proof testing could alter or  damage the structure in a way that 
would invalidate its original characteristics. Before the proof test option is used, 
sufficient studies m i s t  be made to assure that the proof test wi l l  not be damaging 
to the structure. The proof-test procedure has been used extensively for 
pressure vessels, including the large propellant tanks of launch vehicles. Little 
use has been made of it for other types of structures and loadings. In the 
present research, test option T, includes the use of proof testing for all types 
of s t ruc tu res  and loadings. For  example, bending of wings and combined 
compression and bending of fuselage structures a re  considered appropriate for 
proof testing. 
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4.1.4 Model Test Option, T, 
The Model Test Option procedure is to perform all testing on either scale 
models of the actual structure or subassemblies (components) instead of on 
complete assemblies. Such a procedure would not require large, complex test  
facilities. The evaluation approach would be an iteration of design, analysis, 
and testing until the analysis and test results agree. The same design would 
then be used for the flight hardware, and the analysis procedure which agreed 
with the model test results would be used to inalyze the flight design. 
To accomplish the above procedure, it would be necessary to identify 
and numarically define the requiremsnts of the flight article and to measure 
certain parameters identified with these requirements in the model testing. An 
analytical prediction of the same parameters miist be made on both the test and 
flight articles, and the analytical predictions must agree with each other and 
with the test results before the flight article design is placed in service. This 
is the method by which model test results are projected to full-scale design. 
It would be desirable that the descriptions of test options be completely 
free of any am5iguity. However, the testing of complex aerospace hardware 
contains so  many compromises that it is doubtful if this could ever be achieved. 
Hopefully, the preceding descriptions a re  specific enough to permit mutually 
exclusive classifications of the available test options within reasonable 
tolerances. It is not the objective to define a test option so  rigorously that it 
would be difficult to plan a program which falls within a given test option. 
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4.2 Strength Distributions 
4.2.1 Qualitative Comparison 
The test  options described above a re  deterministic in nature in that an 
a priori disposition of every test outcome has been established. Because of 
this, it is reasonable to postulate that a probabilistic strength distribution exists 
for  the population of structural assemblies developed by each test option. Each 
of these distributions can be referenced to the strength value predicted by the 
analyst. This value is the 100-percent value shown in Figure 5, where a 
qualitative comparison of the strength distributions that might result from the 
various test options is shown. 
The general shape of the No-Test Ogtion probability density function 
(PDF) is inferred from the Saturn Booster Data [ 171 for which the CDF is 
shown in Figure 1of Chapter 111. Note that other available data in Figure 1 
tend to confirm the general shape of the left side of Figure 5(a). For the 
standard test option, all test articles which fail to sustain 100-percent load a re  
redesigned and retested. However, th i s  does not completely assure that all 
flight articles have strengths greater than 100 percent, since there would be 
some scatter among nominally identical structures. A distribution of the 
general shape of Figure 5(b) results for  this test option. In Figure 5(c) ,  ro 
is the proof test level. Thus, any structures from the original population shown 
in Figure 5(a) with strengths less than ro are  discarded from the population. 
This would result in a distribution similar to that shown in Figure 5(c). A 
model test program would eliminate some of the unknowns causing the scatter 
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_ _  
Figure 5. Qualitative Comparison of Strength Distributions. 
in Figure 5(a) ,  resulting in a more peaked distribution as shown in Figure 5(d). 
The scarcity of applicable data for calculating the preceding distributions 
is unfortunate, considering the amount of testing that has been done on large 
structural assemblies. The lack of published data can almost certainly be 
attributed to the fact that testing of such large assemblies has been done as a 
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part  of specific system developments rather than as  scientific research. In 
development programs the need for recording and compiling data in the form 
required to determine PDF's has generally not been recognized. 
Four sources of data on large structural assemblies have been located, 
but for various reasons only one, the Saturn V Booster data [ 171, appears 
usable at this time. The Jablecki data [ 201 represents the state-of-the-art in 
the 1940's and is useful  for showing the historical trend of analysis improvement. 
However, data a re  given only for assemblies which failed at less than limit load 
s o  that a complete P D F  cannot be determined. Freudenthal and Wang's data on 
recent aircraft [ 621 also give the results on large assemMies, but only for 
premature failures. In addition, some panel, beam, and frame data (structures 
which should not really be described as  large structural assemblies) are  
included. Martin and Bouton [ 861 presented the so-called Lustig data repre­
senting aircraft from 1950 to 1970. Again, only premature failures were listed, 
and in this case not even the total number of tests is known. This makes it 
impossible to construct even a portion of the CDF, as  was done for the other 
data in Figure 1, Chapter III. 
The two following sections in this chapter will be devoted to determining 
strength distributions that can be realized by test options To and T,, using 
reasonably well-established statistical analysis methods. Strength distributions 
that can be realized by test options Tiand T, require special treatment and will 
be the subject of Chapters V and VI. 
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-4.2 .2  Strength Distribution for No-Test _%tj,n, T o  
4.2.2.1 Saturn V Test Data. The test data of Thomas [ 171 are directly 
applicable to the No-Test Option, since these data represent a sample of 
structures before any redesign or retesting was  accomplished. As such, the 
data can be interpreted as a sample from the population' of structures which has 
not been previously tested. Table 1is a listing of the failure loads for Saturn V 
structural assemblies as a percentage of the design ultimate load, assumed to be 
the analyst's predicted failure load. Thus, each data point is the strength or 
resistance, r. of the particular structure tested. 
1 '  
The data represent all of the major structural qualification tests on the 
Saturn V launch vehicle, including several assemblies from each of the three 
stages, interstages, and the instrument unit. In some cases, where more than 
one load condition was applied to a structure and the load conditions were 
distinctly different from each other, more than one data point w a s  taken on a 
single structure. Note that there a re  a number of censored data points (tests 
which were terminated before failure occurred) in the sample. Tests were 
terminated for various reasons such as economy of testing o r  a desire to save 
the assembly for some other use. 
It would be impossible to give a general physical description of the 
structure or a general description of the types of loading that would characterize 
the sample of Saturn V structures. Construction ranged from riveted skin­
stringer-frame design to honeycomb sandwich. Loading was usually 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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Table 1. Saturn V Test Data 
Structure 
Number 
(Order 
Number) 
-
*Censored sample 
Failure 
Load, r: 
1. 

(Percentage 
of Dssign 
Ultimate Load) 
71.5 

77.2 
80.0 
82.2 
83.7 
85.7 
87.2 
87.2 -. 
89.3 
89.3 
89.3+* 
90.8 
91.5 
92.2+* 
93.0 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 
93.o+* 

94.3 

Structure 
Number 
(Order 
Number) 
26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

Failure 
Load, r,
1 

(Percentage 
of Design 
Ultimate Load) 
99.3 

100,0 

100.0 

lOO.O+;* 

100. o+* 
100. o+* 
100.o+* 
100.o+* 
100. o+* 
100.o+* 
100.7+* 
100.7 
101.3 
103.6+* 
107.2 
107.2 
110.8 
112.1+* 
113.0 
115.0+* 
115.7 
118.0 
125.0 
131.3 
151.3 
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compressive or bending, but loads were often concentrated loads applied to 
large longerons or  to beam or t russ  structures attached to the fuselage shell. 
It is important to note that throughout this research all large structural 
asseir,: ?;*e assumed to belong to a single population for purposes of 
statistical analysis. This is done irrespective of the mode of failure or the type 
of structure. Freudenthal and Wang C 621 made an identical assumgtion, justified 
by the following statement: 
This assumption is unavoidable because replications of ultimate load tests 
of large structures and structural parts a r e  and will always be severely 
limited by technical and economic considerations. Without it, reliability 
analysis of aircraft structures becomes obviously impossible since the 
individual small samples a r e  useless for this purpose. 
4.2.2.2 Computer Program for Two-Parameter Weibull Distribution. A 
computer program developed by Hanagud [ 871 for estimating parameters of the 
two-parameter Weibull distribution for complete and censored samples was 
available at the Georgia Institute of Technology, School of Aerospace Engineer­
ing. The computer program is based on the maximum likelihood method for 
estimating parameters as presented by Cohen [ 881. The cumirlative distribution 
function of the Weibull distribution is given by 
and the probability density function is 
73 
where R is the random variable, v is the scale parameter, and k is the 
shape parameter. The method of maximum likelihood is based on determination 
of the values of parameters k and v which maximize the joint probability of 
observing all of the data points in a particular random sample. For the present 
problem, this means that the method of Cohen can be used to determine values 
of k and v that maximize the likelihood of the joint occurrence of the data 
points in Table 1, including censored values. 
More specifically, the maximum likelihood estimator of the vector of 
parameters [ k, VI is the value of [ k, VI which causes the likelihood function to 
be a maximum. The likelihood function is proportional to the joint probability 
distribution of the random sample, assuming independent observations. Assume 
that (R1, R2 ... R.e 1 a re  observed failure loads and that (RP+l, RP+2 ... Rn) 
a re  observations at which no failure occurred (censored values). The joint 
probability of (R1, R2 ... Rm) for known [ k, VI ir 
f ~ 1 , ~ 2... R~ (rl, r2 ... r l l k ,v )  = (4.3) 
I I ,  m , .  I. .. 
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Similarly, the joint probability of the observed censored values is 
(4.4) 
Regarding equations (4.3) and (4.4) as functions of unknown parameters 
[ k, VI , the likelihood function L gives the relative likelihood of observing-the 
sample ( R  1 - * .  RI, RI+l.. .  R n ) asafunct ionof[k,vJ .  
L(k ,v lR l  = r l  ... Rp = ‘1 ; RI+l ’rl+l, ... Rn > rn) (4.5) 
I n 
= fRi(rilk,v) - F (r. lk,v)l
i=l j = l + l  Rj 3 
Explicitly, 
k-1 
L = i=l(:) exp [(-:)“I j=I+1fi exp[ (-;,*I . (4.6) 
Since there is a monotonic, one-to-one relationship between the likelihood 
A A  
function and its logarithm, they have a maximum at the same values [ k, VI . 
Thus, 
- -  
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Maximizing I n  L , the following equations are  obtained for k and v :  
k 

V V 
i=l 
These equations can be simplified by eliminating v and obtaining an equation 
for k to be solved by Newton's iteration technique. 
1 + A  P [In.- - k h ( $  2n r:) 
k I 1 
(4.10) 
i=l i=l 
L 
= i  k r. k 
i=l 
i=l 
A
The value, k , satisfying equation (4.10) is the maximum likelihood estimator 
for k and can be substituted into equation (4.9) to solve for the maximum 
A 
likelihood estimator v . A computer program for obtaining these estimators 
is given by Hanagud 871. 
When the method was  applied to the data in Table 1, maximum likelihood 
A A
estimators of the parameters were determined as  k = 6.43 and v = 115.5. A 
plot of the probability density function fR(r) that can be realized with test 
option To is given in Figure 6. A Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, in which 
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Figure 6. Strength Distribution for No-Test Option. 
only the uncensored data points could be used, showed that the model could be 
accepted at the 11-percent significance level. Six intervals of equal probability 
were used in the test. A computer program from Hanagud 1.871 was used for 
the Chi-square test. 
4.2.3 	 Strength Distribution for Proof-Test Option, T2 
A very common method of assuring the reliability of pressure vessels 
77 
and tanks in both the aerospace and civil engineering fields is the proof test, 
In this method of testing, before each production pressure vessel or tank is 
placed in service, it is pressure tested in the laboratory to a pressure greater 
than that expected to be encountered in service. The technique has seldom been 
used'for structures other than containers, but there a re  notable exceptions. 
Buntin [ 801 described a proof-test program for  the F-111 aircraft. The main 
purpose of the program was  to detect f laws or  crack-like defects in certain 
steel parts in the aircraft, which could cause failure in service. Although no 
such flaws were detected in proof testing of 325 operational aircraft, two pre­
mature failures due to other causes did occur, This indicates the ability of the 
proof test  to detect and eliminate defective structures of all types from the 
operational population of structures. 
An idealized representation of the effect of proof testing on the strength 
distribution is a straightforward application of truncated distributions as dis­
cussed by Benjamin and Cornel1 [ 21 . If equation (4.2) is the strength distribution 
of the population of structures that have not been tested, then the distribution 
for proof-tested structures is assumed to  be 
= o  r < ro (4.11) 
k 

1 

fB(r)= 1 - FR(ro) 
k-1 - ( 5 )  , r = r0 '  
where FR(ro) is the cumulative distribution of equation (4.1) evaluated at 
the proof-test level ro . The resulting distribution was illustrated qualitatively 
i 
in Figure 5(c), The distribution is plotted for 60-percent and 80-percent 
proof test levels in Figure 7, 
___ . 
140 160 
R, STRENGTH-PERCENT @FANALYST’S PREDICTION 
Figure 7. Strength Distributions for Proof-Test Options. 
4 . 3  Safety Measures 
Safety measures were defined and discussed in Chapter I. The effect of 
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the mean safety factor in controlling resistance relative to load was illustrated 
in Chapter III. In this section attention will  be focused on the relationship 
between the safety index and safety factor, and a particular safety factor wil l  be 
carefully defined. 
In equation (1.5) a characteristic safety factor was defined as 
(4.12) 
S + q a  
S 
In equation (1.l o ) ,  the safety index was expressed as 
-R - Sp = - (4.13)
I40 2 + 0 2R S 
Suppose that s, crR '  and CTS are  known quantities, and a design safety index 
A 
p has been prescribed, Then the mean resistance required in the design can be 
established from squation (4.13) as  
(4.14) 

A
If it is now desired to determine the design safety factor v consistent with the 
A 
prescribed p , equation (4.14) can be substituted into equation (4.12) to give 
A ­ 2A + u s ' - P U R  
(4.15) 
s + g a
S 
I 

Equations (4.12) and (4.13) can be used to derive a number of relationships 
A A
between v and p similar to equation (4.15), depending on which parameters 

a r e  assumed to be known and which a r e  unknown. 

4.3.1 A Special Safe@-Factor Definition 

For the subsequent work in this research and for convenient application 
of the results, it is desirable to  use a particular definition of design safety 
factor. Although the definition to be used here has not previously been explicitly 
stated, its use has been implied in many situations in civil and aerospace 
engineering. In fact, in deterministic design approaches the implied use of such 
a definition is probably the rule rather than the exception in the design of most 
structures. This definition is 
(4.16) 
cu N 
where R is the strength of the structure calculated by the analyst, S is a so­
(v
called limit load, and ;I is the design safety factor. Very often in the past, S 
has been statistically determined as 
N ­
s = s + q oS Y (4.17) 
-
where S is the mean load, QS is the standard deviation, and q is a constant. 
Iu 
Much less frequently, R has been statistically defined, and in many cases 
where this has been done, consideration of factors affecting strength variability 
has been limited. For example, in many analyses the variance in R has been 
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assumed to be due only to  scatter in material properties. As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, scatter in material properties is a relatively minor con­
tributor to the variance in R. A key assumption in this research is that is 
not defined as E- p r~ R ’  is defined as the strength predicted by the analyst.-
The relationship of the deterministic quantity to the mean value will depend 
upon the type of testing (test option) contemplated. Consequently, the probability 
that the strength wi l l  be less than is different for each test option. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5 where E, the analyst’s predicted strength, is 100 percent 
for each test option. 
Furthermore, it will  often be convenient to use the coefficient of variation 
of load rather than the standard deviation: 
U
S 
(4.18) 
where yS is the coefficient of variation. Equation (4.17) becomes 
-
s” = s + q s y s  = S ( l + q y s )  . (4.19) 
Equation (4.16) can then be written as 
(4.20) 
where s is expressed as a percentage of the design ultimate load. Equation 
(4.20) is the objective of the entire development in this section and will be used 
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extensively in the computations in subsequent chapters. The design safety factor 
N 
v is illustrated graphically in Figure 8. As has been previously mentioned, the 
design safety factor establishes the location of R relative to S , and hence in 
effect, controls the design for a known load distribution. The opposite view-
N 
point can be taken. The factor u can be considered to establish the permissible 
loading which can be applied to a given design with strength R (characteyized 
by E). 
DESIGN SAFETY FACTOR = 100 
s U+q< ) 
-
r S, LOAD DISTRIBUTION 
T R, STRENGTH DISTRIBUTIOt 
- - h 
S S(l+qYs) R =lo0  R AND S 
Figure 8. Special Design Safety Factor. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERT OPINIONS 
Helmer [ 891 made the following observation: 
While model-building is an extremely systematic expedient to pro­
mote the understanding and control of o u r  environment, reliance on the use 
of expert judgment, though often unsystematic, is more than an expedient: 
it is an absolute necessity. Expert opinion must be called on whenever it 
becomes necessary to choose among several alternative courses of action 
in the absence of an accepted body of the theoretical knowledge that would 
clearly single out one course a s  the preferred alternative. 
The use of subjective expert opinion is a s  old as  civilization, but systematic 
methods have largely been restricted to application with observed data. Helmer's 
purpose was the systematic collection of expert opinions through a method called 
the Delphi technique. The distinguishing feature of this technique is that a 
sequence of questionnaires is sent to the experts, and each questionnaire in the 
sequence i s  based on information from the previous questionnaires. The 
respondents a re  thus made aware of the opinions of other experts and a re  en­
couraged to make use of these opinions in formulating new responses or revising 
previous responses. 
Since each questionnaire in the Delphi technique is based on previous 
responses, the model for analyzing results must necessarily be loosely defined. 
A more rigorous model for analyzing subjective information with respect to pre­
dicting the future was presented by Gordon and Hayward [901 and E w e r  [911. 
This model, the cross-impact matrix method of forecasting, permits the 
probability of each event in a forecasted set to be adjusted in view of judgments 
relating to potential interactions with the other forecasted events. This is 
accomplished by determining the probability of each event, conditional upon the 
occurrence of each of the other events. The effect of the events on each other 
is called cross impact and is often ignored in less rigorous methods. 
The foregoing developments were adapted and applied to the social 
sciences. Nair, Shah, Smith, and Shah [821 used a probabilistic model to study 
the technical problem of oil spills in the seas. They used expert opinions, 
gathered through mail questionnaires and personal interviews, a s  input to the 
model. The investigators were able to construct a probabilistic model of spills 
with respect to size, cause, and location. 
5.1 Bayesian Viewpoint of Subjective Information 
A n  overall appraisal of the Bayesian viewpoint in statistics was eloquently 
presented by Savage 1841. McGee 131, Papoulis 1921, and Zellner [ 931 gave 
excellent presentations on the adaptation of these concepts to probability analysis. 
Tribus [l] related the Bayesian viewpoint to a broader spectrum of ideas, 
including the rational description of problems and use in design. A complete 
decision methodology based on the Bayesian viewpoint was constructed by Pratt,  
Raiffa, and Schlaifer [ 211 . A n  orientation of Bayesian statistics to decisions in 
engineering problems was given by Benjamin and Cornell [ 21 . 
The Bayesian viewpoint originates in the concept of probability as an 
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individual's degree of belief rather than the traditional concept that probability 
must be interpreted as  a relative frequency of occurrence. Thus, probability is 
a result of the encoding of the decision-maker's personal belief into a plausibility 
(probability) measure. This is accomplished by assigning a real  number 
between zero and unity to the event in question, which is then taken as a measure 
of the relative likelihood that the event will occur. An assignment of zero 
represents no likelihood of occurrence, and unity represents certainty of 
occurrence. An assignment of 0.5 represents an equal likelihood of occurrence 
and nonoccurrence. Note that if the individual has no information available to 
him other than a measured relative frequency of occurrence in an experiment, it 
would be unreasonable for him to assign a probability other than the measured 
relative frequency. In this sense the "frequentist" concept of probability is a 
special case of the Bayesian concept. 
The Bayesian concept of probability leads to the conclusion that all  
available information should be used in making probability estimates. This 
information may be objective, subjective, o r  both. Bayesian statistical methods 
have been devised [ 11, 31,  [. 931 which permit the consolidation of both types of 
information into probability estimates. An application of such methods is used 
in Chapter VI. 
The real  strength of the Bayesian viewpoint lies in its applicability to 
decision methodology. Since a probability assignment represents the individual's 
degree of belief based on all information available to him, the implication is that 
h.e should be willing to base his decisions on such probability assignments. On 
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the strength of this implication, a formal decision procedure which permits 'the 
use of Bayesian statistical methods in statistical decision theory has been devel­
oped [ 211, which makes consistent use of the decision-maker's probability 
assignments. The method is discussed in Chapters 111 and VII. 
5 . 2  Mail Questionnaires 
Given that subjective information is appropriate for use in decision 
methodology, the questions arise a s  to how such information is best obtained 
and formulated in a manner suitable for use in decisions. In the present research 
there is a need to determine a strength distribution for test option T, for which 
no observed data are  available. The existing state-of-the-art in obtaining such 
a distribution would be to guess or to consult with experts and then guess. The 
objective in this chapter is to develop a methodology to systematically obtain 
unbiased subjective expert opinions, statistically analyze these opinions, and 
obtain probability distributions for strength to be used in applications in later 
chapters. 
Two questionnaires (Appendix B) were devised to elicit the opinions of 
structural analysis and testing experts about strength distributions. Question­
naire A was sent to approximately 55 supervisory and technical management 
personnel in industry and government, known by the author to have a background 
pertinent to the subject matter. This questionnaire was used to test the method 
of acquiring opinions, the probabilistic models, and the ability of experts to 
provide the type of information needed. It contained questions leading to strength 
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distributions of aerospace structures in a typical development program before 
test results a r e  available. The experts' opinions were compared with some 
available observed data to determine the validity of results. 
Af te r  preliminary analysis of Questionnaire A results, Questionnaire B 
was sent to approximately 30 respondents of Questionnaire A. To assure 
I 
validity of results, Questionnaire B was identical in format to Questionnaire A 
but contained questions leading to a strength distribution for structural assemblies 
developed through an extensive model and small component development test 
program, test option T,. N o  observed data a re  available for this case, and the 
subjective expert opinions a re  the only source of information for obtaining the 
needed strength distribution. 
An attempt was made in sending out the questionnaires to follow techniques 
which had proved to elicit a high percentage of responses. Such techniques are  
discussed by Bauer and Meissner [941, Campbell and Katona [951, Jeanne and 
Gullahorn [SSl ,  and Parten [ 971. Hints provided by these authors include careful 
and precise construction of questions, minimization of writing required of 
respondents, appearance and neatness of the questionnaire, transmittal by 
personal letter on prestigious letterhead, enclosure of self-addressed stamped 
envelope, and pretesting of the questionnaire. Pretesting was accomplished by 
asking several faculty members to answer and comment on the questionnaire 
and then making changes based on the comments. 
Considering that the questionnaires were lengthy and that no tangible 
reward was offered for completing them, the response can be considered very 
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good. Thirty-nine of 55 copies of Questionnaire A were completed, and 19 of 30 
copies of Questionnaire B were completed. 
5.2.1 Verification of Method -Questionnaire A_­
._ -
Questionnaire A was so devised that two different approaches to calcu­
lating a strength distribution from the responses could be used. For the situation 
described in the questionnaire, observed data were available from the Saturn V 
launch vehicle structures for direct comparison with the questionnaire results. 
A favorable comparison with the observed data would indicate that the expert 
opinions and the approach used were valid. 
The first approach utilizes only the response in Table 1of the question­
naire, which gives the experts' overall views of the scatter in test failure loads a s  
compared with the analysts' predicted failure load. In the second approach, data 
in Tables 2 through 10 of the questionnaire a re  used to construct a counterpart to 
Table 1, which gives the same information a s  Table 1, but is constructed by use 
of a probabilistic model from the various causes which contribute to the scatter. 
The approach yielding results which compare more favorably with observed data 
can then be used to determine strength distributions for other circumstances 
when observed data are  not available. 
Similar to the construction of the counterpart to Table 1, a counterpart 
to Table 3 could be constructed from the data in Tables 11through 19 of the 
questionnaire to check consistency. 
Certain events related to the various entries were labeled in accomplishing 
the questionnaire analysis. Let I.
I 
denote the event that a structural failure 
11 
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occurs in load increment i, where i = 1, 2 ... 10; that is, Il is the event 
that a structural failure occurs at less than 60 percent of the analysts' predicted 
failure load, $ is the event that a structural failure occurs between 60 and 70 
percent of the analysts' predicted failure load, ... Il0 is the event that a 
structural failure occurs at greater than 140 percent of the analysts' predicted 
failure load. 
11 - < 60 percent I,- 100 percent - 110 percent 
& - 60 percent - 70 percent IT - 110 percent - 120 percent 
I, - 70 percent - 80 percent - 120 percent - 130 percent 
I4 - 80 percent - 90 percent I, - 130 percent - 140 percent 
I, - 90 percent - 100 percent Ilo -> 140 percent. 
Since failure of a given structure occurs in one and only one of these. 
load increments, the I. a re  always assumed to be a set of mutually exclusive 
1 

and collectively exhaustive events. 
The event that a particular cause is the reason for a difference beween 
predicted and actual strengths is denoted C where j = 1, 2, ...8. For 
j' 
example, Cl is the event that the analysts' mathematical model is a poor repre­
sentation of the actual structure. A l l  of the causes are  listed in Table 2 of 
Questionnaires A and B, Appendix B. 
Dk denotes the event that a particular discrepancy between the analysts' 
mathematical model and the actual structure is the reason for failure, where 
k.= 1, 2 ...8. The discrepancies are  listed in Table 11 of the questionnaires, 
Appendix B. Note that the discrepancies are  actually special cases or  subcases 
- 
of cause number 1 in Table 2; that is, it is assumed that the eight discrepancies 
a re  the different reasons that the analysts' mathematical model may be a poor 
representation of the actual structure. 
The first step in analysis of the results consists of combining the entries 
of the n respondents. This is accomplished by simply determining the mean 
response for each entry in each table. Let E represent any one of the table 
entries. Let E represent the entry of respondent p (p = 1, 2 .. n). The 
P 
value of the entry to be used in all further afialysis is 
-
E=-
El + E + ... + E OP
2 n P=l 
n (5.1) 
where E is the mean response. 
5 . 2 . 1 . 1  Probabilistic Models. Table 1in the questionnaire represents 
the experts' overall assessment of the strength distribution of the population of 
typical aerospace structural assemblies which have not been structurally tested. 
This distribution can be compared directly with the distribution determined for 
untested structures from Saturn V data in Figure 6 of Chapter IV. This compar­
ison will be made later in this chapter along with a comparison with results from 
probabilistic models. 
Basic probability concepts a s  discussed in standard textbooks such a s  
Benjamin and Cornel1 [21 and Hines and Montgomery [981 are  used in construc­
ting probabilistic models for analyzing questionnaire results. Three counterparts 
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to Table 1 of the questionnaire are  constructed from the data in Tables 2 through 
10 through the use of conditional probabilities. In this context I C and Dk 
i’ j’ 
are  interpreted a s  events. The symbol P[Al stands for the probability that 
the event A will occur. The symbol P [A I Bl stands for the probability that A 
will occur given that R has occurred. A n B (the intersection of A and B) is 
the event that both events A and B occur, and A u B (the union of A and B) 
is the event that either event A or B occurs. 
P [A I B] is called the conditional probability of A given B and is de­
fined [2 l  as  
This can be rewritten to give 
Note that questionnaire A is devised so that an entry in Table 2 can be 
interpreted a s  P [C .I since frequency of occurrence can be interpreted a s  a 
J 
probability. Further, an entry in Tables 3 through 10 can be interpreted as  
P [I. I C.1 since each entry represents the probability of a test  failure in load 
1 1 
increment i conditional upon a particular cause j. 
Then from equation (5 .2 ) ,  
POi n c.1 = PIIiIC.I PlC.1 i (5.3)
3 J J 
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that is, the unconditional probability that a failure will occur in a particular 
load increment due to a particular cause is given by (5.3) . An interpretation of 
this is that P [Ii n C . I  represents the probability that a failure will occur in 
3 
increment i and that C. will be the reason for any difference between the 
3 
actual and predicted failure loads. 
Three separate probabilistic models will be developed for determining 
the strength distribution by various methods of combining the eight causes of 
differences between actual and predicted failure loads. These models will be 
called X, Y, and Z,  and the counterparts to Table 1 of the Questionnaire A con­
structed from these models will be shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4 in this chapter. 
5.2.1.2 Model X. In Model X the causes of differences between actual 
and predicted failure loads C are  assumed to be a set of mutually exclusive 
j 
and collectively exhaustive events. This implies that any given difference 
between actual and predicted failure loads has only one cause, and by an axiom 
of probability, 
8 
P[C,I + P[C,I + ... + P[C,I = prc.1 = 1 . (5.4)Jj l  

Since the mean responses to Questionnaire A, Table 2, do not conform to this 
axiom, the responses must be normalized. It should be noted that respondents 
were asked to answer based on the premise that causes could occur together, and 
this normalization violates that premise. It cannot be proved that the respondents 
would not have answered differently if they had been told that the causes were 
. .  .. .. .-._-..._ . . __ .......--,._,..,.. , , . ,. 
mutually exclusive. Normalization is accomplished by taking 
P f C .  1
P I C . ]  = .lr 
Y (5.5)
3 
P [ C .  1 
Fl J r  
where P [ C .  1 is the mean response opposite cause j (Table 2 in Question­
3r 
naire A )  This normalization is illustrated by the Venn diagrams of Figure 9. 
Since no two causes occur together in general, they do not occur together 
within a given failure load increment i. Therefore, the event I. n C .  excludes 
1 3 
any other event Ii n C1 , I # j, This means that the events li n C.
J 
and I. 
1 
n CI 
a re  mutually exclusive and by an axiom of probability [ 21, 
8 
P [ ( I ~ ~cl) u (I.1 n c 2) u ... u (I .1 n c8) I  = C P[I. n c.1 = P [ I ~ I ~ ~  j =1 1.1 
(5.6) 
where PIIil ~ denotes the probability of failure in increment i for Model X. 
In words, the probability of the occurrence of failure in a particular increment, 
i, due to all causes is the sum of the intersection of I. with each of the causes 
1 
[as  calculated from equation (5 .3 )  1. But the probability of occurrence of I. 
1 
due to all causes is precisely what was requested of respondents in Table 1of 
the questionnaire. Thus, it is clear that Table 2 can be constructed through 
equations ( 5 . 3 ) ,  (5 .5)  and ( 5 . 6 ) ,  which should compare favorably with Table 1 
of the questionnaire and the observed data to validate the model and the experts' 
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NORMA LI2AT ION 
Figure 9. Normalization of Venn Diagram for Model X. 
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r.esponses in Tables 2 through 10, Questionnaire A. 
An example may be instructive. Suppose it is desired to calculate the 
entry for column (6) in Table 2 to compare with Table 1in Questionnaire A. 
The entries in column (6) ( P [ I
6 
IC 
j
1 )  of each of the Tables 3 through 10 in the 
questionnaire would be multiplied by the corresponding frequency of occurrence 
(P [ C . I  ) from normalized entries in Table 2 of the questionnaire according to 
1 
equation (5.3). The resulting products a re  then summed according to equation 
(5.6) to obtain the entry, P [ I61 lX' in column (6) for Table 2. 
These computations have been carried out for each load increment i and 
the results are  shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Failure Probabilities for Model X 
PIIillX 0.040 0.054 0.084 0.134 0.242 0.206 0.120 0.068 0.034 0.018 
These data will be compared with the Saturn V observed data along with the other 
models later in this chapter. 
5.2.1.3 Model Y. In model X the causes were assumed to be mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. It may be possible that more than one 
cause could be a contributor to a given difference in predicted and actual failure 
load. This eventuality was considered in constructing the revised Table 2 in 
I 
Questionnaire A by permitting the responses to total 100 percent o r  more. If 
two causes j and k a r e  not mutually exclusive, then they may have a joint 
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occurrence C .  n C In Model Y the probability of this joint occurrence is. I 
J k' 
considered in each of the failure load increments i. A Venn diagram depicting 
this condition is shown in Figure 10, where onlv two causes a re  shown f m  clarity. 
The intersections of these causes with the mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive events I. a re  also shown. Now consider the relationships existing
1 

within a given load increment i. This is illustrated in Figure 11, where only 
two causes a re  shown for clarity. In the following derivation it is assumed that 
all causes and the intersection of any two causes may exist but that intersections 
of three or  more causes a re  negligible. 
From the Venn diagram, Figure 11, and generalization to eight causes, 
8 
P[I.I = 2 ~ [ c .  1 8 8 n 1.3 - - 2 p [ c j n  c k n  1 ~ 1  (5 .7)
1 j =1 J 1 j=1 k=l 
j#k 
If the causes are  assumed to be independent within i, 
P [ C . n  c k n  1.1 = PE.n 1 ~ 1p [ c k n  1.1 ( 5 . 8 )1J 1 J 
From the definition of conditional probability [21, 
P[C.  n 1 ~ 1  = P[I~Ic . I  pW.1 (5 .9)J J J 
From (5,8) and ( 5 . 9 ) ,  
1.P [ c . ~C k n  1 ~ 1  = P[I.IC.I PfC.1  P [ I ~  k1 P [ C ~ I  (5.10)J 1 1  J 
I 

97 

Substituthg (5.9) and (5,lO) into (5.7), 
P[I.I = 
8 
P[I.IC.lP[C.l ' 21 
8 8 
PIIilC.I PIC.] P[IilCk1 P[Ck1 01 

1 j =1 1 3 I j=1 k=l 3 
j#k 
(5.11) 
Since I. are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events,
1 

10 
C,P[I i1  = 1 . (5.12) 
i=1 
Now the quantities P [C . I  are  precisely the quantities represented by entries in 
3 
Table 2 of Questionnaire A, and the quantities P[I. IC.1 a re  represented by
1 3 

entries in questionnaire Tables 3 through 10. If the mean responses to Question­
naire A a re  substituted into equation (5 , l l )  and the summation of P[I.] is taken 
1 

as  indicated by equation (5.12) , then 
10 
P[I.I = 1,207 # 1 . (5.13) 
i=1 1 
Figure 10. Venn Diagram for Intersecting Causes. 
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1 n ii ... __ 
Figure 11. Intersection of Causes with Load Increment. 
This result indicates that the assumption of independence of causes is not 
compatible with the questionnaire responses. Note that the assumption of 
independence was involved in writing equation ( 5 . 8 ) .  Assume that a factor a! 
exists which accounts for the dependence among causes such that 
(5.14) 

Then, in place of equation (5.11) there results 
8 8 8  

j=1 j=1 k=l 
jfk 
(5,15) 
Substituting this result into equation (5.12) 
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(5.16) 
from which 
10 8 
PIIilC.I P1C.I - 1
i-1 j = 1  3 J 
C Y =  10 8 8 
(5.17) 
1
2 i=l j=1  k=l 
PIIil Cj1P[C. IP[ I i l  CklP[Ck1
J 
j#k 
Once CY has been determined from equation (5.17) the u s i r e d  resu,;s PiI.1 
1 
for model Y can be determined from equation (5.15). These computations have 
been carried out for each load increment i, using mean responses from 
Questionnaire A to obtain the results shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Failure Probabilities for Model Y 
Ii 
(1) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10)  
60- 70- 80- 90- 100- 110- 120- 130­
<60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 >140 
P[IIIly 0,049 0,065 0,095 0.140 0.183 0,201 0.125 0.079 0.042 0.023 
These data will be compared with Saturn V objective data later in this chapter. 
5.2 .1 .4  Model Z A third probabilistic model was constructed, for 
which the development and discussion is identical to that for Model Y through 
equation (5 .13) .  A t  that point instead of assuming a factor a to account for 
dependence of causes, the sample space is normalized by scaling both the causes 
and intersections by a constant factor A. Thus, in model X intersections were 
assumed to be zero, and probabilities of causes only were scaled; in model Y, 
probabilities of intersections only were scaled, and in model Z ,probabilities of 
both causes and their intersections were scaled. 
If model Z is applied to equation (5.11) , there results 
8 8 8  
PtI.1 = A  ( PtI.IC.IPtC.1 - ; PtIilc.lPtc.IPIIilcklPtckl)
1 j =1 1 1 J j=l k=l J J 
jfk 
(5.18) 
= A (Ai -Bi) . 
Substituting this result into (5.12) , 
10 102 pL1.1 = h ( c  Ai - 10 Bi) A ( A - B )  = 1 (5.19) 
i=1 1 i=1 i=1 
Solving equation (5,19) for the value of A required to normalize the sample 
space, 
1A = -
A - B  (5.20) 
Once A has been obtained, P [I.1 can be calculated from equation (5.18) . These 
1 
computations have been carried out for Questionnaire A ,  and the results shown 
in Table 4 were obtained. 
5.2.1.5 Comparison with Observed Data. Three probabilistic models 
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Table 4. Failure Probabilities for Model Z 
.. ..-
Ii 
(1) ( 2 )  (3) (4) (5) (6) ( 7 )  ( 8 )  (9) (10) 
60- 70- 80- 90- 100- 110- -120- 130- 140­

<60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 

P[IiIlz 0.042 0.057 0.087 0.136 0.226 0.204 0.121 0.071 0.036 0.019 
of the strength distribution for untested structures have been constructed from 
the experts' responses to Questionnaire A in Tables 2 through 10. In addition, 
the experts' overall assessment of what the strength distribution should be is 
given directly by the response in Table 1 of Questionnaire A. In this section, 
the resulting four strength distributions will be compared with the strength 
distribution from the Saturn V observed data shown in Figure 6, Chapter IV. 
This will accomplished by a Chi-square test comnarison of each of the four 
strength distributions with the observed data and a visual comparison of CDF's. 
A summary of how the Chi-square test is being used here and in Chapter 
IV may be helpful. Firs t ,  in Chapter I V Y  a two-parameter Weibull model is 
hypothesized to represent the Saturn V observed data, and the parameters of the 
distribution a re  calculated by the maximum likelihood method. A Chi-square 
test  is then made by comparing the Saturn V observed data with the hypothesized 
model. Next, in this chapter, the same Weibull model is hypothesized to 
represent the data from one of the models of subjective expert opinions, and the 
hypothesis is checked by the Chi-square test. 
For the Chi-square test, six load increments with a minimum of five 
expected failures in each increment are  considered. The test will give a 
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measure of the difference in the number of structures expected to fail in each 
load increment from the distribution determined by observed data versus the 
number expected to fail in each increment from the subjective data. Let Si be 
the number of structures from the total of 50 structures expected to fail in 
increment i from the subjective data and 0i be the corresponding number from 
the distribution calculated from the observed data. The Dl statistic is defined 
[21 a s  
k (Si - Oi)2 
Di = c , k = 6  , (5.21) 
i=1 Oi 
This statistic is compared with tabulated values of the Chi-square distribution 
121 to determine the significance level at  which the subjective and observed 
data agree; that is, 
2
where xa,k -1 is the value of the Chi-square random variable with k-1 degrees 
of freedom and cumulative distribution a .  The value of a! is known as  the 
significance level and is a measure of the agreement between the hypothesized 
model and subjective data. 
Calculation of the D, statistic for each of the four subjective models and 
determination of the significance level from standard tables (five degrees of 
freedom) yielded the results shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Results of Chi-square Test 
-
&era11 Model X Model Y Model Z 
Assessment 
~ _ _  
dl Statistic 4.9 14.1 12.8 13.4 
Significance Level 42% 1.5% 2.5% 2.0% 
This indicates a very good f i t  for the overall assessment and a mediocre f i t  for 
the models. 
Cumulative distribution functions a re  shown in Figure 12, where the 
Weibull model of observed data from Chapter IV is shown by the solid line, the 
experts' overall assessment by the dotted line, and an envelope of the three 
probabilistic models of experts' assessment from causes by the cross-hatched 
area. 
It is evident from these results that the experts' overall assessment is 
fa r  superior to the distribution determined from probabilistic models based on 
experts' opinions of causes. To establish the reason for this would require 
additional questionnaires and analysis of the results. With the information now 
available it cannot be clearly established whether there is an intrinsic ability of 
experts to provide a better overall assessment o r  whether the questionnaire and 
probabilistic models could be improved to a point where the model results would 
be a s  good as  the overall results. However, it is known that all of the experts 
consulted have had occasion to directly observe data applicable to the overall 
assessment. It is not known how many of these experts have directly observed 
data applicable to the assessment from causes. 
I .  
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Figure 12. Comparison of Observed and Subjective CDF’s. 
The simplicity of the overall assessment compared with the assessment 
from causes could also have been a factor. The latter required considerable 
time and deliberation and possibly a reordering of information from a form 
available to the respondent to that required to answer the questionnaire. Some 
respondents may have been unwilling to spend sufficient time to do this carefully. 
It should be mentioned that, although the model results a r e  not nearly a s  
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good a s  the overall assessment results, the model result significance level is in 
a range sometimes accepted by statisticians in the absence of better information. 
A significance level sometimes accepted is 1percent, and the model results fall 
within that criterion. 
5.2.2 Strength Distribution for T, - Questionnaire B 
The primary objective of Questionnaires A and B was to determine a 
strength distribution for test option T,, the model test option. The analysis of 
Questionnaire A results in the previous section demonstrated the ability of 
experts to predict strength djstributions and established that the overall assess­
ment is likely to give better results than the probabilistic models of causes. 
Therefore, the experts' overall assessment, Table 1in Questionnaire B, was 
used to determine a strength distribution for test option T,. This was accom­
plished by fitting a two-parameter Weibull model to the data (mean responses) in 
Table 1, Questionnaire B. 
Each percentage point in the mean response was interpreted a s  one data 
point, and the resulting data were input into the computer program by Hanagud 
A 
[871. Maximum likelihood estimates 0 = 109.4 and k = 8.8 were determined 
for the parameters of the Weibull distribution, 
(5.25) 
A significance level of 60 percent was obtained in a Chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test between model and data, using 10 increments of equal probability. A 
106 

comparison of CDF's of the model and the subjective data is shown in Figure 13, 
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Figure 13. Comparison of Subjective Data and Weibull Model. 
In Figure 14 the strength distribution that can be realized by test option 
T, is compared with the distributions that can be realized by To and Ti, The 
comparison is intuitively appealing. For the Model Test Option, T,, the frequen­
cies of both grossly overstrength and grossly understrength structures a re  re­
duced as compared with No-Test Option, To,resulting in a distribution sharply 
107 

?'T3 : =103.5 YR =0.1 352 F­
\ 
\ 
I ' \ TO \ 
f 
I 
r/ \\ 
\ 
\ \ 
4 -'d 
60 80 100 120 1 0 160 
R, STRENGTH, PERCENT OF ANALYST'S PREDICTION 
Figure 14. Comparison of Strength Distributions, 
peaked near the analyst's predicted value. Note that this is in contrast to the 
Standard Test Option, Ti, for which it was assumed that design changes a re  made 
only in understrength structures, and overstrength structures remain a part of 
I 
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the population. The strength distribution given by equation (5.23) and plotted in 
Figure 14 willbe used for T3 in all further analysis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO UPDATING A STRENGTH DETRIBUTION 
In this chapter, Bayesian statistics will be used to determine a strength 
distribution for test option T I ,  the standard test procedure. Bayesian statistics 
provides a means of updating statistical distributions a s  new information becomes 
available. For the present analysis, test data accumulated during the laboratory 
structural testing of Saturn V structural assemblies a re  regarded as prior 
information, and the data obtained through flight experience are  regarded a s  
new information used to update the distribution determined from the prior 
information 
The Bayesian approach recognizes the validity of subjective information 
for use in probability analysis, and such information is used in determining the 
strength distribution for test  option Ti .  However, the effect of the subjective 
data on the distribution is relatively minor, and the resulting distribution can 
be regarded as  primarily based on observed data. 
The method to be used will be developed through discussions of Bayes' 
theorem, the use of Bayes' theorem to combine new data with prior information, 
and the updating of the scale parameter of the Weibull distribution. Next, the 
method is applied t o  the Saturn V test and flight data to determine a two-
parameter Weibull distribution for test option Ti. The final distribution which 
can be realized by TI is obtained from the Weibull distribution by using a 
i i o  
Bayesian analysis to account for uncertainty in the scale parameter. 
6,l Bayes' Theorem 
A conditional probability of the event A given that the event B. has 
J 
occurred is defined as the ratio of the probability of the intersection of events 
A and B.
J 
to the probability of event B
j 
and is denoted by P[AIB.I .
J 
P[A n B:l 
from which 
P[A n B.1 = PiAIB.1 P[ B.1 
J J J 
Similarly, 
P[B.
J 
n AI = P[B.IAl P[Al (6.3)J 
PlAIB.1 PlB.1 = P[B.IAl PCAI .
3 3 J 
Now following Hines and Montgomery [ 981, if B1, B2 ... B represent a set n 
of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive events, then an event A can 
be written a s  (Fig. 15) 
A = (A  n B1) u (A n B2) u ... u (A n Bn) . (6 .5)  
I11 

L A n  B j  ’ ‘ A n B n  
Figure 15. Event A in Terms of Events Bi. 
P[A] = P [ A n  B.,,] + P[A n B 2 ]  + .’.. + P[A n B n ]  (6 .5a)  
Substituting equation ( 6 . 5 )  into equation (6 .4)  
Then from equations (6.2)  and (6 .6)  
- 
Equation (6 .7)  is known as  Bayes' theorem and provides the means of incor­
porating new information with prior probability estimates to yield posterior 
probabilities. 
6.2  Combining ofNew D-ataw&h Prio-r Information 
A continuous version (following Papoulis [ 921 ) of equation (6 .7 )  can be 
derived. Returning to equation (6.1) , let the event B. be the event 
3 
{x < X 5 x + Ax} where X is a random variable, and x is a specific value of 
X ., Then (6 .1)  becomes 
Now by definition of the CDF, 
P [ x < X ~ X + A X ]= F
X 
( x + A x )  - FX(x) . (6.9) 
By definition of the conditional CDF, 
F~(x~A) P L X s x n A I  (6.l o )= 
PIAI 
and 
(6.11)  
P[A n x < X ~ x 2 1  
-	 1.. .
P[ AI 

- - ..... , , . -. - . 
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Substituting equations (6.9) and (6.11) into equation (6.8) , 
[F (X + k I A )  - F ~ X I A ) ]PIA1 
P : A ( x < X S x + h x ]  = x-
F
X 
(x + Ax) - Fx(x) (6.12) 
Now 
(6.13) 
and 
FX(x 	+ IA) - FX(x IA) 
~lim 
A x 4  Ax 
= f
X
(xlA) (6.14) 
Now define, 
(6.15) 
Applying equations (6.13), (6.14) and ( 6.15) to equation (6.12), 
(6.16) 
or 
P [ A J X = x ]  fxox f&xlA) = 
P[ AI (6.17) 
I 
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From equation (6.16) we can wr i te ,  
m m 
P[AIX=xl  fx(x) dx = fX(xIA) P[Al dx PEA1 (6.18) 
-m -03 
Substituting for P[A] in equation ( 7 .  17) 
(6.19) 
Equation (6.19) is the continuous version of Bayes' theorem. In this expression 
let X represent a parameter of the distribution used to model the random 
variable of interest and A be a sequence of independent observations of the 
random variable. Thus, the theorem states that the distribution of the parameter 
X , given the observation A ,  is proportional to the product of the likelihood 
function P[A IX = XI , sometimes denoted L[ XIAI , and the distribution of X 
f
X
(x) before the observations. The distribution %(xlA) , sometimes denoted 
fX "(xi, is called the posterior distribution of X, and fX (x) , sometimes denoted 
fx' (x) , is called the prior distribution of X. 
Incorporated in the above viewpoint is the idea that the parameter of a 
distribution is itself a random variable, a central concept in the Bayesian 
approach. This leads to the recognition that the distribution of a random variable 
such as a strength distribution, wherein the parameters are considered constant, 
does not fully represent the uncertainty involved with the random variable. A 
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complete representation of the uncertainty milst allow for the recognition that 
the parameters of the distribution a re  not known with certainty, A method often 
employed to accomplish this is to use the parameter distribution given by 
equation (6 .19 )  as a weighting function on the PDF of the random variable and 
to  integrate over the domain of the parameter to  obtain a so-called predictive 
o r  Bayesian PDF of the random variable. Thus, 
(6 .20)  
where fy(y) is the distribution of the random variable Y , with parameters 
N 
assumed given, and fy(y) is the Bayesian or predictive distribution of Y .  
The Bayesian distribution can be used to make inferences about as-yet­
unobserved data and wil l  include the uncertainty in the parameters as well as 
the uncertainty represented by fY (y) . 
6 . 3  UDdating. the Weibull Distribution 
Assume that the strength distribution for test option Ti is given by the 
two-parameter Weibull distribution, 
(6.21) 
In the case of this strength distribution, the shape of parameter k will  be 
considered constant (a condition which has been observed to be approximately 
true for some physical phenomena), and the scale parameter will be recognized 
a s  a random variable. For  convenience, in this portion of the analysis the 
-kparameter h will be used in place of v . 
The Bayesian distribution of the strength distribution (6.21) will now be 
obtained. From Soland 1991 (also, see Section 4 .2 .2 .2 )  the likelihood function 
of n observations of r in which ( R
1' 
R2 ...RI ) represent observations of 
failures and (Rr+l, ...Rn) represent observations of load levels in which no 
failure occurred (a censored sample) is 
P I  k- 1 
L[hlk, R1, ...R 
n 
I = k h (R1R2 ...Ra> exp (-A Ri*) 
( 6.22) 
For the present problem, equati0.n (6 .19)  takes the form, 
L(Alk, R1 ... R,) f ' ( A )
fA''(h) = ~~ A ; _ _  (6 .23)9 
Lf i ; (h )  dh 
h 
where F indicates a prior distribution, and f" indicates a posterior distribu­
tion. The foregoing discussion emphasizes the fact that a Bayesian updating of 
a probability distribution is accomplished through an updating of the parameter(s) 
of the distribution. Note that the posterior distribution of the parameter is 
proportional to the prior distribution and to the likelihood function. The integral 
in the denominator can be interpreted as a normalizing constant. 
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Under certain restrictive conditions the mathematics indicated in equation
* 
(6.23) need not be performed explicitly. It is mathematically convenient to use 
a distribution for the parameter A such that the operation indicated by (6.23) 
results in a posterior distribution of h of the same form as the prior distribu­
tion. Such a distribution of the parameter is called a natural conjugate of the 
likelihood function. 
Such a distribution for h (a  gamma distribution) was displayed by 
Soland [ 991 : 
where I and y are the paramsters of the distribution, and I' is the gamma 
function. Soland applied a Bayesian statistical analysis and decision methods to  
a problem of sampling electronic components for quality control. In the present 
research the application is to an updating of strength distributions for aerospace 
structural assemblies. 
If the parameters of the prior distribution f,'(h) are  y' and l ' ,  and a 
sample of the Weibull process yields the likelihood function (6.22) , it was 
shown by Soland [ 991 that the posterior distribution fi '(h) has the parameters: 
y" = y' -I-y , (6.25) 
I" = I' + I , 
i18 

where 
n 
y = c R f  (6.26) 
i=l 
Through the use of the natural conjugate, the mechanics of updating a re  
reduced to the reevaluation of parameters indicated in (6.25) rather than the 
mathematical manipulations indicated in (6.23). 
The Bayesian strength distribution, using (6.20), is 
m 
(6.27) 
Akrk-1 e - A r  
k 1 A1-l,-Ay 
= 
0 (4 
a 
Integrating equation (6.27), 
(6.28) 
This is the Bayesian distribution of strength to be used in the decision process. 
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In equation (6 .28)  , r is the random variable, k is the shape parameter 
(assumed constant) , and y and I are  either prior or posterior parameters of 
the distribution of A .  Thus, the problem of selecting a strength distribution 
reduces to obtaining a value for k and determining prior values y' and I' 
and data-based values y and I from which y" and I" can be calculated from 
equation (6 .25)  and used in equation (6 .28) .  
6.4 Strength Distribution for Ti 
The following step-by-step approach is deemed a reasonable procedure 
for using Saturn V test  and flight data to determine values for k , I" , and y" 
for the Standard Test Option TI. 
1. Determine the shape parameter k and prior estimates of y' and 1' 
from static structural test data, with some subjective interpretations of the 
applicability of certain portions of the data. 
2. Determine data-based values of y and I from the flight successes 
of the Saturn V launch vehicle, using an approximation of the loads experienced 
during flight. 
3. Calculate posterior parameters y" and I" from equations (6 .25) .  
6 . 4 . 1  Saturn V Test Data as Prior  Information 
An understanding of how the test  option T, test procedure affects the test  
data presented in Table 1, Chapter IV, is required in describing step 1. Let 
the data in Table 1 be divided into two groups, I and II. Group I consists of 
structures 27 through 50 which failed or for which the test  was terminated at 
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greater than 100 percent of design ultimate load. Group 11consists of structures 
1 through 26 which failed to achieve design ultimate load. The Standard Test 
@tion TI  requires that no changes be made in the structures in group I and that 
all structures in group II be modified and retested to  greater than design ultimate 
load. The modified and retested group (not shown in Table 1) is designated 
group III. The flight articles a re  built from the same specifications as the 
structures in groups I and III. 
Note now that all samples nominally identical to the flight articles have 
been tested to at least 100 percent of design ultimate load. Nevertheless, it is 
probable that some of the production flight articles would fail at less than design 
ultimate load if all flight articles could be tested, possibly because of the varia­
tion in material properties, variation (within tolerance) of dimensions, or  an 
occasional manufacturing e r ro r  not evident in the test  article, Questionnaire C ,  
Appendix B, was  used to obtain expert opinions on the probable percentage of 
redesigned structures which would fail in each of three load increments less than 
design ultimate load. The percentages predicted by the experts a re  given in 
Table 1, Qlestionnaire C ,  Appendix �3. If these percentages a re  multiplied by 
the 26 structures in group I1 and rounded to the nearest integer numSer of 
structures, no structures a re  predicted to fail in increments 70- to 80- and 
80- to 90-percent, and two structures a re  predicted to fail in increment 90­
to 100-percent of design ultimate load. These two data points will be a s ­
sumed a t  the midpoint (95 percent) of the increment and will be designated a s  
121 

group IV. Note that group IV could be regarded as a remnant of the original 
group II. 
The data base for the prior distribution for  test option TI will be taken as 
groups I, III, and IV. The data are tabulated in Table 6. In this chapter decimal 
fractions rather than percentages are  used to avoid computations with extremely 
large numbers. The computer program by Hanagud [ 871 was used to estimate 
parameters of a two-parameter Weibull distribution model for the data in Table 
A A 
6. 	 The maximiim likelihood parameter estimates were k = 9.27 and v = 1.265 
[ see equation (6.21)1 . Then 
* 	 A-k 
= 1.265-9.27 = 0.113 (6.29)v 
It will  now be shown that this is also the expected value of A. from equation 
16.24) using the same data. From equation (6.26), 
n 
yt = ri = 132.3 9 (6.30) 
i=l 
where the ri a r e  data in Table 6. Also from Table 6, 1' = 15 is the number of 
failures. The prior distribution of A from equation (6.24) is then 
14 -132.a 
f p )  = 
(132.3) l5 (A) e 
= 0.7632xlO
21 
A 
14 
e 
-132.3h. 
r(15) 
(6.31) 
From Benjamin and Cornell [ 21, the expected value of A is 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-- 
m I I 111 I111111111111111.11111 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 3 - .I,.-...,.,...--- ,.._.. 
122 
Table 6. Saturn V Test Data for R.edesigned Structures 
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .- _. _ _ _  ~ - - - -L -_ _. - _  
Group Structure Failure Group Structure Failure 
Number Number Load, r. Number Number Load, r.
1 1 

(Fraction (Fraction 
of Design of Design 
Ultimate Load: Ultimate Load) 
- ~-
II1 1.o o o a  I 27 1.000 
1.o o o g  28 1.000 a 
1.ooo+ 29 1.ooo+a 
1.o o o a  30 1.ooo+a 
1.ooo+ 31  1.ooo+ 
1.o o o a  32 1.ooo+a 
1.'000+ 33 1.ooo+a 
1.ooo+a 34 1.ooo+a 
1.o o o a  35 1.ooo+a 
1.ooo+ 36 1.007+' 
1.o0o.ra 37 1.007 
1.ooo+a 38 1.013 
1.ooo+a 39 1.036+a 
1.ooo+a 40 1.072 
1.ooo+a 4 1  1.072 
1.ooo+a 42 1.108 
1.ooo+a 42 1.121+a 
1.ooo+; 44 1.130 
1.ooo+ 45 1.150+a 
1.ooo+a 46 1.157 
1.ooo+a 47 1.180 
1. 48 1.250 
1.ooo+; 49 1.313 
1.o o o g  50 1.513 
1.ooo+a 
1.ooo+ IVb 51 0.950 
52 0.950 
a. Censored sample 
b. Subjective data, Questionnaire C 
E(A) = 	-I' - -15 - 0.113 (6.32)y' 132.3 
As expected, this is the same as the maximam likelihood estimate, equation 
(6.29). 
Summarizing, the prior distribution of resistance R is the Weibull dis­
tribution, equation (6.11) with parameters k = 9.27 (assumed constant) and 
v = A  
- l/k 
= 1.265. 
-
fR'(r) = 
9.27 8.27 e \1.265 ) (6.33)
9.27
(1.265) 
9.27 
= 1.0488 r 8.27 e -0. 113r 
The prior distribution of A is given by equation (6.31). As  indicated by 
equation (6.20) , the uncertainty in A for purposes of decision analysis can be 
taken into account by determining the Bayesian distribution of r . The prior 
estimates of k ,  P , and y are substituted into equation (6.28) to obtain the 
prior Bayesian distribution, 
I'k rk-1 Pr 33 r8.27 
Q(r) = 
(rk + Y') d'+l 
= 9.252 x 10 (rgoZ7+ 132.3) 16 . (6.34) 
6.4.2 Saturn V Flight Success as New Data 
Since the method by Soland [ 981 (to be used to update the distribution) 
permits censored samples, the Saturn V flight data, which include no failures, 
I 

I1 111 I I 1 1 1 1  I .....-....-.-_. 
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can be used as  new infmmation for updating the prior strength distribution 
which was established from laboratory test data only. There have been 13 
successful Saturn V flights, with each flight having 50 structural assemblies. 
This is a total of 650 assemblies that have been flown without failure. The 
opinion of experts on the loads experienced by these structures is given in 
Table 2 of Questionnaire C, Appendix B. The data in this table will be approxi­
mated as shown in Table 7 for purposes of analysis. 
Table 7. Saturn V Flight Loads 
- .  
Flight Load - Percentage of Design Ultimate Load (R.) 
<30 35 45 52.5 57.5 62.5 68 
. -
Percentage of 
Structures 15 7.22 9.22 12.44 20.22 13.78 22.11 
Experiencing Load 
Number of 
Structures 98 47 60 81 131 90 144 
Experiencing Load 
-
Using these data as new information and noting that the contribution of 
structures loaded to less than 30 percent will be negligible, the parameters of 
- .the posterior distribution of h can be calculated from equations (6.25) and 
(6.26): 
n 
y = Ft: = 47(0.35) 9*27 + 60(0.45) 9.27 + ... (6.35) 
i=l 
9.27+ lM(O.68) = 6.2 
1 
- -  
I 
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y' = 132.3 from equation (6.30) 
I = 0 (no flight failures), 
1' = 15 (15 test failures), 
y" = y + y' = 6.2 + 132.3 = 138.5 , 
Then from equation (6.24), 
15 14 -138.5A 
fl;'(A) = (138.-5) h e = 1.519 x 102 1  h14 e -138.5A 
rl(15) 
(6.36) 
The expected posterior value of A is 
(6.37) 
and the expected value of the scale parameter v is 
1 1-
E"(v) = [ETr(A)] = (0.1083) 9*27 = 1.271 (6.38) 
The posterior distribution of r is then given by the Weibull distribution, equa­
tion (6.21), with parameters k = 9.27, v = l.271: 
1.0038r 8.27 .-O. 1083r9.279.27 8.27 e-(&f'27=
f# = 9.27
(1.271) (6.39) 
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The posterior Bayesian distribution is, from equations (6.28) and (6.35), 
(6.40) 

This is tne final strength distribution for test  option Ti to be used in the decision 
analysis. Differences between the prior distribution, equation (6.33); the 
Bayesian prior distribution, equation (6.34) ; the posterior distribution, equation 
(6.39), and the Bayesian posterior distribution, equation (6.40), are  quite 
small. Some values of the distributions a re  shown in Table 8 to illustrate this. 
Plots of the distributions would all appear as shown by the Ti test option in 
Figure 16. 
The small differences between the Bayesian and non-Bayesian distributions 
indicate that there is sufficient data to m&e a reasonably accurate determination 
of the scale parameter. Even though there were a comparatively large number 
of flight structures and no failure occurred, the flight data caused only a small 
change between the prior and posterior distributions because of the low load 
levels in flight compared with the test loads. 
The improvement in strength that can be gained by testing according to 
test option Tiis illustrated in Figure 16. The dotted line represents the 
strength distribution before the test and redesign cycle (derived in Chapter IV) , 
and the solid line is the distribution from equation (6.40) after the test, rede­
sign, and retest cycle. 
... . . ,. , , .. ..._..--- -.. ,, 
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Table 8. Comparison of Strength Distributions 
r x lo2 
20 1.666 X 
40 5.367 x 
60 0.01533 
80 0.1633 
100 0.9366 
120 2.5657 
140 1.3105 
160 0.007504 
1.743 x 10-6 
5.378 x io-* 
0.01536 
0.1635 
0.9318 
2.4973 
1.3584 
0.03580 
1.664 X 1.665 X 
5.136 x 10'~ 5.138 x 10-4 
0.01467 0.01467 
0.1564 0.1563 
0.9008 0.8949 
2.5209 2.4538 
1.3993 1.44 14 
0.01048 0.03473 
9.27 
Prior  Distribution: f
R
'(r) = 1.0488 r 8.27 e -0.113 r 
8.27 
N 33 r
Prior  Bayesian Distribution: fR'( r) = 9.252 X 10 16(r9*27 + 132.3) 
9.278.27 -0.1083 r
PDsterior Distribution: fR"( r) = 1.0038 r e 
CI 34 r 8.27 
Posterior Bayesian Distribution: f "(r) = 1.841 X 10 16R. (r9'27 + 138.5) 
I-

R = 
YR =0.1 32: 
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Figure 16. Comparison of Strength Distributions for 
No-Test and Standard Test Options. 
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CHAPTER VI1 
THE DECISION MODEL 
In Chapter JII, it was shown how the decision to be made falls within the 
purview of Bayesian statistical decision theory. The fact that this is true 
negates the requirement for formal proof here that the decision procedure is 
valid. The validity has already been established by others in development of the 
theory. Entire volumes are devoted to the subject by Pratt, Raiffa,  and 
Schlaifer [211 Raiffa [831 Morgan [ l o o ] ,  Raiffa and Schlaifer [ l o l l ,  and 
Schlaifer [102]. A treatment sufficient for the present problem is included in 
Benjamin and Cornel1 [2] An essential feature of the theory is that expected 
costs of uncertain events, based on probability analysis, are treated in conjunc­
tion with known or  certain costs in determining a cost optimum decision. 
The structuring of the decision tree,  accomplished in Chapter 111, will 
not be repeated in this chapter. Instead, a flow-chart description of the process, 
which may help to demonstrate some points that could not be shown on the 
decision tree, will be developed. Each element of the flow chart will then be 
examined separately in more detail. Care  has been taken to assure that all 
assumptions and procedures in the flow chart are consistent with statistical 
decision theory. This chart should give a good idea of the interrelationships 
of the problem variables and should help to distinguish what information is 
130 

treated as an integral part of the decision model as opposed to information 
needed as input to the model. 
Figure 17 illustrates the decision process. Consistent with statistical 
decision theory, the process is divided into three major elements: actions, 
state of nature, and values (or utilities). Generally, actions represent alterna­
tives available to the decision-maker, the state of nature represents factors 
(usually not known with certainty) which affect the consequences of the actions. 
and the values are numerical measures of the consequences of action-state 
combinations. 
7 .  i Action - The Decision& be Made 
The alternative actions or decisions a r e  illustrated in the left portion of 
Figure 17. In the present problem, an action consists of two elements: 
( i) selection of a test  option or method of testing from among four discrete 
alternatives and ( 2) selection of a design safety index from a continuous spec­
trum encompassing (theoretically) all real  numbers. The action is denoted by 
the symbol A. ( P )  , where j represents the test option, and P represents the 
3 
safety index. For example, A3 ( i. 5) denotes the decision to use test option 3 
and a safety index of i.5. 
7. i.i Selection of Test %tion 
Clearly, one of the means available to the designer to control structural 
reliability is the selection of a method of testing. Testing tends to decrease 
uncertainties and design errors, thereby permitting the designer to more 
GENERALIZED BAYESIAN DECISION PROCESS FOR SELECTING TEST OPTION AND SAFETY INDEX FOR AN AEROSPACE STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLY 
I I I MINIMUM 
I 
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I
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Figure 17. Flow Diagram for Decision Process. 
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accurately estimated the strength of t4e design. This affects the probabilistic 
strength distribution, which in turn influences the structural reliability. 
In Chapter IV, four possible methods of testing were described. In the 
present research, it is assumed that the designer is to make a selection of one 
of these discrete methods of testing (test options) and that the test option 
selected controls the shape of the probabilistic strength distribution of the design 
as shown in previous chapters. Since the strength distributions were  basically 
derived from experience on aerospace structures built in the past, there is also 
an implication that the inspection procedures, nondestructive test procedures, 
and maintenance procedures for a given test option should be consistent with 
those on the past projects from which the data were obtained. Such procedures 
a re  usually designed to disclose e r rors  and other anomalies which result in 
defective parts. It should then be expected that these procedures affect the 
strength distribution of the population of structural assemblies placed in service, 
since any defects discovered would be rectified. If the procedures in a new de­
sign a re  not consistent with those in past projects from which the strength distri­
butions were derived, there is reason to question the applicability to the new de­
sign. This is emphasized on the flow chart by showing these procedures a s  an 
integral part of the test option. 
Test option T2, the proof test option, requires elaboration here. If T, 
is selected as the test method, the choice of a proof test load level is also 
necessary. Five discrete levels of proof testing will be considered a s  a part 
of the decision space; that is, if the proof test option is selected, a proof test 
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level must also be selected to complete the decision. The proof test level 
will be expressed a s  a percentage of the design ultimate load. Figure 18 shows 
the matrix of test options. 
To, N 0 - TEST OPTION 
Ti, STANDARD TEST OPTION 
50% PROOF TEST 
60% PROOF TEST 
70% PROOF TEST 
80% PROOF TEST 
90% PROOF TEST 
Figure 18. Matr ix  of Test Options. 
7. I.2 Selection of Safetv Index 
A second means available to the designer to control structural reliability 
is the selection of a safety index. Once the safety index has been obtained, it is 
simple to convert the result to the safety factor in any given problem. In the 
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applications in Chapter WI, both the safety index and the safety factor will be , 
considered. 
J 
Thus, the second element of the decision to be made is the selection of a ~ 
I 
design safety index, 0.  The domain of 0 is all real numbers. Negative 
values a re  physically and mathematically possible, but it seems unlikely that , 
negative values would ever be useful in a real situation, since this implies that 
the expected strength is less than the expected load. 
7.2 State of Nature 
7 . 2 .  i Load and Strength Distributions 
The state of nature is illustrated in the middle portion of the flow diagram, 
Figure 17. Basically, there a re  two ingredients which define the state of nature: 
( I)the structural assembly itself and ( 2) the environmental conditions to which 
the structural assembly is subjected. It is convenient to identify specifically the 
important characteristics of the structural assembly and the environmental 
conditions which a re  pertinent to the decision at hand. 
The important characteristics of the structural assembly are its strength 
and weight. A s  indicated in the flow diagram and discussed in previous chapters, 
the shape of the strength distribution R. depends upon the test option. Further,
3 
the final strength distribution R. ( P I  depends on both the test option and the 
3 
design safety index, since the design safety index is used to control the 
predicted strength of the design. Within a given test option and under the 
assumption that the basic configuration of the structural assembly is fixed, an 
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increase in the design safety index to increase the strength will result in an 
increase in the weight. The dependence of weight on the safety index is indicated 
in the flow diagram. 
The environmental condition of importance is the load distribution applied 
to the structure. As  indicated in the flow diagram , the load distribution is 
assumed to be known and is considered as an input to the decision model. 
7.2.2 %e Probability of Failure 
An important quantity which characterizes a given combination of strength 
and load distributions is the probability of failure. In this section, the procedure 
for calculating the probability of failure of a given structural assembly, sub­
jected to n applications of identically distributed random loads, will be 
developed. The n applications of loads could represent n separate flights. 
The development here is consistent with that of Freudenthal, Garrelts, and 
Shinozuka [39]e 
Let FR (x) be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of strength 
of a structural assembly and fs (x) be the probability density function (PDF) 
of the load to be applied to the assembly. By definition of the CDF and PDF, 
and 
fs (x) d x = P  [ X ~ S 5 X + d x ]  (7.2) 
Thus, the probability that R will be less than x and that S will  be in the 
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increment dx is 
P [ R ( x  and x s S r x + d x l  = P [ E { R S x }  n E { x ~ S ~ x + d x } ], 
(7.3) 
where E {} represents the event that the statement in the brackets is true. 
If R and S a re  assumed independent of each other, 
P [E (R 5 X} n E {X s: s s: x + dx)] = F~ (x) fs (x) CIX (7.4) 
by the well-known product rule. Equation (7.4) represents the probability that 
R will be less  than S when S is in a general increment dx. If the probability 
that R is less  than S is desired for all possible load values, an integration 
over all values of x must be performed: 
P [R < SI = FR (x) fS (x) dx (7.5) 
0 
Note that P [ R  < SI represents the probability that a structural assembly with 
CDF FR (x) will fail because of a single application of load from the distribu­
tion fS (x). Thus, the probability of failure on the kth application of load is 
00 
pf (k) = P  [ R  < SI = FR (x)fs (x) dx . (7.6) 
0 
There a re  assumed to be only two possible outcomes on the kth load 
application, failure or  survival. Since the probability of failure is given by 
equation ( 7.6)  , the probability of survival, from an axiom of probability, is 
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The probability that the assembly will survive n load applications is 
N E i n E 2 n  ...n Ek n . . . n E  n 1 ’  (7.8) 
where Ek denotes the event that the assembly survives the kth load application, 
and the intersection Ei n . .nEn denotes the occurrence of all events 
Ei .. .E . If the survival of each of n load cycles is independent of the n 
survival of all other load cycles, the probability of El n ...n En ’  and hence 
the probability that the assembly will survive n load applications, is 
n 
= r[ [i - P f  (k)] - (7.9) 
k=i 
Since the n applied loads are identically distributed, pf ( i) = pf (2) = . a . 
= Pf (n) ’ and 
The probability of failure of the structural assembly during the n load applica­
tions is 
FN (n) = i - LN (n) = i - [i - p (k)] “ = i - [ p f ( k ) l n  (7.i i)  
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Similar results were obtained by Freudenthal, Garrelts , and Shinozuka [391 . 
A special case of equation ( 7 .  1I)arises for  the consideration of the 
application of a single deterministic load such as a proof test load. Let the 
magnitude of the deterministic load be ro. Then, in place of equations (7.4) 
and (7.5) ,  
where P [E ( S = ro)]E I and P [E (R5 ro)] = FR Po) from equation 
(7. I) . Then the probability of failure during proof testing is 
(7.13) 
If m identical structural assemblies a r e  to be subjected to the proof test, the 
probability that one or more of these articles will fail the proof test is given by 
F~ (m) = I - [i- F~ pO)] . (7.14) 
7.3 The Cost Model: Utilities 
In Bayesian decision theory, utilities or  values a re ,  in general, a 
measure of the consequences of various action/state-of-nature combinations, 
The proper expression and use of the utility concept has absorbed a considerable 
portion of the development of the theory. The present problem requires the use 
of only the very elementary concepts of utility, and these have a very high degree 
of intuitive appeal. The utility concepts to be used a r e  described below and are 
consistent with Bayesian decision theory. 
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The measure of utility is very direct - the expected cost in dollars of 
action/state-of-nature combinations is used as the measure of desirability of 
the combinations. The lower the expected cost, the higher the desirability. 
Expected costs include not only direct monetary outlays but also the monetary 
equivalent of other consequences such as performance loss due to weight of the 
structural assembly (assumed to be deterministic) and possible monetary losses 
due to structural failure (assumed probabilistic) A s  would be intuitively 
expected, any costs common to all possible actions may be omitted from 
consideration. This is equivalent to saying that the choice of reference point 
does not affect the decision. A s  indicated in Figure 3 of Chapter III, direct 
costs (costs not affected by the state of nature) may be considered directly 
and need not be included in the utility function. However, these costs could 
be included in the utility function, and the final results would not change. 
The total expected cost to be minimized to obtain the optimum decision 
consists of three basic parts: direct costs CD , cost of weight Cw )  and 
expected cost of failure F'* 
-
c = c D + c  +CF. (7.15)
W 
Each of these cost constituents will be discussed separately. 
7.3.1 Direct Costs 
The direct costs do not depend upon the state of nature but may depend 
upon the action. A s  shown in the flow diagram of Figure 17, these costs include 
such items as development costs Cd and operational costs C, . 
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CDECD = c d + c
0 - (7.16) 
j 
The notation CD is used in the flow diagram to indicate that these costs 
j
primarily depend upon the test option selected. The development costs include 
such items as test hardware, test facilities, and test operations, including an 
allowance for correcting deficiencies which may be discovered in testing. 
Operational costs include items such as  inspection, nondestructive tests, and 
maintenance. In the area of direct costs, it is particularly important to keep in 
mind that costs common to all actions need not be considered; this can signifi­
cantly reduce the amount of information required as  input to the decision model. 
Fo r  example, if all courses of action under consideration require the use of 
the same te'st facility, the cost of the facility need not be included in the cost 
model. 
7.3.2 Cost of Weight 
Weight is usually of prime importance in aerospace systems. In fact, 
this is the basic reason that aerospace systems a re  usually designed with much 
smaller safety factors than civil structures. However, weight does not have 
equal importance in alI aerospace systems. It is not unusual for the monetary 
value of weight to vary by an order of magnitude between the first stage and the 
upper stages of a launch vehicle. This important fact has been largely disre­
garded in the past in establishing structural criteria such as  safety factors. 
The value of weight can easily be included in the present decision model. 
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, Within a given design concept, the weight of a structural assembly 
largely depends upon the design safety index. Let the weight relative to some 
reference value be a known function of the design safety index: 
w = w(p)  (7.17) 
Let the known monetary value of one unit of weight in the assembly under consid­
eration be c . Then the cost of weight as  a function of P appropriate for use in 
W 
equation (7.14) is 
cW = Cw@) = C,W(P) . (7.18) 
7.3.3 Expected Cost of Failure 
_ _ .  
In Benjamin and Cornel1 [21, it is shown that the expected cost of an 
uncertain event is given by the product of the actual cost of the event and the 
probability that the event will occur. In the present context, the uncertain event 
is the failure of the structural assembly under consideration. Note that the 
probability of failure derived in equation (7.11) is the probability of having one 
o r  more failures. The possible events that can occur during the application of 
n load cycles to a fleet of structural assemblies a re  no failures, one failure, 
two failures .,. o r  n failures. According to statistical decision theory [21, 
the expected cost of these mutually exclusive events is 
CF = C P + C P 2 2  + ... + CiPi + ... + C n P n ,  (7.19)0 0  1 1  + C P 
where C. is the cost of i failures, and P. is the probability of having exactly
1 1 

-- .,.I ,, , . .. . . .  
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i failures. 
From equation (7.6) and (7.7) , the probability of having a failure on the 
kth load cycle is p
f 
(k) , and the probability of no failure is 
f 
(k) . The prob­
. 
ability of no failures in n load cycles, Po = %(n) , was given by equation 
(7.10). Assuming independence of the events of failure, the probability of sur­
viving the 1st , 2nd ... (i-1)th , (i+l)th ... and n th cycles and having a failure 
on the ith cycle is given by 
(7.20) 
Similarly, the probability of failing on the jth cycle but surviving all others is 
Note that the failure events, ECfailure on the 1s t  cycle, survival of all other 
cycles} , E{ failure on the 2nd cycle, survival of all other cycles} ... E{ failure 
on the n th cycle, survival of all other cycles} are  mutually exclusive. Then, by 
an axiom of probability [21 , the probability of any one of these events occurring 
is 
n 
p1 - P1 + P2 + ... + pi + ... + p n =  C P i  9 (7.22) 
i=1 
where P1 is the probability of having exactly one failure. Substituting tion 
(7.20) into equation (7.22) and assuming pf (1)= pf (2) = ... pf(k) ...= pf(n) , 
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Similarly, the probability of having failures on the ith and rthcycles and 
surviving all other cycles is 
(7.24) 
If all  possible combinations of i and r a re  considered, the probability of 
having exactly two failures is 
(7.25) 
Generalizing equation (7.23) and (7.25) , 
(7.26) 
Equation (7.26) is recognized a s  the well-known binomial distribution [21 ,which 
has an expected value n pf (k) . 
If equation (7.26) is substituted into equation (7.19) , and C 
0 
= 0 is 
assumed, 
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n! [ P p  1n-qCF = C1 n pf(k) [Ff(k)l n-1 + ...+ C4 4 1 o l  [Pf(k) 1q ­
(7.27) 
Now assuming that C = q C1, that is, q failures cost q times a s  much as  one 
q 
failure, 
(7.28) 
+ ... + n [pf(k)ln ­[pf(k) I )  . 
The term in the braces in equation (7.28) is recognized a s  the definition of the 
expected value of the binomial distribution. Therefore, 
where C
F 
E C 
1 
is the cost of flight failure. A physical interpretation is that 
n p
f 
(k) is the expected number of failures. P
F 
j 
( P )  has been used to represent 
n pf(k) in the flow diagram of Figure 17. This emphasizes the dependence of 
the expected number of failures on the test option j and the safety index, P .  
The expected cost of failure is then given by 
An identical development to equations (7.19) through (7.29) can be constructed, 
( r  ) from equation (7.13) in place of pf (k) , the number ofusing pf (p) = FR O  
1 

proof tests m in place of the number of load cycles n, and the cost of proof 
test failure C
F 
in place of the cost of flight failure C
F' When this is done, 
P 
equation (7.30) is generalized for the proof test option to yield 
(7.31) 
-7.4 Cost Optimization 
The cost constituents from equations (7.16) (7.18) and (7.30) or 
(7.31) are  now substituted into equation (7.15) : 
(7.32) 
The notation here emphasizes the dependence of casts on the test option j and 
the safety index P .  The cost optimization problem now reduces to the mini­
mization of C.(P) with respect to the discrete variable j and the continuous 
3 
variable P .  Consideration of the discrete variable j leads to separate equations 
for each test option: 
A necessary condition for a relative minimum cost within a given test option is 
(7.34) 
I I I II .I I. ,,,..- ,.... 
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provided that C . ( P )  is continuous throughout the domain of P ,  and dC.(P)  I I$ 
J J 
exists at  the minimum point. This relative minimum is the absolute minimum 
provided that C.(a) and C.(b) are  greater than C.(c) where a and b a re  
J J J 
the end points of the domain of P under consideration and c is the value of P 
at the relative minimum given by equation (7 .34)  . Applying equation (I:. 34) to 
(7.331, 
(7 .35 )  
Let the solutions of equations (7 .35 )  be denoted by P = P?. The minimum costs 
J 
for each of the four test options are  obtained by substituting these solutions into 
equation ( 7.33)  . 
(7 .36)  
The minimum cost among al l  test options is selected by 
* * * * * 
c = min{C 
0' 
cl, c y  c3> (7.37)  

Thus, the minimum cost test option and safety index combination is that one 
* 
corresponding to C . The minimization procedure just described was illustrated 
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by Figure 4 in Chapter III. Because of the complexity of the expressions for the 
expected cost of failure, the minimization procedure must be done numerically 
o r  graphically. A graphical method will be illustrated by the applications in 
Chapter VIII. 
Throughout Chapter VII there is an implicit assumption that the minimum 
cost for the particular structural assembly under consideration is not affected 
by the other assemblies in the structural system. This assumption is not be­
lieved to be particularly restrictive for the typical aerospace system. The high 
reliabilities expected in aerospace systems tends to reduce the dependence of the 
probabilities of failure of the various assemblies on each other. Moses and 
Kinser [ 43 I showed that an assumption of independence, when dependence actually 
exists, can cause significant e r ro r s  in reliability prediction for structures .with 
low reliabilities. 
I 11111 11111 I II I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  .,.,.,.,,111.111.11 
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CHAPTER Vm 
APPLICATIONS 
8.1 Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the application of the con­
cepts developed in previous chapters to typical aerospace structural assemblies. 
These concepts culminate in the cost optimization presented in section 7.4. The 
applications given in this chapter are a direct application of the cost optimization 
procedure, where the costs for each test option, as given by equation (7.331, 
are calculated for several values of p . Then the minimum cost decision is 
obtained by plotting the results to obtain the solutions of equations (7.35) and 
(7.37) graphically. 
Some parametric results useful in applications have been obtained and 
included as Appendix C. These results provide graphical means of determining 
pf(k) needed in equation (7.31) Graphs a re  also presented in Appendix C for 
converting between the safety index and design safety factor. 
8.2 Input Data 
To conserve space and to provide for easy comparison of input and 
results, the applications examples are presented together in parallel instead of 
sequentially. Example structures are representative of structural assemblies 
in NASA's Saturn V launch vehicle and Space Shuttle systems. The information 
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presented regarding these systems should not be taken as official NASA data but 
should be considered as  typical of such systems. The Saturn V system is 
illustrated in Figure 19. The S-IVB stage a f t  skirt and the S-II forward skirt  
a r e  the structural assemblies from this system selected as  examples. A sketch 
of the Space Shuttle system is shown in Figure 20. The External Tank (ET) 
intertank, Orbiter aft fuselage, Orbiter wings, and Solid Rocket Booster aft 
skirt  a r e  selected as examples from the Space Shuttle. 
Data required as input to the decision model for the example problems 
a re  shown in Table 9. The table headings indicate where each input is used in 
the equations of Chapter W. Weight versus safety index is also needed in the 
decision model. This is most readily obtained in the form of weight versus 
safety factor, which is given for the exam2le problems in Figures 2 1  through 26 .  
To plot weight versus  safety index would require a family of curves. Qie way of 
plotting would be to plot a curve for each test option, which would hold for only 
one particular coefficient of variation of load. The weight versus safety factor 
curve holds for any test option and any coefficient of variation of load. Since all 
of the example problem structures except the S-I1 stage a re  designed for a safety 
factor of 1.4, the reference value of weight mentioned in section 7.3.2 should 
be the value from the figures corresponding to a 1.4 safety factor ( 1.3 for the 
s-11). 
8.3 R.esults 
Results of the application of the decision model to the input data of 
section 8.2 a re  shown in Figures 27 through 32. For each example problem, 
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Figure 19. Saturn V System. 
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,ORBITER WING 
Figure 20. Space Shuttle System. 
Table 9. Input Data for Example Problems 
Value of c o s t  of c o s t  of c o s t  of c o s t  of c o s t  of Coefficient Number of Number of 
Weight Flight Proof Test Test  Option Test Option Test Option of Variation Flight Load Proof Tests 
Example (dollars per  Failure Failure Tl T2 T3 of Load Applications 
Problem pound) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
cW cF  cD1 
C 
D2 cD3 
n m 
Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation Equation 
(7.18) (7.30) (7.31) (7.16) (7.16) (7.16) (C-4) (7.30) (7.31) 
1. 	 s-IVB 11,500 250 X lo6 0.72 X lo6 2.0 X l o6  3.28 X lo6 1.0 X lo6 0.12916 15 15 
Aft Skirt 
2. 	 s-n 4,230 250 X lo6  1.23 X lo6 5.3 X lo6 8.69 X lo6 2.65 X lo6 0.12916 15 15 
Forwa’rd Skirt 
3. ET 13,706 125 X lo6 0.625 X l o6  2.0 X lo6 22.25 X lo6 1.0 X lo6 0.05787 445 44 5 
Intertank 
4. Orbiter 18,832 250 X l o6  2.0 X lo6 5.3 X l o6  3.3 x 106 2.65 X l o6  0.05787 445 5 
Aft Fuselage 
5. 	 Orbiter 18.832 250 X l o 6  2.0 X lo6 5.3 X lo6 6.6 X lo6 2.65 X lo6 0.37 890 
wings 
10 
6. 	 SRB 1,624 14.8 X lo6 0.35 X l o6  2.0 X lo6 8.25 X lo6 1.0 X lo6 0.37 890 50 
Aft Skirt 
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the expected cost versus safety index and versus safety factor is plotted. Two 
sample calculations are shown in Appendix D, and the results are plotted as 
points A and B in Figure 27 and as points C and D in Figure 29. For clarity, 
the proof test option T, has been plotted separately, since there is a separate 
curve for each proof test level. In Figure 27(a), the results for a simpler cost 
model in which P
F 
( p )  was assumed equal to F
N 
(n) (equation 7.11) are plotted 
j 
as dotted lines. This model applies only if the probabilities of failure are very 
small. 
A summary of the final results is given in Table 10 for all example 
problems and all test options. The results were obtained by selecting minimum 
points on the curves in Figures 27 through 32. 
8.4 Trends Shown by Results 
The optimum decision for each of these example problems is the result 
of a complex interaction of several factors which contribute to the expected cost. 
Each of the inputs in Table 9 contributes to the expected cost. 
A higher value of weight in a structural assembly tends to produce lower 
optimum safety factors. A higher cost of flight failure tends to produce higher. 
optimum safety factors. A high cost of proof test failure tends to discourage 
use of the Proof Test Option T, and to reduce the optimum level of the proof 
test load. The optimum proof test level represents the most cost effective 
balance between expected costs of proof test failure and flight failure. The 
number of flight load applications has a pronounced influence on the probability 
I 1 1 1  
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of flight failure, resulting in a tendancy toward higher safety factors for larger 
numbers of flights. 
The Proof Test Option, T2, which has seldom been used in aerospace 
structures of this type, appears remarkably effective, even if the maximi.m 
proof test  level is restricted to 70 percent, as  was done in Table 10. This 
effectiveness appears to arise because of the ability of this test option to pro­
duce more reliable structures with smaller safety factors than the other test 
options. This trend can be observed by comparing Figure 36 (a)  with Figure 
37(a)  in Appendix C ,  for example. The advantage of test option T2 would be 
even more pronounced for one-of-a-kind structures, since only one item instead 
of several would have to be tested ( m  = 1) , resulting in an even lower cost. 
The SRB aft sk i r t  optimum safety factors a re  generally lower than those 
of the other structures, This is very likely because of the lower cost of flight 
failure for this structure, resulting in a lower required reliability as  compared 
with the other structures. 
An encouraging aspect of these results is the comgatibility of the test 
option TIoptimum factors with past experience. The S-IVB and S-II example 
problems were included to establish this compatibility. The design safety factor 
for these structures was 1.40, which compares closely with the 1.47 optimum 
value for Ti in Table 10. A lack of compatibility with previous experience would 
have made the validity of the model developed here questionable. 
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cost 
Optimum 
Decisions 
Overall 
Option 
p* 

N 
V 

Reliability 
Option To 
5 
N 
V 

Reliability 
Option TI 
5 
N 
v 

Reliability 
Option TJ 
p* 

N 
V 

Reliability 
Option T, 
p* 

N 
V 

Reliability 
.-
Table 10. Summary of Cost Optimum Decisions 
s-IVB s-I1 ET Orbiter Orbiter SRB 
Aft Skirt Forward Intertank Aft Wing Aft Skirt 
Skirt Fuselage 
TI T3 TZ T2 T2 TI 
4.12 4.15 2.25 2.32 3.15 4.13 
1.47 1.77 1.37 1.42 1.43 1.33 
0.995 0.995 0.955 0.993 0.951 0.984 
3.62 3.70 3.80 4.07 4.10 3.75 
2.10 2.25 2.65 3.25 2.25 1.80 
0.988 0.989 0.870 0.950 0.900 0.768 
4.18 4.18 4.10 4.65 4.45 4.13 
1.47 1.47 1.55 1.87 1.50 1.33 
0.995 0.996 0.805 0.953 0.949 0.984 
2.6 2.6 2.25 2.32 3.15 3.08 
1.35 1.35 1.37 1.42 1.43 1.37 
0.998 0.998 0.955 0.993 0.951 0.933 
4.10 4.15 4.20 4.65 4.45 4.00 
1.70 1.77 1.95 2.30 1.80 1.53 
0.994 0.995 0.850 0.956 0.940 0.818 
?The maximum proof test level considered feasible for these structures is 
70 percent. Higher levels could damage the structures by yielding. 
* 
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Figure 23. External Tank Intertank Weight. 
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CHAPTER M 
RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Results 
A review of the background material in structural reliability was  pre­
sented in Chapter I. This background was  based on generally accepted principles 
that had evolved from the literature on the subject, which was  reviewed in 
Chapter II. A problem w a s  posed, and a method of solving the problem, based 
on statistical decision theory was  presented in Chapter III. Some concepts to be 
used in the problem solution were carefully explained in Chapter IV. The test 
option concept and a special safety factor definition were new ideas introduced 
in Chapter IV. The test  option formalizes certain structural tes t  procedures in 
a manner suitable for use as one of the decision elements in statistical decision 
theory. The special safety factor definition wil l  make the methods developed in 
this dissertation much easier for the typical user to employ than would alterna­
tive safety factor definitions. 
The use of subjective expert opinion in decision methods was exploited in 
Chapter V. Questionnaires to obtain experts' opinions on structural reliability 
and probabilistic models for analyzing the opinions were developed. The validity 
of the questionnaire and modeling techniques was tested by using a trial ques­
tionnaire concerning a problem for which observed data were available for 
comparison with the experts' opinions. This comparison revealed that one 
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particular model, which utilized the experts' overall assessment of a particular 
strength distribution, agreed remarkably well with the observed data. This 
model and questioning technique was subsequently used to develop a strength 
distribution for a test option for which no observed data were available. 
In Chapter VI, Bayesian statistical methods were used for combining 
prior information from laboratory tests with new information from flight 
experience to develop a strength distribution for a particular tes t  option. This 
was accomplished by fitting a two-parameter Weibull model to the laboratory 
data by the maximum likelihood method, then updating the scale parameter of 
this distribution with flight data, using Bayesian statistical methods. 
A decision model for selecting the test option and design safety index 
which results in minimum expected cost was developed in Chapter VI1 and 
applied to  six typical aerospace structural assemblies in Chapter WI. Results 
which appeared reasonable were obtained for each of the six example problems. 
9.2 Conclusions 
1. The decision techniques developed in this research can readily and 
confidently be used for selecting design factors and test  options for aerospace 
structures, if minimum expected cost is the desired objective. 
2 .  Expert opinions a re  a valuable source of quantitative information in 
structural problems, provided that adequate care  and deliberation are used in 
acquiring the opinions and analyzing the results. 
3. Bayesian statistical techniques provide a viable method of combining 
prior information with new data in structural reliability problems. 
.I I II I I 111111 I 111111111111- -11.111 I 111.1 1.11.1 ..I.,. II-I ,1111 ,1._1­
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9.3 Recom1nendati.s 
As is the case with most research, the completion of this endeavor 
provides several new problem areas in which further research could be initiated. 
Some of these will be discussed briefly. 
One group of such problems could come under the heading of an expan­
sion of the decision space. The introduction of failure modes other than static 
strength failures would constitute such an expansion, For  example, inclusion of 
fatigue failures would require that the decision space be expanded to include the 
selection of a fatigue test procedure and a fatigue safety measure, such as a 
design scatter factor. Another exam2le would be the consideration of fracture 
mechanics where the decision would again involve selection of a test procedure 
and a safety measure appropriate to the fracture failure mode. Another con­
sideration which would expand the decision space would be the selection of an 
optimal sample s ize  (e. g. the optimum number of tests to run) which would 
minimize cost. 
A second group of related problems would involve a coupling of the 
decision for  a given assembly with the decision for all other assem5lies in the 
system. Although all the ramifications of such a coupling have not been fully 
explored, it is quite certain that i t  would lead to a very sophisticated optimiza­
tion procedure, possibly far beyond any that has been developed. This could be 
an area of research in its own right. One cause of such a coupling would be an 
assumption that the reliability of one assembly depends upon the reliability of 
another. The following conditions tend to  reduce such a dependence: (1) a small 
177 

variance in load compared with a variance in strength, (2, loads in the various 
assemblies arising from different sources, and (3) high reliability in all 
assemblies. Another cause of assembly coupling would be the application of a 
constraint on the total reliability of a system made up of several assemblies. 
Such a constraint could possibly be dictated by management or contractual 
requirement and would cause the expected cost to be higher than the attainable 
minimum, 
Other features which would increase the quality of a decision would be 
the consideration of miiltiple load conditions and of the lack of symmetry of the 
cost with respect to an error in the decision. The first feature would simply 
require that all load conditions be included in calculating the probability of 
failure. A special case of this would be the omega condition proposed by Bouton 
and Trent [ 191. The omega condition is one of infrequent occurrence, such as 
a load that might be caused by failure of a nonstructural system. Such a loading 
could be treated as a load distribution conditional upon the probability of failure 
of the nonstructural system. 
The unsymmetrical cost feature would be so devised that the decision-
maker would not make the decision which absolutely minimizes cost but would 
bias his decision in the direction and by an amount that would minimize his risk 
when the asymmetry of cost with respect to his decision is considered. 
In the previous discussion of test options in Chapter IV, it was implied 
that a test option is deterministic in nature, and this is the intention in the 
present research. However, a more refined approach would not prescribe a 
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completely deterministic course of action but wouId recognize the probabilistic 
aspects of testing, such as noise in the test results. To be consistent with the 
Bayesian approach, it would not be sufficient to  make inductive statistical 
inferences about the probabilities involved, but a means would need to be 
devised to cause such probabilities to be properly weighted as to  their effect on 
the decision at hand. This could be a challenging and rewarding area. 
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APPENDIX A 
NOMENCLATURE 
Symbol Definition 

A A general event. 

A ,  Aj(P)  Action or  decision space. 

A I B  Event A conditional on event B. 

A n B  Intersection of events A and B. 

A U B  Union of events A and B. 

a 
B 
c 
* 
C 
A particular action or  decision. 
A general event. 
Cause of a difference between actual and predicted strengths. 
Total expected cost. 
Optimum cost. 
Direct costs. 
Development costs. 
Cost of one failure. 
Expected cost of failure. 
Cost of i failures. 
Cost of weight. 
Cumulative distribution function. 
NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
C Unit cost of weight.
W 
D Discrepancy between mathematical model and actual structure. 

Dl A statistic measuring the difference between data and model. 

dl 
A particular value of D1' 

E A n  entry in response to questionnaire. 

-
E Mean value of repondents' cfuestionnaire entries. 
,\Y ~ 
Expected value of A. 
E M  The event that the statement A is true. 
e A constant, 2.71828 
FX(4  Cumulative distribution function of the random variable X. 
g (XI  Probability density function of the random variable X. 
(4 Pr ior  density function. 
q x )  Posterior density function. 
Ngc.) Bayesian density function. 
Event of failure in load increment i.Ii 
i, j, k, 1, m ,  n Enumeration indices. 
k Shape parameter of the Weibull distribution. 
f: Maximum likelihood estimate of k. 
L Reliability; likelihood function. 
q4 	 Probability that a structural assembly will survive n load 
applications. 
P Number of observed failures in a sample. 
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NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
I, 1', I" 	 General, prior, and posterior values of a parameter of the 
gamma distribution. 
P Number of structural assemblies to be proof tested. 
n 	 Number of observations in a sample; number of load cycles 
experienced by a structure; number of alternative actions. 
*i 	
Number of structures expected to fail in load increment i from 
observed data. 
Probability that event A will occur. 
Expected number of failures. 
Probability of having exactly i failures. 
Probability density function. 
P A constant; proof test  cycle. 
P f W  Probability of failure on the kth application of load. 
Probability of no failure on the kth application of load. 
Probability of failure on the ith application of load and surviving
pi all others. 
P. Probability of failure on the ith and rth applications of load and 
1, surviving all others. 
4 A constant. 
Resistance or strength of a structural assembly. 
R A characteristic value of the resistance. 
P-
R Mean or expected value of the resistance. 
r A particular value of R. 
r Proof test load level.
0 
I . . 
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S 
S 
q
-

S 
SM 
-

SM 
T 
U 
V 

A 
V 
P 
p” 

r 
’R”S 
9 
e 
R 
NOMENCLATURE (Continued) 
Load applied to a structural assembly. 
A characteristic value of the load. 
Mean or expected value of the load. 
Safety margin. 
Mean o r  expected value of the safety margin. 
Test option. 
Utility function. 
Scale parameter of the Weibull distribution. 
Maximum likelihood estimate of v. 
Weight of a structural assembly. 
Particular probabilistic models of experts’ opinions. 
General, prior, and posterior values of a parameter of the gamma 
distribution. 
A constant; an allowable risk; a scaling factor; significance 
level. 
Safety index. 
Optimum safety index. 
The gamma function. 
Coefficients of variation of resistance and load, respectively. 
Vector of parameters of a probabilistic model; the state of nature. 
A particular value of 8. 
A parameter of the Weibull distribution. 
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NOMENCLATURE (Concluded) 
A A particular value of A .  
V Safety factor; factor for uncertainty. 
A
V 	 A safety factor in terms of characteristic values of resistance 
and load. 
; Safety factor in terms of mean resistance and mean load. 
N 

V Safety factor in terms of analysts’ predicted resistance and a 

characteristics value of load. 
l-r Indicates the product of following terms. 
c Indicates a summation of following terms. 
U Standard deviations of resistance, load, and safety margin,R’ “S’ aSM respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
This appendix contains the questionnaires, as  well as the introductory 
letters, used to elicit the opinions of experts in structural analysis and testing, 
The opinions obtained were used in calculating strength distributions for some of 
the test  options used in this dissertation. 
Questionnaire A was used to test the method of acquiring opinions, the 
probabilistic models, and the ability of experts to provide the type of informa­
tion needed. The results are analyzed in Chapter V. Questionnaire B was used 
for obtaining information to develop a strength distribution for test option T,, 
the model test option. The required distribution is calculated from the Qdes­
tionnaire B results in Chapter V. The Questionnaire C results yielded subjec­
tive information which was combined with observed data to obtain a strength 
distribution for test option Ti, the standard test option in Chapter VI. 
The questionnaires are included here exactly as they were sent to the 
experts. To conserve space, the mean responses to the questionnaires [ see 
equation (5.1) 1 a re  entered in boldface type in the spaces provided for the 
experts' responses. 
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GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30332 
SCHOOL OF DANIEL GUGGENHEIM SCHOOL 
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 404as4aoOo OF AERONAUTICS 
Dear 
I am engaged in research on structural reliability with Dr. S. V. Hanagud 
at Georgia Tech in aerospace structural engineering. The end product of this 
research will be a methodology for selecting a combination of design safety 
factors (or equivalent parameters) and structural testing options which yields 
a minimum zxpected system cost. 
The particular decision theory to be used in this process permits subjec­
tive information as well as objective information to be employed in reaching a 
decision. One type of subjective information is expert opinion. In certain test 
cases a remarkable correlation between collective expert opinion and indepen­
dent objective data has been observed. 
The enclosed questionnaire is being sent to a few experts, such as your­
self, in the area of structural analysis and testing. It is the first of a series of 
two similar questionnaires which 1 hope you can find time to answer. 
There is no reason for me to believe that your opinions in this area or 
your employment affiliation should be sensitive informatim. Nevertheless, 
your reply will be treated as sensitive, and no names or employers will be 
disclosed in the publication of results. In fact, the replies will be sanitized 
(identification removed) upon receipt, and the publication will be a conglom­
erate of replies in which no individual reply appears separately. It may be 
interesting for you to compare your own opinions with the collective opinions 
of other experts when the results are compiled. If you wish to receive a copy 
of the summary results, please check the box on the first page of the question­
naire. 
As you may know, I am an employee of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Admistration. However, I am presently assigned to full-time graduate study 
and am asking this as a personal favor in the interest of research, and not as 
an employee of NASA. To answer the questionnaire will require some delibera­
tion and at least one hour of your time. However, we believe this effort will be 
amply rewarded by a greater insight into the factors affecting structural reli­
ability. 
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The questionnaire has three parts, arranged in order of importance. 
If time does not permit you to  answer the entire questionnaire, perhaps you 
could complete Part I, which is especially simple. If you intend to reply, 
please do so by July 15, 1973. A mail-back envelope is enclosed for your 
reply to 
Dr. S. Hanagud 

School of Aerospace Engineering 

Georgia Institute of Technology 

Atlanta, Georgia 30332 

If you are  unable to complete the questionnaire for any reason, please 
mail it back anyway so we can keep track of our returns. Detach this letter 
for your records if you wish, 
Thank you very much for your time. 
Sincerely, 
Jerrell M. Thomas 
JMT/ jct 
. . ... . .. . .. ... . -....- , .. . ._ _  . ..._. 
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S e r i a l  Number __Mean Response 
Questionnaire A 
A STUDY OF FACTORS AFFECTING 
THE ACCURACY OF mROSPACE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
S. V. Hanagud and J. M. Thomas 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia I n s t i t u t e  o f  Technology 
Atlanta,  Georgia 30332 
( ) Please send summary of study r e su l t s .  
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INTRODUCTION 

EXPLANATION OF SERBS OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
The ser ies  of questionnaires consists of two separate question­
naires, A and B. Questionnaire A i s  enclosed. Questionnaire B w i l l  
be sent t o  respondents of A, 'after the ' resu l t s  of A have been analyzed. 
The purpose of A i s  t o  determine the val idi ty  of the expert 
opinion approach in th i s  particular application. Some objective' data 
are available for  comparison w i t h  the collective expert opinion t o  be 
obtained from A. 
If there i s  good correlation between the objective data and expert 
opinion from A, B w i l l  be sent out. B w i l l  relate t o  a situation where 
objective data are not available. Thus, the collective expert opinion 
w i l l  be the only source of data available fo r  the si tuation i n  B. 
EXPLANATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE A 
The questionnaire seeks t o  determine %he amount and source of 
errors which can be expected in aerospace s t a t i c  s t ructural  analysis 
before the analyst has obtained qualification t e s t  resul ts .  This i s  
done by using the analyst 's predicted fa i lure  load as a baseline 
value and attempting t o  determine the sca t te r  about t h i s  baseline. 
The analyst's prediction contains no safety factor. That is ,  the 1m 
value is  not l i m i t  load or l i m i t  load times the required safety factor,  
but i s  the load at which the analyst predicts the structure w i l l  fai l .  
It is assumed tha t  there is always some difference (sometimes very small) 
between the analyst's prediction and the actual fa i lure  load. 
Innumerable questions would have t o  be answered t o  remove a l l  
ambiguity from the questionnaire. For example, one could legitimately 
ask: was  the analysis done by the superior methods of my own company 
or  by the obsolete methods of Company X? How much development tes t ing 
or  pr ior  experience is associated with the design i n  question? what 
is the type of construction, etc? You are asked t o  aaswer these types 
of questions fo r  yourself (and t o  yourself) by drawing on your own 
experience as t o  w h a t  constitutes a typical development program of a 
typical  aerospace system. 
It i s  perfectly acceptable t o  consult with your co-workers o r  t o  
review any data which you may have i n  hand in answering the questionnaire. 
On the other hand, it is  a l so  appropriate t o  give completely "off-the-
cuff" responses. 
I 

--- 
-- 
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QUESTIONNAIRF: A 
PART I. HOW ACCURATE ARE ANALYSTS' PmDIC"IIIONS? 
Suppose tha t  during a typ ica l  development program of a typ ica l  
major aerospace system, the  point i n  time has been reached f o r  struc­
t u r a l  s t a t i c  qua l i f ica t ion  t e s t ing  t o  begin. The t e s t  program i s  t o  be 
accomplished by t e s t ing  one each of a number of large s t ruc tu ra l  
assemblies such as a complete wing, a t h rus t  s t ruc ture ,  a large fuse­
lage section, an inters tage s t ructure ,  e tc .  For each assembly, the  
responsible s t r e s s  analysts have given predictions of the  ult imate fa i l ­
ure loads under s t a t i c  conditions (no fat igue involved). We are  
interested i n  your judgement of how accurate we can expect these predic­
t ions t o  be. 
In  the  tab le  below are  ten  t e s t  f a i l u r e  load increments, expressed 
as a percentage o f  analysts '  predictions.  Please indicate  the  approxi­
mate percentage OB t e s t  f a i lu re s  you would expect t o  f a l l  in each incre­
ment for s t a t i c  s t ruc tu ra l  t e s t s  of t h i s  so r t .  For example, if you 
believe 20% of the  assemblies tes ted  w i l l  f a l l  between 80% and 90% of 
f a i lu re  
(4) 
load predicted by the analysts,  you would en ter  20% i n  column 
Table 1. Accuracy of Analysts' Predictions 
I - - - _  
! Test Failure Load Increment - Percent of Analysts' 1 
1 
'of Failures 
... 
Check: Do your estimates of percent f a i lu re s  t o t a l  100%. 
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PART I I ( A )  . WHAT CAUSES ANALYSTS' ERRORS? 
We are interested i n  your opinion of what typically causes 
predicted fa i lure  loads t o  be different from actual  t e s t  fa i lure  loads 
in t e s t s  of large s t ructural  assemblies. Listed below are several 
possible causes f o r  these differences, with space fo r  you t o  add any 
other causes which might account for the differences. 
In the table below, you are asked t o  indicate your judgement of 
the approximate percentage of a l l  errors which are primarily caused 
by each of the causes l i s t ed  (including any you have added). For 
example, if you f e e l  tha t  5 out of every 100 prediction errors are due 
t o  "Scatter i n  material properties", please enter "5" opposite item 4 
in  the table. 
Table 2. Causes of E r r o r s  
*Responses not shown. See letter introducing Approximate 
Questionnaire B. Percentage of 
Errors  from th i s  
Primary Cause of Prediction Error  Cause 
i. 	 Analysts' mathematical model i s  a poor repre­
sentation of the actual structure. * %  
2.  Analyst made a mathematical error. * %  
3. 	 Analyst overlooked (or  fa i led  t o  analyze) 
some c r i t i c a l  area o r  fa i lure  mode. * %  
4. Scatter i n  material properties. * %  
5 .  Variation (within tolerance) of dimensions. * % 
6 .  Undetected manufacturing error. * % 
7. Test load condition did not represent f l i gh t  
condition used by analyst for  prediction. (e.g.,
aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 
d i f f icu l t  t o  duplicate). * % 
8. Other causes (Please l i s t ) .  
* % 
Check: Do your percentages sum t o  loo%? TOTAL loa 
191 

PART I I ( B ) .  SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES_ _ -
On the previous page you gave an indication of what you believe 
are the causes f o r  differences. in predicted and t e s t  strengths of 
structura3. assemblies. In  the tables below you are asked t o  indicate 
the amourrts by which you believe these causes can affect  the difference. 
The causes are t o  be considered one a t  a time. You gre asked t o  assume 
that  a given cause has been determined t o  be the reason for  differences 
between t e s t  and predicted strengths i n  a rimer of assemblies. 
Please enter i n  the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would f a i l  in each load increment due 
t o  the given cause. The sum of entr ies  i n  each table  should t o t a l  100%. 
Table 3. 	 Analysts' Mathematical Model Is A Poor 
Representation of the Actual Structure 
Test Failure Load Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
,Your ! ! i/Estimate of I 
i 1 ! 
Table 4. Analyst Made a Mathematical Error 
I 
Test Failure Load Increment - Percent D f  Analysts ' I 
Y o u r  

E s t i m a t e  of 

Percentage 8.7 7.4 

of Failures 

I I 
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PART I I ( B )  . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM D W m - C A U @  (Continued) 
Table 5 .  	 Analyst Overlooked (or Fai led t o  Analyze) 
Some C r i t i c a l  Area o r  Fai lure  Mode 
~-_ _  .. - . .. __  - . 
Test Failure Load Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
Your 
Estimate of 
Table 6. Sca t te r  i n  Material  Propert ies  
I 
- ~ .- - _ -
Test Fai lure  Load Increment - Percent of AnalN-stsf 
Table 7. Variation (Within Tolerance) of Dimensions 
Estimate of 
Percent age 
- - -- 
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_ _sxzg OF E-EJRORS-~OM DIFFERENT CAUSES (continued) 
Table 8. Undetected Manufacturing Error 
1 ­
- . .  
T e s t  Failure Wad Increment - Percent of Anests '  
Table 9. 	 Test Ioad Condition D i d  Not Represent Flight 
Condition Used by Analyst for Predict ion 
-. . . - _. 
1 
Test Failure Load Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
tdict&on I 
( 2 )  ' (3) 
I 60- 70­70 80 
Y o u r  

Estimate of 

Percentage 1.3 

of Failures 

Table 10. Other Causes 
- . . ._~ . . . . . .
I 1
l Test Failure Load Increment - Percent of ha*sts' I 
E s t i m a t e  of 

Percentage 10.1 24.2 

of Failur%
-E --
Check: Do your en t r ies  in each table t o t a l  lo@? 
- -  - -  
i94 
PMT I I I ( A )  . DISCRFPANCIES I N  MAT�&MAXICAL M O E  
The purpose of Par t  I11 is  t o  fur ther  quantify the  e r ro r s  in 
mathematical models (Cause Number 1). That i s ,  the  individual  d i s ­
crepancies which cause the analysts '  mathematical model t o  be a poor 
representation of the  ac tua l  s t ruc ture  will be examined. 
In the t ab le  below, please indicate i n  the  Frequency of Occurrence 
column the  percentage of occasions you bel ieve the  discrepancy i n  the 
l e f t  column w i l l  be the p r i m r y  reason tha t  the  analysts '  mathematical 
madel i s  in er ror .  The Frequency of Occurrence column should t o t a l  100%. 
Table 11. Frequency of Discrepascies 
Discre-m" Between Analvsts ' Mathemtical 

Model an3 Actm.1 5tructure 
----___­

1. A stress d i s t r ibx t ion  i s  assumed inwteal o f  cal­
culated. E x a q l e  : Linear s t r e s s  distribil- t im 
ass'umed over bean cross sect ion znar end 12beam. 12.4- -% 
2 .  	 A l imar amLLj-sis i s  used where a notilint?ar &ialysis 
i s  closer to r e a l i t y .  Examples : Elas t i c  a;?alysis 
used in p i s t i c  a?ea. S - t l l  deformation theory u3ed 
where defo~imtio:;s are large. 
3. 
4. 

17.3 % 
5 .  	 Fin i t e  element model i s  too coarse. Example: 
Rapid s t r e s s  changes at discontinuity o r  
cutout not predicted by model. 16.6 4 
6. Geometric idea l iza t ion  i s  incorrect.  Example: 
Sheet-stringer combination t rea ted  as 
i so t ropic  p l a t e .  12.1 % 
7 .  	 Anisotropic o r  inhomogeneous materials t r ea t ed  
as i so t ropic  o r  homogeneous. Example : 
Composite mater ia l  analyzed by methods applicable 
only t o  homogeneous, i so t ropic  materials.  6.1 % 
8. Other discrepancies (Please l i s t ) .  
4.2 %-
Total:  100% 
-- 
-- 
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Ln t h i s  pa r t  you are asked t o  indicate  the amounts by which you 
bel ieve the  discrepancies l i s t e d  on the previous page can a f f ec t  the  
difference between predicted and tes t  strengths.  The discrepancies 
are  t o  be considered one at a t i m e .  You are  asked t o  assume that a 
given discrepancy is  known t o  be the  reason f o r  differences between 
predicted and t e s t  s t rengths .  
Please en ter  in the  tab les  below your opinion of the percentages 
of assemblies which you believe would f a i l  in each load increment due 
t o  the given discrepancy. The sum of en t r i e s  in ea,ch t ab le  should 
t o t a l  100%. 
Table 12. A S t ress  Distr ibut ion Is Assumed Instead o f  Calculated 
._ -
Table 1.3. 	 A Linear Analysis Is Used Where a 
Nonlinear Analysis Is Closer t o  Reality 
-- -
Test Fai lure  Load Increment - Percent of Analysts' ! 
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P W  I I I ( B )  . 	S E E  OF ERfioRs FROM DISCXEPANClES I N  W m T I C A L  MODES 
(Continued) 
Table 14. Empirical Data Is Extrapolated Too FZr 
I I T e s t  Failure -ad Increment - Percent of Analysts' 1 
Table 15. Incorrect Boundary Conditions Are Used 
Test Failure mad Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
Predict ion 
(1) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  (4) ( 5 )  (6) (7) (8 )  (9 )  (10) 
60- 70- 80- go- loo- n o - m- 130­
60 70 80 go loo u o  120 130 140 >i4o 
~ 
Your 

Estimate of 

Percentage 2.2 3.9 7.9 14.5 23.4 14.8 7.9 5.3 2.2 

-of Failures I 
Table 16. Finite Element Model Is Too Coarse 
I I Test Failure I;oad Increment - Percent of Analvsts' t 
-- 
-- 
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PUT III(B), _SIZE OF ERRORS ~~RO-DI~XEP@CIFS-IN MAT=-TICAL MODELS 
(continued) 
Table 17. Geometric Idealization Is lncorrect 
- -_ _  -
T e s t  Failure lncrement - Percent of Analysts' 
Predict ion 
Percentage 7.6 
of Failures 
Table 18. 	 Anisotropic or Inhomogeneous Materials 
Treated A s  Isotropic or Homogeneous 
I 	 Test Failure Load lncrment - Percent of Analysts' 
Predict ion 
(1) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  (4) (5) 
60- 70- 80- 9­
- 6 0  70 80 90 100 
- - - ­ __=- .. 
Y O G  
Estimate o f  
Percentage 8.3 7.0 10.2 16.5 22.3 16.1 
of Failures 
. - ..- _I 
Table 19. Other Discrepancies 
Test Failure mad Increment - Percent of AnalystsI-~ 
Estimate of 
Percentage 1.7 
-
Check: Do your entr ies  in each table t o t a l  lo%? 
198 

PART IT 
Comments : 
End of Questionnaire A 
Please enclose in envelope provided and m a i l  t o :  
Dr. S. Hanagud 

School of Aerospace Engineering 

Georgia I n s t i t u t e  of Technology 

Atlanta,  Georgia 30332 

Name : 
Employer : 
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GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30332 
SCHOOL OF DANIEL GUGGENHEIM SCHOOL 
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING OF AERONAUTICS 
Dear 
Your response to our first questionnaire on factors affecting the accuracy 
of aerospace structural analysis was certainly appreciated. Some meaningful 
preliminary results have already been obtained from Questionnaire A, and a 
summary of those results is enclosed. Analysis of Questionnaire A is continuing 
along the line of searching for better data reduction techniques. 
As mentioned in our first letter an enclosed second questionnaire has been 
prepared, which is similar to the first questionnaire, but deals with the increased 
analytical accuracy obtained through an expanded component and model develop­
ment test program. 
It has been determined that Part II( A) in Questionnaire A was probably 
poorly constructed (see enclosed Preliminary Results from Questionnaire A). 
Therefore, a revision of Part II(A) is included in this mailing. Please complete 
the revised Table 2 and return it with Questionnaire B. 
Your reply to Questionnaire B is especially important to us, since it is 
being sent only to respondents of Questionnaire A. 
If you intend to reply, please do so by September 17, 1973. Thank you 
again for spending part of your valuable time in helping with this reaearch. 
Sincerely, 
Jerrell M. Thomas 
JMT/jt 
Enclosure 
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S e r i a l  Number Mean Response. . - . .  . 
Questionnaire B 
A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF 

MODEL AND COMPONENT TESTING I N  INCREASING 

THE ACCURACY OF AEROSPACE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 

S.  V .  Hanagud and J .  M. Thomas 
School of Aerospace Engineering 
Georgia I n s t i t u t e  of Technology 
Atlanta,  Georgia 30332 
( ) Please send sunrmary of study r e s u l t s  
--- -- -- --- -- 
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INTRODUC!EON 
This questionnaire seeks t o  determine the amount and source of er­
rors  i n  aerospace s t a t i c  s t ructural  analysis, assuming that the analyst
has available t o  h i m  the resul ts  of an extensive component and moiiel de­
velopment test program. This i s  done by using the analyst 's  predicted 
value as a baseline value and attempting to  determine the scat ter  about 
this baseline. The analyst 's  prediction contains no safety factor. That 
is ,  the loo$ value i s  the load a t  which the analyst predicts the struc­
ture  will fa i l .  It i s  assumed that there i s  always some difference (some­
times very small) between the analyst's prediction and the actual fa i lure  
load. 
I n  Questionnaire A you were asked t o  assume that the analyst 's  pre­
dictions were based on a typical development program of a typical aero­
space system. The point i n  time assumed was before any s t a t i c  qualifica­
t ion  tes t ing had been accomplished. The only change i n  these assumptions 
for  Questionnaire B i s  that  much more than a typical development program 
i s  assumed t o  have been accomplished i n  the area of component and model 
testing. The expanded component and model t e s t  program t o  be assumed i s  
described qualitatively i n  the following paragraph. 
A component i s  defined as  a reasonably small st ructural  subassem­
bly such as a ring segment , a thrust  post (longeron), or a major f i t t i ng .  
A model i s  a scaled ( in  the engineering sense) replica of a large struc­
tural assembly. Development testing i s  accomplished on such components 
and models through the use of an i t e r a t ive  process. The i te ra t ive  process 
involves basing the t e s t  conditions on expected service conditions, pre­
diction of t e s t  resul ts  by the best available analysis methods, direct  
and detailed comarison of t e s t  resul ts  with analytical  predictions, and 
repeti t ion of design, analysis , and testing unt i l - analysis and t e s t  re­
smts agree. Design of every subassembly of the f l i g h t  a r t i c l e  i s  then 
based on these components and models, and the f l i gh t  a r t i c l e  - analyzedi s  
b d t h e  same techniques which agreed with the model and component t e s t  re­
sults .-
All parts  of Questionnaire B pertain t o  the accuracy i n  analysis
of the f l i g h t  a r t i c l e  a f t e r  such an extensive developent program but 
before any rull scale s t ructural  qualification testing. 
Even i f  you have no data or observations i n  such a situation, we 
are interested i n  y o u  opinion about the expected accuracy. 
I 

- -  
-- 
-- 
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QUESTIONNAIRE B 

PART I:, gow-ACCURATE ARE . .  PREDICTIONS?... . -~A.~LYSTS-~ . 
Suppose t h a t  during development of a t y p i c a l  aerospace sy.stem, a 
. = .- . . , - .  . . . -number of l a rge  s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies have been developed through the  
model and___. .- -.._-. . .. .- _I_component t e s t  procedure described i n  t h e  introduct ion.  For 
each assembly, the responsible stress ana lys t s  have given predlct ions of 
the  ultimate f a i l u r e  loads under s t a t i c  conditions (no f a t igue  involved).  
We a r e  in te res ted  i n  your judgement of haw accurate  we can expect these 
predict ions t o  be. 
In  the  t ab le  below a r e  t en  t e s t  f a i l u r e  load increments, expressed 
as a percentage of ana lys t s '  predict ions.  Please ind ica te  the  approximate 
percentage of t e s t  f a i l u r e s  you would expect t o  f a l l  i n  each increment i f  
each assembly developed by the  above procedure i s  subJected t o  a s t a t i c  
t e s t .  For example, if you bel ieve 2@ of the assemblies t e s t e d  w i l l  f a i l  
between 80% and 90% of f a i l u r e  load predicted by the ana lys t s ,  you would 
en ter  20% i n  column ( 4 ) .  
Table 1. Accuracy of Analysts Predict ions 
*_ ­.. .. -. -.- -- .- -. ~~ -~ ~ ... - .- _c
of Analysts 
. . . - .. -..__ 
Your 
Estimate of 
o f  Fai lures  
Check: Do your estimates of percent f a i l u r e s  t o t a l  l.OO%? 
203 

PART I I ( A ) .  WHAT CAUSES DIFFERENCES SETWEEN PRFDICTED AND ACTUAL FAILURE-
LOADS? 
Assume t h a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  of var ious  magnitu.des have been observed 
between a n a l y s t s '  p red ic ted  f a i lu re  load and a c t u a l  t e s t  failure load  i n  
each of 100 s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies cons is t ing  of components developed 
according t o  t h e  expanded component and model t e s t  program descr ibed i n  
t h e  in t roduct ion .  I n  t h e  t a b l e  below i s  a l i s t  of  poss ib le  causes of 
t h e  observed d i f f e r e n c e s .  
Assume t h a t  i n  t h e  sample of 100 s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies you will 
always f i n d  one of t h e  causes present ,  and t h a t  occasional ly  you may f i n d  
more than one cause present .  For example, s c a t t e r  i n  material p r o p e r t i e s  
and v a r i a t i o n  of dimensions could be present  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  an a n a l y s t ' s  
poor mathematical model. 
I n  what percentage of t h e  t e s t s  do you be l ieve  t h a t  each of t h e  
causes was a c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  observed d i f f e r e n c e ,  regard less  of t h e  
magnitude of tne  d i f f e r e n c e ?  Your e n t r i e s  i n  Table 2 can a l s o  be i n t e r ­
pre ted  t o  represent  how o f t e n  or how f requent ly  you t h i n k  t h e  given cause 
cont r ibu tes  t o  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  pred ic ted  and a c t u a l  s t r e n g t h s .  Because t h e  
sample i s  concerned w i t h  a l l  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  d i f f e r e d  from t h e  ana lys t ' s  
p r e d i c t i o n ,  without regard f o r  t h e  magnitude of t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  any one 
o r  more of t h e s e  causes (e .g .  s c a t t e r  i n  material p r o p e r t i e s  or v a r i a t i o n  
of dimensions* or any one of t h e  o t h e r  8 causes i n  t h e  1ist)may be re­
sponsible  (Hypothe t ica l ly)  f o r  only small  magnitudes of d i f f e r e n c e s  , b u t  
could be present  i n  l a r g e  numbers i n  t h e  sample of 100. Causes 4 and 5 
are t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as normal or n a t u r a l  occurrences and t h e  remaining 
causes are intended t o  represent  e r r o r s  or anomalies. Since one or more 
cauzes a r e  assumed t o  always be present ,  your e n t r i e s  should t o t a l  100% 
or more. 
Table 2. Causes of Differences 
Frequency of 
Cause of Difference Occurrence 
1. 	 Analysts '  mathematical model i s  a poor representa t ion  
21.33 %of  t h e  a c t u a l  s t r u c t u r e .  
2 .  Analyst  made a mathematical e r r o r .  6.72 % 
3. 	 Analyst  overlooked (or  f a i l ed  t o  analyze)  some 
24.44 %c r i t i c a l  area or  fa i lure  mode. -
+These causes are given as examples only and should not  be permit ted 
t o  inf luence  your response.  
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Table 2. Causes of Differences (continued) 
Frequency of 
Cause of Difference- Occurrence 
4. Scatter in material properties. 18.00 $ 
5. Variation (within tolerance) of dimensions. 15.78 $ 
6. Undetected manufacturing error. 14.94$ 
7. Test load condition did not represent flight 
condition used by analyst for prediction. (e.g.,

aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 

difficult t o  duplicate). 17.285 

8. Other causes (Please list). 
. . . . . . .  ..____ __ 
3.72 % ... -. .. 
Total: 122.21 % 
._... -- ...------ .............. 1.11.-11. ......,.,I,.. I_..,.. .. .I I , ,  I I, . I I - I..., ......... 
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PART I_S(B). SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIE'FERIWT CAUSES 
On the previous page you gave an indication of what you believe 
are the causes f o r  differences in predicted and test strengths of 
s t ruc tura l  assemblies. In the  tables below you are asked t o  indicate 
the amounts by which you believe these causes can affect the difference. 
The causes are t o  be considered one at, a t h e .  You are  asked t o  assume 
t h a t  a given cause has been determined t o  be the reason f o r  differences 
between t e s t  and predicted strengths i n  a number of assemblies. 
Please enter i n  the tables below your opinion of the percentages
of assemblies which you believe would f a i l  in each load increment due 
t o  the  given cause. The sum of entries i n  each table should t o t a l  10%. 
Table 3. 	 Analysts' Mathematical Model Is A Poor 
Representation of the Actual Structure 
- - _ ~ ­-~ . - - _ ~ ~ - .- ~
ITest Failure Load Increment 1Percent of Analysts' 
D f  Analysts ' I 
Estimate Percen age 
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PART II(B) . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DIFFERENT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 5.  Analyst Overlooked (or Failed t o  Analyze). 
' Some Cr i t ica l  Area or  Failure Mode 
-
1 7 ~ T e s - bFailure b a d  Increment - Percent of A n a l y s t s ' /  
Table 6. Scatter in Material Properties 
1- Predict ion 
E; i.E-iT-
Estimate of 
::lentage 1I 0.06 28.25 34.63 19.91 
2f Failures 
. .  
Table 7. Variation (Within Tolerance) of Dimensions 
1- ~ I 	 Test Failure bad Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
Predict ion 
(1) (2) ( 3 )  (4) (5) ( 6 )  (7 )  ' ( 8 )  ( 9 )  (10) 
60- 70- 80- go- 100- 110- EO- 130­
4 0  70 80 90 100 ll0 120 130 140 >140 ----====I-~,
of Failur s 0.06 0.50 2.25 10.00 31.561,- 33.75 15.81 4.38 1.63: 1 -0.06'IYour * of
- - - - 
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PART II(B) . SIZE OF ERROWFROM DIFFE_RNT CAUSES (Continued) 
Table 8. Undetected Manufacturing Error 
___- ~ - -- -_  _ _  __ 
Test Failure b a d  Increment - Percent 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )  (6 )  (7 )  (8) (9)  (10) 
60- 70- 80- go- 100- 110- 120- 130­
-40 70 80 go loo 110 120 130 140 >i40 
Your 
Estimate of 
Percentage 4.00 7.11 11.78 23.83 28.33 16.39 6.44 1.28 0.67 0.17 
of Failures - -
Table 9. 	 Test bad Condition Did Not Represent Flight 
Condition Used by Analyst f o r  Prediction 
I T e s t  Failure bad Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
Estimate of 
Percentage 
of Failures 
Table 10. Other Causes 
Test Failure bad Increment - Percent of  Analysts ' I 

(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )  ( 6 )  (7 )  
60- 70- 80- 90- 100- 110­
40 70 80 go loo p10 120 
-
Y o u r  
Estimate of 

Per centage 2.50 11.00 10.50 16.00 24.50 15.50 9.00 

of Failures 
check: DO your ent r ies  in each table  t o t a l  , -:, .r, 
I 
-- 
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PART I I I ( A ) .  DISmPANCIES I N  MATJBMATICAL MODELS 
The purpose of Part I11 is  t o  fur ther  quantify the errors in 
mathematical models (Cause Number 1). That is, the individual dis­
crepancies which cause the analysts'  mathematical model t o  be a poor 
Irepresentation of the actual  structure w i l l  be examined. 
In  the table below, please indicate i n  the  Frequency of Occurrence 
column the percentage of occasions you believe the discrepancy i n  the 
l e f t  column w i l l  be the prkmwy reason that the analysts'  mathematical 
model i s  in error.  The Frequency of Occurrence column should t o t a l  l o a .  
Table 11. Frequency of Discrepancies 
Discrepancy Between Analysts ' Mathemtical Frequency of 
Model an3 Actuzl S t rwtu re  Occurrence 
1. 	 A stress dis t r ibut ion i s  assumed instead. of cal­
culated. Example : Linear s t ress  d i s t r i b u t i m  
assumed over beam cross section near end of beam. 11.72 4 
2. 	 A l inear  malys is  i s  used where a nonlinear analysis
i s  closer t o  rea l i ty .  Exanples: Elas$ic analysis 
used i n  2 l s s t i c  area. Sm1.l lieformation theory used 
17.65 3where deformations are large. 
3. 	 Empirical data I s  exkrapolated too far. Example : 
Lightly s t i f fened she l l  buckling coeffizients used 
f o r  h e . a T . 4 b  st i f fened shell .  12.94 4 
4. Incorrect boundary canditionc a r e  used. Exmp2-e : 
Fixed edge used where component j o i n s  another 
e l a s t i c  structure. 18.94' $ 
5 .  	 Finite element model i s  too coarse. Example: 
Rapid s t ress  changes at discontinuity or 
cutout not prel ic ted by model. 20.00 $ 
6. 	 Geometric idea:'-ization is  incorrect. Exarrrple : 
Sheet-stringer combination t reated as 
isotropic plate.  13.59 $ 
7. 	 Anisotropic or inhomogeneous materials t reated 
as isotropic or honogeneous . Example : 
Composite material analyzed by methods applicable 
only t o  honogent?ous, isotropic materials. 3.76 $ 
a. Other discrepanc:ies (Please l i s t ) .  
2.00 % 
Total: laO% 
-- ---- 
- 
. -  
- 
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PARI' G I ( B ) .  SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCRFPANCIES- I N  MATHEMATICAL MODEIS-__ 
In t h i s  part you are asked t o  ind-icate the amounts by which you 
believe the discrepancies l i s t ed  on the previous page can affect the 
difference between predicted and t e s t  strengths. The discrepancies 
are t o  be considered one at a t i m e .  You are asked t o  assume that a 
given discrepancy is  known t o  be the reason for  differences between 
predicted and t e s t  strengths. 
Please enter i n  the tables below your opinion of the percentages 
of asseniblies which you believe would f a i l  i n  each load increment due 
t o  the given discrepancy. The sum of entries i n  each table should 
t o t a l  loo$. 
Table 12. A Stress Distribution Is Assumed Instead of Calculated 
w __ - -­
(3) (4) ( 5 )  ( 6 )  (7 )  ( 8 )  (9) (10) 
70- 80- go- 100- no- 120- 130­
80 90 100 110 I20 130 140 >1b 
-
Y o u r  
Estimate of 
Percentage 0.33 10.67 15.73 25.33 24.13 12.40 5-33 3.13 0.27 
of Failures 
- .  - A - _ _  - . .- II__ 
Table 13. 	 A Linear Analysis Is Used Where a 
Nonlinear Analysis Is Closer t o  Reality 
- - -.
i- I Test Failure Inad Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
70­
80 
Percenl;&: I 1.69 1 2.13 I 8.63 
lures 
I 
-- 
- - 
-- 
2 10 

PART III(B) . SIZE OF ERRORS FROM DISCREPANCSES I N  -@THEMATICAL MODEW­~ 
(Continued) 
Table 14. Empirical Data Is Extrapolated Too Far 
- - -~ ~ _ ..- - --
I 	 Test Fa i lure  Lm,d Increment - Percent of Analysts' 
Predict ion 
(1) 	 (2) 
60­
40 70 
--__I---
Your 

Estimate of 

Percentage 0.47 1 4.59 

of Fa i lures  

*_- -i 
( 3 )  (4) ( 5 )  (6) 
70- 80- 90- loo­
80 go 100 110 
. _ _  
13.06 22.24 25.12 16.53 
Table 15. Incorrect Boundary Conditions Are Used 
~ 
Test Fai lure  Load Increment - Percent of Analysts'  
Pred ic tion __ _­
(1) ( 2 )  (3) (4) ( 5 )  ( 6 )  
60- 70- 80- 90- 100­
4 0  70 80 90 100 110 
Your 

Estimate of 

Percentage 0.53 3.06 5.82 16.12 32.71 19.53 

of Fa i lures  I
Table 16. F in i t e  Element Model Is Too Coarse 
- ____- _ _  
Test Fai lure  Load Increment - Percent of Analysts'  IPredict  ion -F­
-.. .. . . (1) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 5 )  (6) 60- 70- 9- 100-
40 70 80 100 110 
- --~ _-
Your 
Estimate of 

Percentage 0.71 4.59 13.00 22.76 30.76 15.59 

of  Failures 1 --. _ _  
.- . . 
(9) 
130­

140 

.. 
1.18 0.12 
-I 

I 
----- -- -- --- 
-- 
-- 
- -  
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__-­=III(B). S G E  OF ERRORS FROM DISCREX'ANCIES I N  MATHZMATICAL MODELS -
T~ont inued)  
Table 17. Geometric Ideal-ization 1s Tncorrect 
___L__. -..- ,_ - : - - -. ..
I 	 Test Failure Tnncrement - Prrcen-t o f  Analysts' 
Predict ion -. . . . _ _  . . . . 
(2) ( 3 )  (4) (5) 
60- 70- 80- 90­
70 80 90 100 
-
?ercentage 29.71 
I f  Fai lures
I__~_. - .  _i- ...~. 
Table 18. 	 Anisotropic or Tnhomogeneous Materials 
Treated A s  I so t ropic  or Homogeneous 
- . _ .  
Test Fa i lure  Load Increment - Percent of 
( 3 )  (4) (7) 
110­

120 

. 
Estimate of -....'-I10.9: 
-
Table 19. Other Discrepancies 
-I I
I I Test Fa i lure  Load Increment - Percent x?Analysts 1
_ _ _  
(7) 
110­1 120 u o r  -
E s t i m a t e  of 

Percentage 9.17 

. 
Check: Do your entr ies  in each table t o t a l  lo*? 
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W e  are in t e re s t ed  i n  t h e  relative cos t  of the  model and component 
development t es t  program considered i n  %his.questionnaire.  A l l  cos ts  
r e l a t ed  t o  t h e  t e s t i n g  are of i n t e r e s t  except construct ion of f a c i l i t i e s .  
Some per t inent  cos ts  are test  hardware, instrumentation, fixtures, and 
test operations.  
What would you expect such a model and component t es t  program to 
cos t ,  expressed as a percentage of a typical static s t ructural  qua l i f i ­
cat ion test program? 
50 4 
PART V. COMMENTS.~ 
End of Questionnaire B 
Please enclose i n  envelope provided and m a i l  t o :  
Dr. S. Hanagud 

School of Aerospace Engineering 

Georgia I n s t i t u t e  of Technology 

Atlanta ,  Georgia 30332 

Employer : . .  . . . .  . . . . .  _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .. .  
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Revision to Part I I ( A )  of Questionnaire A 
Please complete and return with Questionnaire B 
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PART II(A). WHAT CAUSES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PIiEDICTED AND ACTUAL FAILURE 
LOADS? 
Assume that differences of various magnitudes have been observed 

between analyst's predicted failure load and actual test failure load in 

each of 100 structural assemblies developed according to what you would 

consider typical aerospace structural development program. In the table 

below is a list of possible causes of the observed differences. 

Assume that in the sample of 100 structural assemblies you wLll 
always find one of the causes present, and that occasionally you may find 
more than one cause present. For example, scatter in material properties 
and variation of dimensions could be present in addition to an analyst's 
poor mathematical model. 
In what percentage of the tests do you believe that each of the 
causes was a contributor to the observed difference, regardless of the 
magnitude of the difference? Your entries in Table 2 can also be inter­
preted to represent how often or how frequently you think the given cause 
contributes to differences in predicted and actual strengths. Because the 
sample is concerned With all structures that differed from the analyst's
prediction, without regard for the magnitude of the differences, any one 
or more of these causes (e.g. scatter in material properties or variation 
of dimensions* or any one of the other 8 causes in the list) m y  be re­
sponsible (Hypothetically) for only small magnitudes of differences, but 
could be present in large numbers in the sample of 100. Causes 4 and 5 
are to be interpreted as normal or natural occurrences and the remaining 
causes are intended to represent errors or anomalies. Since one or more 
causes are assumed to always be present, your entries should total a 
or more. 
Table 2. Causes of Differences 

Frequency of 

Cause of Difference 

1. Analysts' mathematical model is a poor representation

of the actual structure. 

2. Analyst made a mathematical error. 

3 .  	Analyst overlooked (or failed to analyze) some 
critical area or failure mode. 
* These causes are given as examples only and should not be permitted 
0ccurrence 

moo 
8.38 $, 
24.69 4 
to influence your response. 
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Table 2. Causes of Differences (continued) 
Cause of Difference 
4. Scatter in material properties. 
5. Variation (within tolerance) of dimension. 
6. Undetected manufacturing error. 
7. 	 Test load condition did not represent flight 
condition used by analyst for prediction. (e.g., 
aerodynamic loads and boundary conditions are 
difficult to duplicate). 
8. Other causes (Please list). 
__ . - .- . . . . .... . . ... 
Total : 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
19.13 5 
16.00 $, 
5 

19.63 4 
4.69 4 
130.33 % 
2 16 

S e r i a l  Number Mean Response 
Ques t ionna i r e  C 
AEROSPACE STRUCTURES 
STRENGTH IMPROVEMENT BY DESIGN MODIFICATIONS 
AND 
LOADS EXPERLENCED BY SATURN V FLIGHT STRUCTURES 
J.  M .  THOMAS 
School o f  Aerospace Engineer ing  
Georgia  I n s t i t u t e  of Technology 
A t l a n t a ,  Georgia 30332 
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QUESTIONNAIRE C 
Questionnaire C cons is t s  of two separate  areas  of i n t e r e s t :  improvement 
i n  s t rength  of s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies gained by design modifications made 
i n  the s t ruc tu re  a f t e r  tes t  f a i l u r e s  and loads typ ica l ly  experienced by 
s t ruc tu res  i n  f l i g h t .  These areas  w i l l  be considered separately i n  
Pa r t s  I and 11. 
Par t  I. IMPROVEMENT I N  STRENGTH BY DESIGN MODIFICATIONS 
Suppose t h a t  a la rge  number of la rge  aerospace s t ruc tu ra l  assemblies, 
designed and analyzed by typ ica l  methods, have been s t a t i c  tes ted .  W e  
a r e  in te res ted  i n  the  port ion of these s t ruc tu res  t h a t  f a i l ed  a t  less 
than the  ana lys t s '  predicted f a i l u r e  load, which i s  designated a s  100% 
design ul t imate  load (DUL). Suppose t h a t  of those s t ruc tu res  f a i l i n g ,  
8% f a i l e d  between 70% and 80%, 35% fa i l ed  between 80% and 90% , and 
57% f a i l e d  between 90% and 100%of the ana lys t s '  predicted f a i l u r e  load. 
This i s  shown i n  l i n e  1 of Table 1, below. 
Now aisume t h a t  f a i l u r e  analyses of these s t ruc tu res  a r e  conducted, 
design changes a r e  made and incorporated i n  the tes t  assemblies, and 
the assemblies a r e  r e t e s t ed  and a l l  sus t a in  a t  l e a s t  100%load. 
Suppose t h a t  a new group of these assemblies i s  now b u i l t ,  and the 
same design changes incorporated i n  the test assemblies a r e  incorporated 
i n  the new bui ld .  I f  t h i s  new bui ld  of assemblies should now be tes ted ,  
what percentage would you expect t o  f a i l  i n  each load increment given 
i n  Table l ?  Enter your estimates i n  l i n e  2. Your estimates should 
t o t a l  100%. 
Table 1. Strength Improvement 
~~ 
T e s t  Fai lure  Load Increment - Percent I 
I of Analysts'  Predict ion (DUL) 1 
I 70 - 80 1 80-90 i 90-100 1 > 100 1 
i 
Percent of S t ruc tures  
Fa i l ing  F i r s t  T e s t  i n  57 ­
1 Each Increment 
Your Estimate of Per­
cent  of Redesigned 
St ruc tures  Fa i l i ng  i n  0.11 6.78 91.89 
Each Increment I 
2i a  

P a r t  11. LOARS- EXPERIENCED BY SATURN V FLIGHT- STRUCTLTReS 
W e  a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  loads experienced by l a r g e  s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies 
of the  Saturn V system i n  a c t u a l  operat ion.  Many s t r u c t u r a l  assemblies 
have more than one c r i t i c a l  design condi t ion.  I n  a l l  t h a t  follows, 
consider  t h e  maximum load experienced i n  each mission f o r  each des ign  
condi t ion  a s  one "loading" of the  s t r u c t u r e .  Of a l l  loadings experienced 
by a l l  assemblies of t h e  Saturn V launch v e h i c l e  i n  a l l  missions t o  d a t e ,  
what percentage of t h e  loadings do you b e l i e v e  f e l l  i n  each load increment 
shown i n  Table 2,  below? The Table i s  i n  terms of des ign  u l t imate  load.  
Your e n t r i e s  should t o t a l  100%. 
Table 2 .  Loads on Saturn V S t r u c t u r e s  i n  Operation 
4 30 40 50 71* 
. .  . . . .  i _ _ .  
Your Estimate of 

Percent of Struc­ 

t u r e s  Experiencing 9.22 13.78 22.11 

Loading i n  Each 

Increment 

.1 ._. . . . . . .  . . . .  
JE 71% of design u l t imate  load i s  approximately l i m i t  load.  I f  you a r e  
aware of any Saturn s t r u c t u r e s  experiencing g r e a t e r  than l i m i t  load ,  
p lease  d i s c u s s  b r i e f l y  i n  the space below. 
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APPENDIX C 
PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
This appendix gives the resul ts  of a parametric analysis which was done 
to establish the sensitivity of the probability of failure of a s t ructural  assembly 
N 
to certain variables: test option Ti’ safety index P ,  safety factor v ,  and 
coefficient of variation of load yS‘ The figures presented here are very useful 
for  determining the probability of failure for a single application of load, pf (k) , 
as given by equation ( 7 , 6 ) ,  Chapter VII. The pf(k) determined from these 
figures can then be entered into the cost model through equation (7.30) , Chapter 
VII, or  used for any other purpose for which pf (k) is required. 
The figures, in conjunction with the nomenclature in Appendix A, are 
essentially self-contained, and no detailed explanation of each figure is required. 
An outline of the method used to calculate a typical point for plotting on 
the pf(k) versus p curves follows. From the definition of the safety index, 
where (TR = yR R and = Ys s Then 
- -  
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Note that for positive values of p,  R > S . If both sides of equation ( C - 2 )  are 
squared, and the resulting equation is solved for 2, 
Interest is usually in positive values of p ,  and s and E are defined as positive 
real quantities. Note that the denominator of equation (C-3) is always less than 
unity. Therefore, if E is to be greater than s as must be the case for positive 
p ,  the numerator in brackets must also be less than unity. This implies that the 
minus sign must always be chosen in front of the radical. 
Now, beginning with an assumed test option (which uniquely determines 
- -
R and yR) ,  an assumed value of yS' and an assumed positive value of p ,  S can 
be calculated from equation (C-4). If a normal distribution of the applied load 
is assumed, then sufficient information is now available to evaluate the integral 
equation (7.6) of Chapter VII and plot one point on the pf(k) versus p curves. 
Next, additional values of P a re  assumed with the other parameters held fixed, 
and several points a r e  plotted to establish one curve. These computations are 
easily carried out on a hand calculator o r  a small computer. 
Once % has been determined from equation (C-4), the safety factor F 
consistent with the assumed value for /3 can be determined from equation (4.20) 
I: 
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of Chapter IV. To do this, a value of q must be selected, and a value of 3.0 
was selected for q for all numerical computations in this dissertation. The 
results of the parametric calculations are shown in Figures 33 through 38. 
O 
4 
I I I­
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1 2 3 4 5 
SAFETY INDEX, B 
a. Test Options Toand T,. 
3 
2 
1A 
K-

I­
u 
Y
i= 
W
2 
1 
1 2 3 4 2 3 4 5 
SAFETY INDEX, 8 SAFETY INDEX, f i  
b. Test Option TI. c. Test Option T,. 
Figure 33. Relationship of Safety Factor and Safety Index. 
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1.o 2 .o 3 .O 4.0 5.0 
SAFETY INDEX, 6 
a. yS = 0.05787. 
Figure 34. Probability of Failure versus Safety Index for 
Test Options 0, 1, and 3. 
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-1 
1.@, 	 2.Q 3.0 5.0 
SAFETY INDEX, #? 
b. y
S 
= 0.12916. 
Figure 34. (Continued). 
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1.o 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
SAFETY INDEX, f l  
c. ys = 0.37. 
Figure 34. (Concluded). 
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LL 
-5 
10 
-6
10 1 .o 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6 .O 
SAFETY INDEX, /3 
a. yS = 0.05787. 
Figure 35. Probability of Failure versus Safety Index for 
Test Option 2. 
0 
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SAFETY INDEX, fl  
b. yS = 0.12916. 
Figure 35. (Continued). 
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2 .o 3.0 4.0 
SAFETY INDEX, 
c .  ys = 0.37. 
Figure 35. (Concluded). 
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15' 
* -4
10 1.0 1.5 3.0 3.5 
SAFETY FACTOR, y" 
a. y
S 
= 0.05787. 
Figure 36. Probability of Failure versus Safety Factor for 
Test Options 0, 1, and 3. 
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10 1,o 2.0 2 0 5  
SAFETY FACTOR, 'i; 
b. yS = 0.12916. 
Figure 36. (Continued) . 
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SAFETY FACTOR, 
c. ys = 0.37. 
Figure 36. (Concluded). 
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1.o 1.5 2.o 2.5 3.0 3.5 
SAFETY FACTOR, 
a. yS = 0.05787. 
Figure 37. Probability of Failure versus Safety Factor for Test  Option 2. 
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1 .o 1.5 2.0 
SAFETY FACTOR, v" 3.0 3 
b. y
S 
= 0.12916. 
Figure 37. (Continued) . 
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Figure 37. (Concluded). 
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Figure 38. Probability of Failure ve r sus  Proof Test Level. 
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APPENDIX D 
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS 
To illustrate the method used for plotting the cost optimization curves, 
Figures 27 through 32 in Chapter VIU, sample calculations will  be performed in 
this appendix for two of the sample problems. This is accomplished by applying 
the equations of Chapter VII to data for the example problems in Table 9. 
D . l  Procedure 
A step-by-step procedure for calculating one point in the cost optimiza­
tion curves will be given. 
1. 	 List the input data from Table 9: cw, CF, CF ,CD., ys, n, m. 
P I 
2. 	 Assume a value of p. 
N 
3. From Figure 33, read the corresponding value of Y for the appro­
priate test option and ys . 
4. From the appropriate Figures 21 through 26, read the weight value 
N 
corresponding to v from step 3. 
5. Determine W(P) by subtracting the baseline weight from the weight 
determined in step 4. The baseline weight may be selected arbitrarily and the 
expected cost will  then be relative to this arbitrary baseline. In the examples 
Iy 
in this dissertation, baseline weights corresponding to v = 1.4 were used 
Iy 
except for the S-II forward skirt, where v = 1.3 was used. 
I 
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6. Calculate the cost of weight, Cw = cw W ( p ) ,  equation (7.18). W(p)  
is from step 5, and c is from the input data. 
W 
7. Read pf(k) from the appropriate Figures 34 through 38. 
8. If the calculation is for the proof test option, determine 
-
9. 	 Calculate the expected cost zf failure,  CF = CF n Pf(k) + CF mPf(P) 
P 
from equation (7.3 1). cF and CF 
a r e  input data, and pf(k) and pf(p) a r e  
P 
from steps 7 and 8, 
10, Calculate the total expected cost for this example problem from 
equation (7.32),  using CD. (direct costs) from the input data, C W from step 
J 
- ­
6, and CF from step 9: C . ( p )  = CD 
+ c
W 
+ c
F 'J j 
11. Plot a point on the expected cost versus p curve using the assum2d 
value of p from step 2 and C . ( p )  from step 10. Plot a point on the expected
J 
N N 
cost versus v curve using the value of v from step 3 and C . ( P )  f rom step 10.
J 
D. 2 Sample Calculation for S-IVB 
~ 
Aft Skirt 
____I_ 
A sample calculation for test option T, with ro= 60 wil l  be made for  the 
S-IVB 	aft skirt  using the procedure outlined in section D. 1. 
1. Input data from Table 9: cw = 11,500 dollars per  pound, CF 
= 
250 x l o6  dollars, CF = 0.72 x l o6  dollars, C = 3.28 x lo6 dollars , 7s = 
P D2 
0.12916, n = 15, and m = 15. 
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2, Assume that /3 = 3.00. 
N 
3. 	 Read v = 1,57 from Figure 33a for /3 = 3.00 and y
S 
= 0.12916. 
N 
4. From Figure 21, the S-IVB aft skir t  weight for Y = 1.57 is 
N 
W ( V  = 1.57) = 1920 lb. 
Iv N 
5. W(p) = W(V = 1.57) - W(V = 1.4) = 1920 - 1815 = 105 lb. 
6. Cw = cw W(p) = 11,500 (105) = 1,208,000 dollars. 
7. From Figure 35b, pf(k) = 3.2 X 
8. pf(p) = FR (60) = 1- e \l15*51 = 0.01472. 
9. 	 CF = C F n p f ( k )  + C F  mpf (p )  =(250X106)  (15) (3.2X10-5) 
P 
+ (0.72 X lo6) (15) (0.01472) = 279,000 dollars. 
10. 	 C2(3. 00) = CD 
+'W 
= C F 
= 3,280,000 + 1,208,000 + 279,000 
j 
= 4,767,000 dollars. 
11. The result from step 10 is plotted in Figure 27a as points A and B. 
D, 3. Sample Calculation for ET Intert-tnk 
A sample calculation for test option Ti  will be made for  the ET intertank. 
1. Input data from Table 9: c
W 
= 13,706 dollars per  pound, CF = 
125 x lo6 dollars, C = 2.0 x l o 6  dollars, yS = 0.05787, n = 445, and m = 445. 
Dl 
2. 	 Assume that /3 = 4.00. 
N 
3. 	 From Figure 33, v = 1.53 for  p = 4.00, and yS = 0.05787. 
N 
4. From Figure 23, W( u = 1.53) = 12,600 Ib. 
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N N 
5. W(p) = W(V = 1.53) - W(V = 1.4) = 12,600 - 11,600 = 1,000 lb. 

6. Cw = cw W(P) = 13,706 (1,000) = 13,706,000 dollars. 

7. From Figure 34’ Pf (k} = 5.2 X for P = 4.00, test option Ti. 

8. Not applicable for test option Ti. 

9. F = CF n pf (k) = 125 X lo6 (445) (5.2 X 
= 28.925 X lo6 

dollars. 

10. 	 C 1(4.00) = CD. + Cw + CF = 2,000,000 + 13,706,000 + 28,925,000 

J 

= 44,631,000 dollars. 
11. The result from step 10 is  plotted as points C and D in Figure 29b. 
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